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PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The use of financial derivative instruments in investment portfolios has outpaced the 
development of income tax legislation to differentiate their characterisation as either ordinary 
or capital income in South Africa. As capital income is taxed more leniently, this distinction 
has led to uncertainty in the application of the common law to diverse commercial conventions. 
This is especially applicable to derivative instruments, whose use has become commonplace in 
financial markets. Whether existing tax principles as determined by our courts can be applied 
in addressing the character of gains and losses on disposal is at issue. Can derivative 
instruments be regarded as capital assets in their own right and therefore be subject to ordinary 
determination?  
I argue for equity derivatives (EDs) as a simplifying proxy, in line with Smalberger JA’s 
determination in CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust4 that ‘transactions 
involving shares do not differ from transactions in respect of any other property and the capital 
or revenue nature of a receipt is determined in the same way whether one is dealing with land 
or shares’. 
4 CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 1992 (4) SA 39 (A), 54 SATC 271 is regarded as a leading 
case on the subject. 
vii 
METHODOLOGY 
The research for this thesis comprises four broad sections: (1) background and context on 
financial derivatives and their use within managed portfolios; (2) international accounting 
treatment; (3) legislative, regulatory and case law overview for South Africa, the United States 
of America, the United Kingdom and Australia; and (4) an approach to these instruments that 
our courts and policy makers might apply in their analysis.  
The research attempts, first, to contextualise derivatives. The general approach of the 
analysis is not dissimilar to the development of the definitions of income or capital gains tax5 
in South Africa.6 Simplifying proxies are used to limit the many variables that might be 
encountered: only equity derivatives are considered within the context of regulated, managed 
investment portfolios. The object of the research is not to determine the characterisation of the 
instruments, but to enquire where the appropriate legal analysis should rightfully begin. The 
hypothesis has been stated above.  
The critical issue is therefore whether these instruments can be treated as capital assets 
in their own right to qualify as property according to Smalberger JA’s reasoning. To this end, 
the contractual nature of derivatives and the relationship of contract rights to notions of 
property and capital are considered within the framework of the ISDA Master Agreement for 
unlisted financial derivative instruments. 
5 See SARS Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax Issue 7 (2018) 32: ‘In designing the Eighth Schedule 
reference was made to the legislation of a number of countries most notably Australia and the United Kingdom 
and to a lesser extent Canada, the United States and Ireland amongst others. Experts from Australia, the United 
Kingdom and United States provided invaluable assistance. For a number of reasons no single country’s CGT 
legislation could serve as a model for South Africa. Each country presented its own difficulties.’ 
6 See CIR v Goodrick 1942 OPD 1, 12 SATC 279 at 304: ‘When income tax was first levied in South Africa the 
definition of “income” was rather bald and sweeping, if taken according to its literal meaning, that the 
Legislature could not possibly have intended to use it in that sense. In ascertaining the meaning of the 
Legislature, therefore, our Courts invoked notions expressed in the English Acts to distinguish between moneys 
accruing upon the realization of capital assets and true income within the contemplation of the Legislature.’ 
viii 
A review of foreign legislation and case law attempts to identify the approach of 
legislators and courts in other common-law jurisdictions, given the lack of a policy framework 
and specific case law in South Africa applicable to financial derivative instruments. A 
comparative analysis is not attempted or intended. The research is concerned with how 
common-law jurisdictions have approached the distinction and whether interpretations by their 
courts align with Smalberger JA’s determination in CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share 
Purchase Trust7 that ‘transactions involving shares do not differ from transactions in respect 
of any other property’, given that this is a leading case on the subject in South Africa.  
Each jurisdiction is therefore reviewed and conclusions drawn. The assumption is that 
there can be no context distinct from the general concepts of law specific to derivatives. 
Continuity and coherency within a long tradition of case law on capital and revenue 
characterisation should be maintained. General case law on income characterisation is therefore 
included. The common-law jurisdictions of the USA, the UK and Australia were selected, 
because they share a similar general system of law.  
As would be expected, the problem underlying the cases is universal, but the responses 
are not. The development of the law cannot, however, depend on a poll of decisions and codes 
adopted in foreign jurisdictions against a background of different rules and traditions. The law 
must be developed coherently, in accordance with principle, so as to serve, even-handedly, the 
ends of justice.8 On the other hand, even within this limited grouping of jurisdictions sharing a 
similar colonial past, trying to bring systematic order to such varied contexts would seem to be 
of questionable value. Each jurisdiction is therefore reviewed separately and conclusions drawn 
in order to: 
7 1992 (4) SA 39 (A), 54 SATC 271. 
8 Per Lord Bingham in the House of Lords in 2002: Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd and Others; 
Fox v Spousal (Midlands) Ltd; Matthews v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1978) Ltd and Others 
[2002] UKHL 22 [34]. See Law Library of Congress The Impact of Foreign Law on Domestic Judgments (2010) 
30.
ix 
1. provide perspective on what these jurisdictions have achieved in clarifying income
characterisation for these instruments;
2. discover any helpful reasoning by the courts that will support or refute the findings of
Smalberger JA in CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust as a leading case
on the subject; and
3. make conclusions on tax policy development based on the above.
Three distinct policy approaches emerge: (1) a common-law approach, where the facts
and circumstances are assessed for evidence of a ‘scheme of profit-making’ as indicative of a 
revenue motive; (2) an accounting policy approach, which is followed in the UK, Australia 
and, to some extent, South Africa; and (3) a highly codified system, as evidenced in the USA, 
which seeks to unite the common law and legislation.  
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Law is an interpretive concept … which unites jurisprudence and adjudication. It makes the content of 
law depend not on special conventions or independent crusades but on more refined and concrete 
interpretations of the same legal practice it has begun to interpret … Law’s attitude is constructive: it 
aims, in the interpretive spirit, to lay principle over practice to show the best route to a better future, 
keeping the right faith with the past.1 
 
The definition of ‘gross income’ in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (the Act) excludes receipts 
or accruals of a capital nature, but includes capital gains and assessed losses on disposal in the 
Eighth Schedule of the Act. Receipts or accruals of a capital nature are not defined in the Act 
and have therefore been the subject of extensive litigation.  
The definition of gross income includes ‘the total amount in cash or otherwise, received 
by or accrued to or in favour of any person’. This amount includes ‘not only money but the 
value of every form of property earned by the taxpayer, whether corporeal or incorporeal which 
has a money value’.2 
Characterisation has depended on an examination of the facts of the case, such as the 
nature of the asset sold,3 disposal in the ordinary course of business,4 and a clearly observable 
 
1 R Dworkin Law’s Empire (1986) 410–13. 
2 See CIR v People’s Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd 52 SATC 9 at 363I–J in CSARS v KWJ Investment 
(142/2017) [2018] ZASCA 81 [24]. 
3 CIR v George Forest Timber Company 1 SATC 20, 1924 AD 516; COT v Booysen’s Estates 1918 AD 582. 
4 Natal Estates Limited v CIR 1975 (4) SA 177 (A), 37 SATC 193. 
2 
trade or business,5 ‘frequency’6 or ‘degree’,7 the nature of the asset,8 the holding period of the 
asset,9 the method of finance,10 and the reason, method and circumstances of the transaction.11 
Emslie, Davis, Hutton and Olivier12 have summarised this body of case law, citing CIR 
v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust13 as a leading case on the matter. The paramount 
test is always the intention of the taxpayer.14 The consistently applied test for distinguishing 
between capital and revenue receipts or accruals, confirmed in CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee 
Share Purchase Trust, is the inquiry whether a taxpayer was engaged in a ‘scheme of profit-
making’.15  
In a 1994 consultative document, the Tax Advisory Committee (SA) stated: 
[T]he question of the tax treatment of gains and losses on various transactions has yet to be resolved by 
our courts and this uncertainty, in particular in relation to the timing of the recognition of gains or 
losses, is hampering investment decisions by businessmen who seek certainty with regard to the tax 
consequences of any financial transactions which they may enter into.16 
 
How jurisdictions approach this distinction can be found in two general legal traditions. 
Civil law may be defined as the legal tradition that has its origin in Roman law, as codified in 
the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian,17 and as subsequently developed in Continental Europe 
 
5 ITC 1377 45 SATC 221 and Morrison v CIR 1950 (2) SA 449 (A), 16 SATC 377. 
6 Durban North Traders Ltd v CIR 21 SATC 85, 1956 (4) SA 594 (A); CIR v Nussbaum 1996 (4) SA 1156 (A), 
58 SATC 283. 
7 Natal Estates (n 4).  
8 For example, Kruger Rands produce no income and have no other economic utility. See ITC 1525 54 SATC 
209; ITC 1526 54 SATC 417; ITC 1543 54 SATC 446. 
9 ITC 1343 44 SATC 14. 
10 ITC 595 14 SATC 258; ITC 1142 32 SATC 237. 
11 African Life Investment Corporation (Pty) Ltd v SIR 1969 (4) SA 259 (A), 31 SATC 163; CIR v Nussbaum 
1996 (4) SA 1156 (A), 58 SATC 283, where the gains were both realised during strong markets. 
12 TS Emslie, DM Davis, SJ Hutton & L Olivier Income Tax: Cases and Materials (2001) 180. 
13 CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 1992 (4) SA 39 (A), 54 SATC 271. 
14 Ibid [85]. 
15 Emslie et al (n 12) 180. 
16 Tax Advisory Committee (SA) Consultative Document on the Tax Treatment of Financial Arrangements 
(1994) 1. 
17 The Corpus Juris Civilis is a four-part compilation of Roman law prepared between 528 and 534 AD by a 
commission appointed by Emperor Justinian and headed by the jurist Tribonian. The Corpus includes the Code 
(a compilation of Roman imperial decrees issued prior to Justinian’s time and still in force, arranged 
systematically according to subject matter); the Digest (or Pandects) (fragments of classical texts of Roman law 
by well-known Roman authors such as Ulpian and Paul, composed from the first to the fourth centuries AD, 
3 
and around the world. Civil law eventually divided into two streams: the codified Roman law 
(as seen in the French Civil Code of 1804 and its progeny and imitators – Continental Europe, 
Quebec and Louisiana being examples), and uncodified Roman law (as seen in Scotland and 
South Africa). Civil law is highly systematised and structured and relies on declarations of 
broad, general principles, often ignoring the details.18 
Civil-law countries (eg France and Germany) typically treat all the income based on the 
nature of the entity so that a commercial company is viewed as generating business profits that 
will include capital gains. Common-law jurisdictions (the UK, the USA and Commonwealth 
nations) make this determination based on the nature of the income.  
Common law is the legal tradition that evolved in England from the eleventh century 
onwards. Its principles appear for the most part in reported judgments, usually of the higher 
courts, in relation to specific fact situations arising in disputes that the courts have adjudicated. 
The common law is usually much more detailed than the civil law in its prescriptions. Common 
law is the foundation of private law, not only for England, Wales and Ireland, but also in 49 
US states, nine Canadian provinces, and in most countries that first received that law as 
colonies of the British Empire and that, in many cases, have preserved it as independent states 
of the British Commonwealth.19 
South Africa is regarded as having a mixed legal tradition, which includes Roman, 
Roman-Dutch and English legal influences, melded into a unified system.20 In fact, as far back 
 
arranged in 50 books subdivided into tides); the Institutes (a coherent, explanatory text serving as an 
introduction to the Digest, based on a similar and earlier work by the jurist Gaius); and the Novellae (Novels) (a 
compilation of new imperial decrees issued by Justinian himself). 
18 W Tetley ‘Mixed jurisdictions: Common law v civil law (codified and uncodified)’ (2000) 60 Louisiana Law 
Review 683. 
19 Tetley (n 18) 684. 
20 Ibid 693. 
4 
as 1887. it was noted that ‘we shall find references in the Law Reports to Roman, Dutch, 
English, American, Scotch, French, German and other authorities.’21 
Through colonization, the English common law was spread over North America, Australia and New 
Zealand, parts of Africa and Asia. In Europe, its influence has been limited to Wales, Ireland and, to a 
lesser extent, Scotland. After independence, the legal systems of the Latin American states were largely 
based on Roman law and French civil law. As from the twentieth century, this continent has seen a 
growing influence of the common law.22 
 
The USA is a common-law jurisdiction, and has relied both on a statutory definition of 
capital assets and case law, and seems to have been no more successful in achieving certainty, 
as discussed in chapters 5 and 6. The UK and Australia, discussed in chapters 7 and 8 and 9 
and 10 respectively, have turned to accounting standards to assist in the drafting of revised tax 
statutes and are facing problems of definition in the absence of appropriate and developed case 
law related to accounting standard concepts and language.  
In the 2012 Explanatory Memorandum to the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, the 
National Treasury states: 
In respect of financial instruments, the rules pertaining to income tax and financial accounting have 
completely diverged. This divergence has proven to be a challenge … From a SARS standpoint, the 
divergence between tax and accounting has become so great that accounting is often no longer a useful 
benchmark for assessing risk vis- à-vis the accuracy of taxable income.23 
 
From a tax law perspective, the test to determine whether the gain or loss is capital or 
revenue is the ‘scheme of profit-making’ test.24 The ‘Basis for Conclusions’ published under 
IFRS 9 for Hedge Accounting25 states: 
 
21 V Sampson ‘Sources of Cape law’ (1887) 4 Cape Law Journal 109 at 109–10. See F du Bois & D Visser ‘The 
influence of foreign law in South Africa’ (2003) 13 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 593.  
22 M van Hoecke Methodology of Comparative Legal Research (2015) 24. 
23 National Treasury ‘Taxation Laws Amendment Bill Explanatory Memorandum’ (2012) 57. 
24 CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 1992 (4) SA 39 (A), 54 SATC 271. 
25 IFRS Foundation, IFRS 9, Chapter 6, Hedge Accounting, Basis for Conclusions, 18. South Africa subscribes 
to accounting standards as determined by the IFRS Foundation and its standard setting body, the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). IFRS 9, which became effective in January 2015 (replacing IAS 39 and 
32), sets the standard for the recognition of financial instruments.  
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The implementation guidance accompanying IAS 39 provided the rationale for not permitting 
derivatives to be designated hedged items. It stated that derivative instruments were always 
deemed to be held for trading and measured at fair value with gains or losses recognised in profit 
or loss unless they are designated as hedging instruments.26 
However, the ‘Basis for Conclusions’ goes on to state that ‘this rationale is difficult to 
justify’ as some purchased options have been allowed under hedging rules to qualify as items 
that may be the object of a hedge. The May 2012 IASB meeting agreed that accounting for 
macro hedging would be decoupled from IFRS 9. A separate standard will be issued for macro 
hedging. However, as far back as 1998, Southern stated that derivatives should be seen as assets 
or liabilities in their own right – a distinct departure from the traditional analysis and a defining 
point of departure for this research: 
The tax treatment of derivatives comes of age when it is established and accepted that the taxation of 
derivative financial instruments (DFIs) is not to be determined by reference to the tax treatment of the 
underlying instrument to which the derivative relates. Derivatives are to be treated as assets and 
liabilities in their own right with their own tax rules. This has the consequence that hedges will be de-
recognised as hedges, in that they will be regarded as transactions in their own right, not as part of 
some larger transaction.27  
 
The current lack of certainty is characterised by the following aspects: 
1. our common-law tradition, which distinguishes between income types; 
2. the absence of comprehensive legislation on derivatives in South Africa that codifies tax 
policy; 
3. reliance on South African case law, in which there is little precedent on derivative income 
characterisation and often doubt as to how historic cases on character determination 
might be applied to these instruments; 
4. the possibility of legal certainty being undermined by varied interpretations by our courts, 
as evidenced by the experience of other countries;28 
 
26 Ibid. See page 18 para BC6.65. 
27 D Southern ‘The taxation of derivatives’ (1998) 4 British Tax Review 348–63. 
28 See the discussion of Corn Prod Ref Co v Commissioner 16 TC 395 (1951), 11 TCM (CCH) 721 (1952), 
supplemented by 20 TC 503 (1953), affirmed in part and review dismissed in part, 215 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1954), 
affirmed, 350 US 46 (1955) and Arkansas Best Corp v Comm’r 485 US 212 (1988) in chapter 6 on the USA. 
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5. the unfolding accounting treatment,29 which classifies all derivatives as ‘for profit or 
loss’, other than when used as a hedge, yet is struggling with the limitations of its 
interpretation; and 
6. an absence of recognition that derivative instruments might in themselves represent a 
capital asset (property, through the rights they confer), like the asset they reference.  
 
These uncertainties make it difficult to predict outcomes and result in significant 
uncertainty in practice.30 Smalberger JA, in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Pick ’n Pay 
Employee Share Purchase Trust clearly made the point that the tests applied by our courts are 
laid down as guidelines only: ‘There are a variety of tests for determining whether or not a 
particular receipt is one of a revenue or capital nature. They are laid down as guidelines only – 
there being no single infallible test of invariable application.’31 
  
 
29 Prior to IAS 39 (effective 2001), derivatives were often not recognised in financial statements, as they required 
little or no initial investment. IAS 39 and IAS 32 (effective 2005) have since been the accounting standards 
applicable to financial instruments. IFRS 9 replaces IAS 39 and 32, effective 2015. IFRS 9 was developed to 
simplify the treatment of financial instruments and to move towards a more principles-based approach. 
30 See the discussion under section 1.1.1 below. In 2001 the Tax Committee of the then Association of 
Collective Investments had extensive engagements with SARS about gains made on the sale of listed shares. 
SARS expressed the concern that fund managers were actively trading portfolios rather than ‘investing’. An 
opinion, styled as a Discussion Memorandum, ‘Taxation of Equity Unit Trusts on Gains made on the sale of 
listed shares’ was prepared by me and TS Emslie SC, dated 29 June 2001. The matter was successfully resolved. 
In 2006, I was called to a meeting on behalf of the Association of Collective Investments with the Financial 
Services Board to discuss how hedge funds might be included under the Collective Investment Schemes Control 
Act 45 of 2002 (CISCA), given the difficulties associated with the taxation of derivative instruments and what 
was generally seen as active management within the funds. Various options were discussed. The matter was not 
resolved and the regulatory initiative did not progress. Following the global financial crisis in 2008, the 
regulation of hedge funds was placed on the G20’s agenda of reforms. South Africa, as a member of the G20, 
undertook a comprehensive and collaborative exercise with the investment industry to find a solution under 
CISCA. This culminated with the issuance of Board Notice 52 of 2015. The taxation of gains and losses 
associated with these portfolios was settled on the basis that portfolios would be subject to a facts and 
circumstances approach at the discretion of SARS, as for any other collective investment scheme portfolio (or 
any other similar determination not covered by specific provisions in the Income Tax Act). Given that SARS 
had never challenged a regulated CIS in court for active trading, I found this outcome unsatisfactory. In the 
absence of a simplifying regulatory provision, SARS was placed in an invidious position, investors were 
subjected to uncertainty and potential tax liability, and financial service providers were unfairly prejudiced as 
they have to provide assurance to clients about tax certainty. What was intended as an equitable outcome had in 
fact increased uncertainty. 
31 CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 1992 (4) SA 39 (A) at 56. 
7 
1.1.1 Recent practical examples of attempts to improve certainty 
After an initial submission in 2016 and meeting with the Davis Tax Committee on 31 October 
2017 on behalf of the Association for Savings and Investment SA (ASISA), I prepared a 
submission for the Davis Tax Committee dated 30 November 2017, where research for this 
thesis informed a motivation for the establishment of a technical committee to develop an 
approach to the treatment of financial derivative instruments. The committee’s response is cited 
in detail below in its report on the corporate income tax system.32 
 
The DTC considered the various elements of taxation within the financial sector in compliance with its 
terms of reference contained in the 2013 Budget Review (page 63). The aspects relating to financial 
services have been dealt with in various DTC reports including the BEPS report, and in particular 
Action 2 titled ‘Neutralise the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements’ and Action 4 titled ‘Limit base 
erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments’ … 
 
Having said that, the below-mentioned submissions are worth mentioning based on the specificity of 
their contents. The Association for Savings and Investment South Africa (ASISA) made a submission 
that provides a comprehensive analysis of the current uncertainty within the South African market and 
international treatment of financial instruments from a capital versus revenue perspective, as well as a 
number of suggested ways available for handling this issue. ASISA concludes as follows: 
 
- There is no conceptual difference between buying a financial instrument (like a share) and 
entering a derivative contract that replicates ownership. 
- Derivatives are financial instruments in their own right and gains or losses therefrom might be 
capital or revenue. 
- Ordinary principles of interpretation should be applied, with due regard to what the parties 
contracted, within the context of their commercial agreement. 
The nature of derivative instruments is not defined by ‘hedging’. 
- There is no conceptual difference between a long and a short position. Facts and circumstances 
associated with those positions determine their nature. 
- Multi-derivative or hybrid strategies should not be unbundled, but considered as unitary intent 
subject to ordinary principles. 
- Transactions within a portfolio should not be viewed in isolation of each other, but within the 
entirety of the investment mandate … 
 
32 Davis Tax Committee Report on the Efficiency of the Corporate Income Tax System (2018) 92, 93. 
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ASISA’s recommendation is that a focus group between industry, the South African Revenue Service 
and National Treasury should be set up to reach some final views from a policy perspective. The DTC 
supports the formation of a focus group and has forwarded the ASISA and Mr Da Silva’s submissions 
to the National Treasury for further consideration. 
 
Following the issuance of the DTC report and an expectation that a technical work 
group would be established to consider a workable solution, the 2018 draft Taxation Laws 
Amendment Bill (TLAB), published for comment on 16 July 2018, included a surprise proposal 
that all gains and losses derived from the disposal of financial instruments within 12 months of 
their acquisition in Collective Investment Scheme (CIS) portfolios be deemed income of a 
revenue nature and therefore taxed at unit holder’s marginal rates. This was a direct policy 
import from the USA, where such a rule exists across the tax system, as part of a two-tier capital 
tax rate regime. However, in this proposal it was to be applied selectively to CIS and the 
distinction was not to be a short- or long-term capital gains tax rate, but a CGT or ordinary 
marginal tax rate – i.e. a re-characterisation. The practice in South Africa since the inception 
of the CIS industry has been to treat all transactions as capital. These gains and losses were 
exempt from all income tax prior to the introduction of capital gains tax (CGT) in 2001. Since 
2001, gains and losses have been included in unit holder’s ordinary income at the CGT 
inclusion rate when units are redeemed. Accruals on capital account are deferred until 
redemption and then included in declared income by the taxpayer upon redemption.   
Following the proposed 2018 TLAB amendment, all transactions in instruments held 
for less than 13 months would attract maximum marginal rates applicable to individual 
taxpayers (up to 45 per cent). This would affect not only share selection transactions, but also 
transactions generated to meet redemption requests, rebalancing, all derivative hedging, and 
portfolio optimising transactions. The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Bill 
motivated the reason for the policy change as follows: 
It has come to Government’s attention that some CIS are in effect generating profits from the active 
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frequent trading of shares and other financial instruments. These CIS argue that the profits are of a 
capital nature. They base this argument on the intention of long term investors in the CIS.  
 
The fact that the determination of capital or revenue distinction is not explicitly stated in the Act and 
reliance is based on facts and circumstances as well as the case law has led to different application of the 
law and this has resulted in an uneven playing field regarding the taxation of CIS. 
 
The proposal was broadly objected to by the tax fraternity as inequitable. After having 
several meetings with the National Treasury and SARS, and an appearance before Parliament’s 
Standing Committee on Finance, the proposal was withdrawn, pending further work that would 
be conducted in conjunction with financial institutions and other professional tax advisory 
firms. The situation remains unchanged as at the date of writing. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
In the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) ‘Report on the Tax 
Treatment of Futures and Options’ dated 23 October 1992,33 the association states that ‘two 
main problems are encountered with the taxation of financial futures and options … The first 
problem relates to the capital/revenue distinction, i.e. can derivative instruments be regarded 
as capital assets?’,34 to which is added later, ‘in their own right’.35 Brincker by his own 
admission ventures a generalisation that ‘speculation would be of a revenue nature and 
synthetic investments would be of a capital nature’.36 The latter was a bold statement at the 
time, answering the SAICA question in the affirmative and in keeping with the findings of 
this research. The SAICA report goes on to state: ‘The real issue therefore seems to be 
whether existing tax principles are capable of effectively addressing the capital/revenue 
 
33 South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) Report on the Tax Treatment of Futures and 
Options 5. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid 22. 
36 TE Brincker Taxation Principles of Interest and other Financing Transactions Issue 4 (2011) W-6-2 and W-
6-3. 
10 
distinction arising from these new financial instruments, or whether new rules need to be 
devised to cater for these new instruments.’37 
One of the pragmatic policy approaches for addressing the characterisation of these 
instruments is to use accounting standards. This aligns financial reporting with the tax 
outcome and ensures that the two remain synchronised. Section 24JB of the Act is an 
example of this approach, where IFRS is referenced in tax legislation. 
A review of the literature on financial derivatives indicates that both in Australia and 
the UK there is dissatisfaction with the consequences of a transliteration from accounting 
policy into tax law. The two disciplines of accounting and tax law serve different purposes, 
yet need to be understood together since they coexist in the commercial world. However, 
analysis demands that logic is not coloured by propositions that are inaccurately inferred. The 
departure point has to be a legal one.  
What then is the correct legal departure point for assessing the tax character of 
financial derivative instruments? Is the often short duration of derivative contracts indicative 
of revenue character, according to the logic of Barnato Holdings Ltd v SIR38 because it is 
presumed they are always ‘bought for sale’ or considered not to be of a capital nature? 
According to the SARS Tax Guide for Share Owners,39 ‘[t]he sale of futures contracts is 
likely to be on revenue account, even if used as a hedge against losses on underlying shares 
held as capital assets (ITC 1756; Wisdom v Chamberlain (Inspector of Taxes)).40 The 
implication is that if the share type produces ‘nil’ dividends it is unlikely to be considered 
capital in nature, regardless of its purpose.  
 
37 SAICA (n 33) 6. 
38 Barnato Holdings Ltd v SIR 1978 (2) SA 440 (A), 40 SATC 75.   
39 South African Revenue Service Tax Guide for Share Owners Issue 6 (2018) paras 3.3.3 and 3.4.6. 
40 Footnotes omitted. Wisdom v Chamberlain involved silver ingots held in a safe as a hedge, regarded by the 
court as a trading adventure. SARS states that ‘[t]he proceeds are more likely to be of a revenue nature when the 
type of share purchased does not produce dividends’. See South African Revenue Service Tax Guide for Share 
Owners Issue 6 (2018) at 3.4.6. 
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The question that thus arises is the following: Can these contracts, these financial 
derivative instruments, be considered to be assets in their own right and the income arising 
from them being characterised as capital or revenue, within established South African case 
law? 
1.3 APPROACH OF THE THESIS 
This thesis seeks to answer this question. It does so by applying two simplifying proxies to the 
determination of whether the income from derivative instruments is capital or revenue. First, it 
considers the use of derivative instruments in regulated investment portfolios only, where 
professional portfolio managers purport to be using the derivatives for investment and are 
subject to legislation and the regulation of their activities. Second, it tests the issue of 
characterisation against only one class of derivative, namely equity derivatives (EDs), as a 
means of limiting a complicated and almost limitless set of variables. These two simplifying 
proxies will enable an analysis unencumbered by the many contingencies that so easily divert 
logic. If this endeavour is successful, it fractures an overly generalised logic that these 
instruments are always ‘bought for sale’ (which is to define the tax nature through a generalised 
assumption based on intent or function which is the same for all taxpayers) or, as the accounting 
profession has held, ‘for profit and loss – other than when used as a hedge’, where it would 
seem that the exception proves the point. 
This thesis does not address the use of financial derivatives within regulated investment 
portfolios per se. The thesis does not seek any special convention in thinking. It has to be 
agnostic to any special conventions that apply to the regulated savings system, which in most 
jurisdictions receives favourable policy treatment because saving serves a national purpose – 
increasing saving stocks that can be used for investment in the economy and diminishing 
dependency on the state. Regulated investment portfolios have been selected as a proxy for the 
legal analysis because the context provides a simplified and, in theory at least, a ‘sanitised’ 
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environment within which to consider the merits of what a departure point for the taxation of 
these instruments should be. These portfolios also demonstrate that an investment decision that 
was considered capital in nature and included in taxable income at the relevant inclusion rate 
(40 per cent for natural persons and 80 per cent for companies and trusts) could retrospectively 
be liable for tax at a much higher marginal tax rate (45 per cent) for individuals, given the 
distinction South Africa makes between the taxation of revenue and capital. This distinction 
represents a differential of 27 per cent for natural persons paying tax at the maximum marginal 
rate.  
A logically reasoned policy or judicial outcome as to character determination should be 
based on the legal nature of these instruments, regardless of where and how they are used. This 
is the central objective of this research. What should be avoided is a definition based on pre-
conceived opinions or public choice theory, that is ‘legislation [that] may be little more than a 
series of “deals” between legislators and interest groups, having no definable public purpose, 
at all’, rather than the more idealistic notion that ‘unless the contrary unmistakably appears, 
that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes 
reasonably’.41 
When I use a word, Humpty Dumpty said …, it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor 
less. The question is, said Alice, whether you can make words mean so many different things. The 
question is, said Humpty Dumpty, which is to be master – that’s all.42 
 
My approach has therefore been to choose other jurisdictions that have progressed further 
on the topic of derivative taxation. Three distinct policy approaches emerge: (1) a common-
law approach, where the facts and circumstances are assessed for evidence of a ‘scheme of 
 
41 See M Livingston ‘Practical reason, “purposivism”, and the interpretation of tax statutes’ (1996) 51 Tax Law 
Review 677. 
42 Lewis Carroll Through the Looking Glass ch VI at 238 (1946 ed). See WT Plumb ‘The Federal Income Tax 
significance of corporate debt: A critical analysis and a proposal’ (1972) 26 Tax Law Review 369. 
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profit-making’ as indicative of a revenue motive; (2) an accounting policy approach, which is 
followed in the UK, Australia, and, to some extent, in South Africa; and (3) a highly codified 
system, as evidenced in the USA, which tries to unite features of the common law with 
legislation.  
The USA has a long history of taxing capital gains and mainly using anti-avoidance 
measures to limit tax abuse through derivatives. Given the USA’s common-law tradition and 
its leading role in the global financial system, its learnings are of great value. Codification and 
its limitations, demonstrated by the endless litigation in the US courts, must provide a 
forewarning for the selection of South African tax policy design. The UK and Australia have 
struggled with their embrace of accounting convention as a remedy for uniting commercial 
praxis with tax policy. Their common-law traditions make for sound comparisons with South 
Africa, given that our courts often follow the jurisprudence of their courts. The task of trying 
to extract lessons for derivative characterisation within the broader context of capital treatment 
within these jurisdictions that have similar legal systems does not allow for the consideration 
of civil-law jurisdictions, which might well provide further perspectives. As the research is 
mainly legal, and therefore reliant on a distinction in the way capital is taxed in common-law 
jurisdictions, this limitation seems satisfactory within the confines of a thesis. 
The chapters that follow therefore consider: (1) relevant tax legislation; (2) accounting 
treatment; (3) general case law on capital treatment; and (4) leading case law specific to 
financial derivative instruments for each of the selected jurisdictions.  
The first issue is therefore the relationship of the instrument with the underlying security, 
limited here to ‘equity’. The second aspect is whether tax law should treat the derivative in the 
same manner as the tax of the underlying security (economic equivalence). A third issue is 
whether the differences between derivatives and the underlying shares reflect a substantively 
different subject that requires a different tax result. To this end, the contractual nature of 
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derivatives and the relation of contract rights to notions of property and capital are considered, 
as well as the courts’ approach to the interpretation of these contracts. I submit a uniform 
method of construction and a simplification of the propositions that belong to the logic of 
character determination for these instruments. Using equity derivatives as the cornerstone, the 
totality of propositions is defined. 
Insolvency case law in the UK related to the Lehman Brothers collapse following the 
global financial crisis in 2008/2009 guided this research to its conclusion – that the rights 
conferred through derivative contracts are property rights and that financial derivatives should 
therefore be treated as assets or liabilities in their own right and should not be defined with 
reference to any underlying asset or specified use, such as ‘hedging’. It is therefore submitted 
that their treatment should accord with the leading judgment on the subject, CIR v Pick ’n Pay 
Employee Share Purchase Trust.43  
The conclusions reached in this research will not spare the legal analyst from the 
obscurity of the borderline that distinguishes capital and revenue determination for any asset. 
This research merely presents an interpretative basis from which to begin. The conclusions, it 
is submitted, provide continuity with the developing literature and established South African 
case law, and suggest a starting point for policy formulation.
 




A SHORT DEFINITIONAL INTRODUCTION AND EXPLANATION OF 
EQUITY DERIVATIVES AND THEIR USE IN INVESTMENT 
PORTFOLIOS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Claudius Ptolemy was the second-century astronomer who created a model of the heavens that 
predicted the positions of the sun, moon and planets, and was used for over 1,400 years. There was one 
problem with his universe, however: The earth was in the middle. How could a model that was simply 
wrong provide sufficient accuracy to be used by Western civilisation for over 14 centuries? The answer 
is: With a great deal of complexity. To explain and predict heliocentric planetary patterns in a 
geometric model, Ptolemy’s planets travelled in a series of ellipses or epicycles around the earth. But 
this alone was insufficient. To correct further, Ptolemy had the planets move closer and then further 
away from the earth, and even slow down and reverse in their orbits. Our federal system for taxing 
financial instruments is truly Ptolemaic.1 
 
This research topic presented a unique opportunity to study controversial and abstract subject 
matter. This requires a dispassionate consideration of the facts, but also an appreciation of the 
historic, socio-economic and legal contexts. At first I seemed to have little guidance upon 
which to proceed. This was especially true for South Africa as a jurisdiction. However, a wider 
reading soon revealed that things were not as new as they seemed, or as well defined or 
consistent as one might have hoped. Time proves to be an essential ingredient in the tradition 
of interpretation. It reminds us how society viewed matters through very different lenses not 
that long ago and that our own sense of correctness in the present could consequently also be 
partial. It is not possible to attempt a treatment of the contingency of law, other than to make 
the reader aware that such a consciousness needs to be present in a contextual reading of the 
 
1 David Miller, in his testimony to the Senate Finance Committee, described the US rules-based tax code on 
derivatives. See David Miller ‘Toward an economic model for the taxation of derivatives and other financial 
instruments’ (2013) 3 Harvard Business Law Review 108. 
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analysis that follows. It is essential to be sensitive and yet on guard in order to assign the correct 
measure of emphasis to sentiments that shape and influence a sense of social reality, 
interpretation and judgments within societies. As Phillips has explained: 
[L]egal history teaches us about the contingency of the law, about the fact that law is not a set of 
abstract ahistorical and universal principles, it does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, it is formed by, and 
exists within, human societies, and its forms and principles, and changes to them, are rationally 
connected to those particular societies. … I think it is useful, both to illustrate this point about 
contingency and to show how relatively new this idea is, to contrast the legal history we are familiar 
with today with the situation prior to the 1970s … As English legal historian, David Sugarman, has 
recently put it, prior to the 1970s English legal history in the twentieth century was narrow and 
parochial, ‘preoccupied with the origins of legal doctrines and institutions, emphasizing continuity and 
de-emphasizing change and contingency’. Its subjects were limited to courts, judges and legal doctrine, 
its preoccupations were in the ‘origins’ of those subjects, its explanatory tools mostly internal to the 
legal system itself, and it emphasised continuity with the past ….2 
 
2.2 SOCIETAL SENTIMENT 
Derivatives are burdened by the notoriety of their users. A long list of spectacular crises 
includes losses in 1993 and 1994 by institutions such as the German company 
Metallgesellschaft,3 the US companies Procter and Gamble4 and Gibson Greetings,5 and the 
British Barings Bank.6 One of the USA’s most prosperous municipalities, Orange County 
California, became bankrupt in 1994. In 1998, the hedge fund Long-Term Capital collapsed.7 
In 2003 and 2008, South African Airways (SAA) reported losses of R6 billion and R1 billion 
respectively, attributed to the use of derivatives in the hedging of currency and oil prices. The 
world has experienced the damaging effects of the financial crisis of 2008. The cataclysmic 
 
2 J Phillips ‘Why legal history matters’ (2010) 41 VUWLR 293 at 295. He makes the case for why legal history 
matters for both lawyers and historians and argues for a continued contextual approach to the study of legal 
history. 
3 Losses through its US subsidiary as a result of oil derivatives requiring a $2 billion bailout. 
4 $157 million loss through interest rate swap agreements entered into with Bankers Trust. 
5 $23 million loss incurred by engaging in derivative transactions with Bankers Trust. 
6 $950 million in losses resulted in the collapse of the oldest British investment firm through the actions of its 
trader, Nicholas Leeson, in its Singapore office. 
7 For these examples, see Steven D Conlon & Vincent Aquilino Principles of Financial Derivatives, US and 
International Taxation (2000) A1.01[2] nn 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. 
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failure of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc triggered the crisis. The disappearance of insurers 
such as AIG,8 Ambac, MBIA and others followed, enabled by derivatives that facilitated the 
build-up of systemic leverage. As Berd stated, ‘[i]n essence, the over-the-counter (OTC) 
market, instead of dispersing the counterparty risk of market participants, concentrated it in the 
hands of intermediaries and thus transformed it into pseudo-systemic risk.’9 
The cost to societies is significant, from taxpayers who had to repair the chasm in the 
finances of the Orange County municipality to the estimated one million people who lost their 
jobs in South Africa after 2008. Second-round effects included the cost of further regulation 
and capital requirements within banks and insurers (Basel III10 and Solvency II (in South 
Africa, the Solvency Assessment and Management framework or ‘SAM’)),11 which again 
increase costs for users of the financial system. These events affect all aspects of public 
sentiment.  
A comparative analogy is the development of societal sentiment and legal reasoning 
about something that is now regarded as settled within the understanding of finance – the 
concept of charging interest for the use of another’s money. The great Roman-Dutch jurist 
Gerard Noodt (1647–1725) devoted much of his productive life to the study of interest as the 
‘life blood of finance’. His resulting treatise De Foenore et Usuris Libri Tres (The Three Books 
on Interest-Bearing Loans and Interest) contains the following remark in his preface: 
Yet strangely enough no other issue has to the same extent been subject to contradictory judgments of 
men. For interest was at one time held to be just and honourable, at another godless and disgraceful – 
let alone amongst the masses … but also amongst intelligent people of excellent reputation and highly 
 
8 See AM Berd Lessons from the Financial Crisis (2010) xxvii: ‘In some cases, such as AIG, with its “iron-
clad” AAA ratings, there were no margins required whatsoever, making even a transaction earning a few basis 
points a winning trade, given virtually infinite leverage … The resulting margin calls appeared to be so severe 
precisely because any reasonable margin requirement is infinitely large when compared to zero, … (unless of 
course they have the internal discipline to set aside sufficient cash reserves and self-insure, like Warren Buffet’s 
Berkshire Hathaway is used to doing).’ 
9 Ibid xxvi. 
10 There have been three Basel Accords, referred to as Basel I (adopted in 1988), Basel II (2004) and Basel III 
(rules published in December 2010). 
11 The SAM regulations are intended to align the South African insurance industry with international standards. 
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regarded dignity. And yet this unfavourable view was due not to interest itself but to the men who 
exploited interest-bearing loans and interest. What aggravated the misconception was the fact that those 
men who wanted to regulate by discipline the mores of other people with the intention of censuring 
worldly vices, sometimes – as usually happens – drew in the reins more tightly than occasion 
demanded, through ignorance of reasoning that controls human endeavours, the most that was achieved 
was that interest-bearing loans and interest were forbidden. And yet the most severe laws and 
punishments could not prevent the utilisation of money ….12 
 
Aristotle expressed the following sentiment: 
But that [usura] which consists of the bartering of money is deservedly censured (since it is not 
consonant with nature, since in this case one person is hunting for profit from another); the whole 
system of moneylending is with very good reason hated by all, because profit is sought from the money 
itself and they do not acquire it for the purpose it was created; for it came into existence for the sake of 
the exchange, but foenus13 increases and multiplies it; … an offspring of money. For that reason of all 
the means of seeking to acquire money, this is the one that is most seriously inconsistent with nature.14 
 
2.2.1 Anecdotal examples of public sentiment about derivatives 
Abbott LCJ, in his 1826 decision in Bryan v Lewis, expressed a similar difficulty with the 
nature of a derivative instrument. The plaintiff had sold a quantity of nutmegs to the defendant, 
to be delivered on 9 March. When delivery was tendered the defendant was unable to pay. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff had expended money to purchase the nutmegs for 
delivery, Abbott LCJ held that the contract was unenforceable: 
I have always thought, and will continue to think, until I am told by the House of Lords that I am 
wrong, that if a man sells goods to be delivered on a future day, and neither has the goods at the time, 
nor has entered into any prior contract to buy them, nor has any reasonable expectation of receiving 
them by consignment, but means to go into the market and to buy the goods which he has contracted to 
deliver, he cannot maintain an action upon such a contract. Such a contract amounts, on the part of a 
vendor, to a wager on the price of a commodity, and is attended with the most mischievous 
consequence.15  
 
12 G Noodt, SJ van Niekerk et al The Three Books on Interest-Bearing Loans and Interest (Foenus et Usurae) 
(2009) 3. 
13 ‘[W]henever something was owed in terms of an agreement, it was to be called foenus, but usura if it was 
delivered either according to that agreement or in accordance with judicial discretion’. Ibid 25. 
14 Ibid 27. 
15 Ry & Moody KB (1826) 386–7, quoted in EJ Swan Building the Global Market: A 4000 Year History of 
Derivatives (2000) 208 nn 58 and 59. 
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Even though it was pointed out to Abbott by counsel for the defendant that this would 
have a profound effect on the Royal Exchange, he was firm in his view. Ten years later, in 
Wells v Porter, this view of the law was called doubtful.16 But this view was disapproved of 
only in 1839, and overruled in 1874.17  
In a speech at the Worshipful Company of International Bankers dinner on 24 September 
2008, the Archbishop of York criticised the use of equity derivatives in a short selling strategy18 
– a view not unlike that expressed by Abbott LCJ, 183 years earlier: ‘To a bystander like me, 
those who made £190 million deliberately underselling the shares of HSBOS, in spite of its 
very strong capital base, and drove it into the bosom of Lloyds TSB Bank, are clearly bank 
robbers and asset strippers.’19 
Yet, the economist and central banker Alan Greenspan, a proponent of free markets, 
would refer to derivatives as essential distributors of risk to those who could bear the risk (and 
therefore they were a public good):  
A market vehicle for transferring risk away … can be critical for economic stability … The buffering 
power of these instruments was vividly demonstrated between 1998 and 2001, when CDSs [Credit 
Default Swaps] were used to spread the risk of $1 trillion in loans to rapidly expanding 
telecommunications networks. Though a large proportion of these ventures defaulted in the tech bust, 
not a single major lending institution ran into trouble as a consequence.20 
 
16 In examining the development of law applicable to speculative contracts, Swan (n 15) 78 and 79 provided a 
stark contrast to Abbott’s decision from Roman law in the second century AD. In the second century AD, 
Sextus Pomponius wrote a 36-book commentary of the jus civile entitled ad Sabinum. In Sabinus, Book 9, he 
identified and distinguished between two kinds of valid contracts for future delivery. The first type, vendito re 
speratae, included contracts that promised for future delivery such things as future crops. The second, vendito 
spei, was essentially a sale of whatever proceeds a speculative venture returned. The important legal distinction 
between them was that the first kind was void if the goods failed to materialise (no crop), but the second was 
valid regardless of whether the venture yielded any proceeds or not. Pomponius wrote: ‘Sometimes, indeed, 
there is held to be a sale even without a thing, as where what is bought is, as it were, a chance. This is the case 
with the purchase of a catch of birds or fish or of largesse showered down. The contract is valid even if nothing 
results, because it is a purchase of an expectancy and, in the case of largesse, if there is eviction from what is 
caught, no purchase proceedings will lie, because the parties are deemed to have contracted on that basis.’  
17 Thacker v Hardy 4 QBD 685 (1878), quoted in Swan (n 15) 208 n 64. 
18 When you borrow an asset to ‘sell it short’ in the expectation that its price will decline. 
19 E Parker Equity Derivatives, Documenting and Understanding Equity Derivative Products 7. 
20 A Greenspan Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence, Adventures in a New World (2007) 371, 372. 
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These sentiments, much more broadly expressed in a full reading of his autobiography, 
were published in 2007 just before the financial crisis erupted, caused specifically by Credit 
Default Swaps (CDSs), which are a credit derivative. This time the world entered ‘the Great 
Recession’ as the crisis has been called. The financial crisis of 2008 demonstrated the powerful 
combination of leverage (or gearing) enabled by bank balance sheets coupled with the use of 
derivative instruments – a cost that ultimately came to be borne by society itself through job 
losses, higher public debt and increasing taxes. However, it was not the instruments themselves 
that caused the crisis, but the way in which they were used.  
The 2011 Nobel Laureate in Economics, Joseph Stiglitz, described Alan Greenspan as 
the ‘high priest’ of an ideology that led to the crisis. He described Greenspan in this way not 
for his understanding of the function of financial derivatives, but because of his liberal 
approach to the regulation of financial markets. Like Noodt, Stiglitz pointed to failed morality, 
rather than financial instruments: ‘When we tax the returns to speculation at much lower rates 
than the income of those who work hard for an income, not only do we encourage more young 
people to go into speculation, but we say, in effect, that as a society we value speculation more 
highly.’21 
In 2002, the renowned investor Warren Buffet wrote a letter to shareholders in the 2002 
Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report where he set out his view of derivatives: ‘Indeed, at 
Berkshire, I sometimes engage in large-scale derivative transactions in order to facilitate certain 
investment strategies’. But then he issued a stern warning about the dangers of misuse:  
In fact, the reinsurance and derivatives businesses are similar: Like Hell, both are easy to enter and 
almost impossible to exit … When … I finish reading the long footnotes detailing the derivatives 
activities of major banks, the only thing we understand is that we don’t understand how much risk the 
institution is running …. In our view … derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying 
dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.22 
 
21 JE Stiglitz Freefall, Free Markets and the Sinking of the Global Economy (2010) 278. 
22 Ibid 217. 
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An analysis by the US Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation defined derivatives as 
‘a wager with respect to the change in price or yield of an underlier’.23 The Companies and 
Securities Advisory Committee in Australia24 opened their 1995 report with the following 
illustrative quote: 
Futures and commodity options trading is among humanity’s more impenetrable concepts. It involves 
selling what one does not own and, as a rule, buying what one does not want. It is deeply shrouded in 
terminology that conceals its meaning. It operates in an arena where opinion is everything, where 
supply and demand are hard to distinguish from supposition and doctrine, and where inherent 
uncertainty has spawned an endless holy war between two religious-sounding antagonists, the 
‘fundamentalists’ and the ‘chartists’, not to mention the new breed of computer-dependent faithful. Into 
this world comes the general public, eager to enjoy its riches and often unprepared to become its poor.25 
 
And so with derivatives, not unlike interest, a tension springs from the concern that it is 
money serving itself, rather than its natural purpose. The tools of trade have themselves become 
the object of trade. This is referred to by some as an over ‘financialisation’ of economies, 
whereby financial services and their instruments exceed their social good; and where engineers, 
rather than designing and supervising the instruments of production, are bought at great price 
to mathematically construct derivative products for investment banks to on-sell to clients at 
rich margins. The topic could be debated endlessly. If the intent is purely speculative, the 
contracts introduce new risks for society. If they are used to hedge out existing risks, they net-
off such specified risks between those that cannot bear them and a counterparty that is willing 
to bear that risk. 
My intention, therefore, is to apply legal reasoning to validate established law amidst 
much contextual complexity in society. 
 
23 Joint Committee on Taxation ‘Present Law and Analysis Relating to the Tax Treatment of Derivatives, 
Scheduled for a Public Hearing before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the House Committee 
on Ways and Means on 5 March 2008’ 2. 
24 The Companies and Securities Advisory Committee (the Advisory Committee) was established under Part 9 
of the Australian Securities Commission Act 1989 (the ASC Act). 
25 PM Johnson & TL Hazen Commodities Regulation vol III 2 ed (1989) 155, cited in Companies and Securities 
Advisory, 1995, Law of Derivatives, International Comparison, at viii. 
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2.3 OVERVIEW OF THE MODERN LEGAL AND REGULATORY CONTEXT 
There is a growing awareness that derivatives, although not referred to as such, have a 
much longer history than has been popularly thought. Kummer and Pauletto described their 
origins in Roman law as follows: 
Under Roman law, two types of forwards could be identified. The first was a promise for future 
delivery of goods at the delivery date and the second was a purchase of ‘expectancy’ as a Roman 
lawyer wrote in the second century AD. The legal difference between the two was that the first was 
void if the delivery of goods failed to materialise, but the second was valid even if the seller could not 
deliver on the promise. In this case, Roman law would enforce the intentions of the parties, even if they 
were speculative. Roman law had influence on derivatives trading and regulation for centuries, but its 
main contribution to the development of derivatives markets in Continental Europe, in the UK and later 
in the United States of America (USA) was the greatest barrier set by the Romans’ own use of 
derivatives. In early Roman law, the transferability of the rights and obligations of contracts was not 
legally recognised. Assignment of contracts only became recognised by the end of the Empire.26 
 
The concept of a ‘sale of a promise’ seems to be as old as trade itself, yet the physical 
non-delivery alternative as a means of honouring that promise, that is, by way of cash, resulted 
in these contracts, instruments or obligations being construed as the wagering of a bet on price 
movements. Even in relatively modern times, courts and regulators tried to rule against them 
as undesirable and unwanted. By way of introduction, I include historical context provided 
largely by Swan for two jurisdictions central to the development of financial markets: the UK 
and the USA. A review of current regulation is included for each individual jurisdiction when 
it is examined in this thesis.  
2.3.1 Early developments in the United Kingdom 
In 1845 the British Parliament introduced the Gaming Act, which sought to protect the public. 
The Act effectively ‘took away all cognizance of wagers from the Courts of law’.27 The 
 
26 Paper presented to the European Free Trade Association, Seminar on Regulation of Derivatives Markets, 
Zurich, 3 May 2012, citing Swan (n 15) 75–84 and 284–6. 
27 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates (3rd series), vol 82 (4 July – 9 August 1845) 794, quoted in Swan (n 15) 211 
n 85. 
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Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 contains a specific exclusion in section 412(1) which 
states that these instruments are ‘void or unenforceable because of s. 18 of the Gaming Act 
1845’,28 to avoid a contention that ‘two persons, professing to hold opposite views touching 
the issue of a future uncertain event, mutually agree that, dependent upon the determination of 
that event, one shall win from the other … a sum of money.’29 
The importance of this Act was not only its repressive effect on the development of the 
trading of derivatives in the UK and the USA, but also the fact that it led to the ‘intent test’,30 
which continues to play an important role in UK, US and South African law. The US Supreme 
Court endorsed the intent test in 1884 in Irwin v Willar.31 Matthews J wrote for the majority as 
follows: 
A contract for the sale of goods to be delivered at a future day is valid … when the parties really intend 
and agree that the goods are to be delivered by the seller and the price to be paid by the buyer; and, if 
under the guise of such a contract, the real intent be merely to speculate in the rise and fall of prices, 
and the goods are not to be delivered, but one party is to pay to the other the difference between the 
contract price and the market price of the goods at the date fixed for executing the contract, then the 
whole transaction constitutes nothing more than a wager, and is null and void.32 
2.3.2 Early developments in the United States of America  
Following the American Revolution, the individual states developed their own legislation, 
based on English law. In 1812, New York was the first state to regulate against the sale of 
securities that the seller did not own at the time. The short sale of natural resource commodities 
was, however, still enforceable. States such as Massachusetts, Missouri, Pennsylvania and 
Illinois followed with their own legislation.  
 
28 Ibid. 
29 Carlill v The Carbolic Smoke Ball Company (1892) 2 QB 484 at 490, per Hawkins J. 
30 In Grizewood v Blane 11 CB 526 (20 November 1851) this test was explained and applied. See Swan (n 15) at 
212, 213 and n 91. 
31 110 US 499 (1884). 
32 Irwin v Willar 110 US 499 (1884) 508–9, quoted in Swan (n 15) at 239 n 85. 
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The ‘intent test’ applied in Grizewood v Blane33 had its impact in the USA as well, with 
courts applying it and many states writing its principles into statute. The irony of this 
application, however, was that the Grizewood decision was based on the Gaming Act 1845 and 
not on the common law.34 
In the late 1800s several states legislated against futures (most on the basis of non-
delivery), including California (1879), Mississippi (1882), Tennessee, Arkansas, South 
Carolina (all in 1883), Texas (1885), Iowa (1886), Michigan (1887), Missouri (1889), 
Massachusetts (1890), North Dakota (1890), Louisiana (1898) and Ohio (1882). The legislation 
imposed fines or jail terms.35 
In an 1896 report, strong interest was expressed in developments in Germany where 
similar sentiments against futures had resulted in repressive legislation: 
Germany, under the pressure of the Agrarian party, has undertaken what other nations have been 
desirous of doing, viz. to check speculation on the exchanges, not alone in stocks, but also in food 
products, principally grain. Whether this will be accomplished by the new law, remains to be seen, and 
it will certainly be very interesting for other nations to watch the experiment. Below are given the most 
salient features of the law: 
No exchange can be established without the consent of the government, which, through a 
commissioner, will exercise a continued supervision over its actions and dealings. 
All dealings in futures or on term at the exchange are prohibited, unless the parties to the transaction 
are entered in the so-called exchange register. 
The ‘term’ business or dealing in futures in grain and mill products or stocks of mining and 
manufacturing establishments on the exchange is entirely forbidden.36 
 
 
33 Grizewood v Blane (n 30) 584. Jervis CJ described the agreement as ‘a colourable contract for the sale and 
purchase of railway shares, where neither party intended to deliver or to accept the shares, but merely to pay 
differences according to the rise and fall of the market … the transaction was clearly gambling, and a practice 
which clearly everyone must condemn.’ 
34 Swan (n 15) 220. 
35 Ibid 239, 240. 
36 US Consular Reports, vol. LII, November 1896, quoted in JF Boyle Speculation and the Chicago Board of 
Trade (1920) 182–7. 
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The enactment of legislation in this vein continued into the twentieth century, based on 
general suspicion fuelled by incidents such as the ‘Panic of 1907’.37 Pressure for federal 
regulation resulted in various examinations of the futures market.  
In 1905, the Supreme Court case of US Board of Trade of Chicago v Christie Grain & 
Stock Co38 set aside the intent test, turning to a ‘serious business purpose’ as a means of 
distinguishing between gambling and real business, thereby enunciating a legitimate form of 
futures trading.  
2.3.3 The introduction of federal regulation 
By 1916, the US Congress had enacted the Cotton Futures Act, followed by the unsuccessful 
Futures Trading Act of 1921.39 The Grain Futures Act of 192240 and the Commodity Exchange 
Act (CEA) of 1936 followed. The CEA was the result of President Franklin Roosevelt’s call 
for greater regulation after the market collapse of 1929.  
Continuing concerns about laxity in the self-regulatory system, with allegations about 
puts and calls (derivative option instruments) being sold for non-exchange traded commodities, 
undue price loading on the part of sellers, and credit risk because sellers were not covering 
their own positions led to the formation of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) in 1974. Regulation became a product of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
Act. However as the SEC realised the extent to which derivatives were becoming a part of its 
market, rivalry developed, with more than one jurisdictional encroachment by the SEC being 
taken to court.41 
 
37 Farmers caught in extended credit hoped to repay from future crops. However, sagging prices caused panic. 
Many farmers and those politicians who supported them believed that prices were driven artificially low by 
futures traders. This notion of course ignored the fact that commodity speculation is a zero sum game. See Swan 
(n 15) 244 n 104. 
38 198 US 236 (1905). 
39 Unsuccessful because the monetary tax it imposed (aimed at options contracts) was held to be unconstitutional 
by the US Supreme Court in Hill v Wallace 259 US 44 (1922). 
40 Which omitted the monetary tax. 
41 Swan (n 15) 260, 261. 
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In 1992, Congress enacted the Futures Trading Practices Act, intended principally to 
allow the CFTC to exempt from regulation certain transactions that had to be freed from 
regulation for internationally competitive reasons. However, more complexity has resulted.  
Following the financial crisis of 2008, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) was passed by Congress in July 2010. The Act confers 
expansive new authority for non-security-based derivatives on the CFTC, and authority for 
security-based derivatives on the SEC.42 Under the Trump administration there have been calls 
for change. A US Treasury report43 dated October 2017 expressed the following sentiment: 
More than seven years after Dodd-Frank’s enactment, it is important to reexamine these rules, both 
individually and in concert, guided by free-market principles and with an eye toward maximizing 
economic growth consistent with taxpayer protection.44 
 
2.3.4 United Kingdom regulatory development after World War 2 
The period between the two World Wars saw the developing of concern about ‘share-pushing’, 
which involved unbridled selling and persuasion by salesmen. As a result, the Bodkin 
Committee (established in 1937)45 recommended the registration of dealers in shares. The 
Prevention of Frauds (Investment) Act of 1939 was passed. The implementation of the Act was 
delayed by World War 2, and was consolidated into the Prevention of Frauds Act of 1958.46 
The Act remained until 1986 as the principal statutory regulation of the futures and investment 
industry. 
 
42 ‘Explanatory Memorandum: Annexure C, An Examination of the South African OTC Derivatives Markets to 
Recommend Measures for Strengthening their Regulatory Oversight’ (2010) 34. This report was commissioned 
by the Financial Services Board of South Africa, in response to a call by the G20 for certain measures to be 
implemented in the OTC derivatives markets of member countries. 
43 US Department of the Treasury ‘A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities, Capital Markets’ 
Report to President Donald J. Trump (2017). 
44 Ibid 5. 
45 Swan (n 15) 226. 
46 LCB Gower ‘Big bang and city regulation’ (1988) 51(1) Modern Law Review 1–22; Swan (n 15) 227 n 21.  
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However, concern over the lack of regulation to undergird investor confidence resulted 
in the appointment in 1981 of Professor Gower by the Secretary of State for Trade to survey 
the industry and to make recommendations for legislation. In 1984, the Governor of the Bank 
of England appointed an advisory group (called the ‘Ten Wise Men’) in response to Professor 
Gower’s recommendations to look into self-regulatory organisations (SROs). These 
developments culminated in the publication of a White Paper, Financial Services in the United 
Kingdom: A New Framework for Investor Protection,47 emanating from an accord between the 
Bank of England and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The principles were then 
incorporated in the Financial Services Act (FSA) of 1986: 
1. Excessive regulation was not desirable as it imposed unnecessary monitoring and 
enforcement costs and impeded new product and service design. 
2. The best available standards in terms of self-regulation therefore had to be developed. 
3. Regulation was not an antidote for risk, but rather necessary to see that risk taking was 
fairly rewarded in terms of profit and that the scope for losses resulting from fraud and 
the concealment of risk were minimised. 
4. Regulation would therefore offer more comprehensive protection against fraud and 
negligence, facilitate fair competition and innovation, and allow the details of the 
industry to be run by those familiar with it, with minimum state intervention. 
Swan attributes the enshrinement of these principles to the successful growth of future 
trade in the UK. Factors such as a stable government, a history of international futures trading, 
a good judicial system, language and convenient time zone placement are all secondary to a 
liberal approach. ‘Other advantages such as political power, vast production of natural 
 
47 1985 Cmnd 9432.  
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resources, or large consumption of commodities cannot compete with liberal regulatory policy 
in attracting healthy international futures markets.’48 
No major revisions were made to the regulatory policy until the Financial Services and 
Markets Bill was introduced in 1998.49 The enactment of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000 introduced a new regulatory regime under the supervision of the Financial Services 
Authority, focusing on market risk, investor education, and the avoidance of abuse and money 
laundering. Effective from 1 December 2001, the Act created a new mega-regulator, the FSA,50 
which amalgamated a number of authorities. 
Following the financial crisis of 2008, at the request of the European Commission (EC), 
a report was published on 25 February 2009 by a high-level group chaired by Jacques de 
Larosière. The report concluded that ‘the supervisory framework of the financial sector of the 
Union needed to be strengthened to reduce the risk and severity of future financial crises and 
recommended reforms’. This included ‘the structure of supervision of that sector, including the 
creation of a European System of Financial Supervisors, comprising three European 
supervisory authorities, one each for the banking, the insurance and occupational pensions and 
the securities and markets sectors, and the creation of a European Systemic Risk Council’.51 
The 2012 European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) imposes requirements on 
firms entering into any form of derivatives. In the UK, the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 now includes 2013 regulations governing OTC derivatives, Central Counterparties 
(CCPs) and Trade Repositories (TRs).52 
 
48 Swan (n 15) 234. 
49 T Herrington ‘Amendments to the Financial Services Act’ (February 1990) International Business Lawyer 
78–80 at 78; Swan (n 15) 232 n 53. 
50 The FSA is a body corporate governed by its chair and governing body, capable of being removed by the 
Treasury: FSMA 2000, Sched 1, para 2. See A Hudson The Law on Financial Derivatives (2002) 514 n 7. 
51 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, 
central counterparties and trade repositories. 
52 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Over-the-Counter Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade 
Repositories) (No. 1 & 2) Regulations 2013. 
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2.4 INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY DERIVATIVES 
This thesis is unable to attempt a full explanation of derivatives, other than within the narrow 
confines of the stated topic. Two simplifying proxies have been applied in an attempt to limit 
almost limitless variables. These are the following: 
1. Only equity financial derivative instruments were considered. 
2. The context was limited to investment portfolios licensed as such by domestic 
regulators, and managed by professional managers on behalf of third party investors. 
On the part of the manager and the investor it was assumed that legitimate investment 
objectives exist because of adherence to regulation. 
2.5 ANECDOTAL EXAMPLES OF DEFINITION 
By way of introduction, a few definitional examples from various quarters are offered next. 
The first ‘legal’ or judicial use of the term ‘derivative’ was made in American Stock 
Exchange v Commodity Futures Trading Commission,53 a 1982 New York Federal Court case. 
Judge Weinfeld wrote: 
When exercised, options on physicals lead to the delivery of the physical commodity itself; thus they 
are ‘first derivative’ instruments but one step removed from the underlying commodity. Options on 
futures are ‘second derivative’ instruments which give rise only to delivery of a futures contract, a 
contractual undertaking which can be transferred to third parties to buy or sell a fixed amount and grade 
of a certain commodity on some specified date. The term is first found in a reported English decision in 
October 1995.54 
 
The Securities Investment Board in the UK simply defined a derivative as ‘a future, 
option or contract for differences’.55 The Securities and Futures Authority (SFA) and the Self-
Regulatory Organisation (SRO) also applied this definition. 
 
53 528 F.Supp. 1145 (USDC SDNY 1982). 
54 Bankers Trust International PLC v PT Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera et al Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial 
Court) (Transcript), 19 October 1995. See Swan (n 15) 6. 
55 SIB Rulebook vol 1 ch 3: ‘The Financial Services Core Glossary’ (1992) 2. See Swan (n 15) 11 n 55. 
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The Bank of England, after enquiring into the Barings Group, issued a report56 on 18 July 
1995 in which a derivative was defined as ‘a contract or instrument that changes in value 
depending on the price movements in another instrument or index, e.g. future, option.’ The 
Financial Law Panel in the UK formulated the following definition of derivatives: 
At its widest, a ‘derivative’ can be taken to mean any obligation which is identified by reference to 
another obligation. Thus, an option to buy an equity is a derivative of an equity, which is itself a chose 
in action. For present purposes, we think this definition is too wide to be helpful. Accordingly, we use 
the term to mean a chose in action under which sums will be, or may in specified circumstances 
become, payable between one party and another. The amount or amounts payable will often, but not 
always, vary according to a formula or other objective external factors.57 
 
Tolley’s Taxation of Corporate Debt, Foreign Exchange and Derivative Contracts 
defined derivatives as being ‘“derived from” something outside themselves but then take on a 
life of their own and become financial assets with distinct characteristics. Their nature is 
defined as “the sale of a promise”.’58 Swan defined derivatives as ‘[a] sale of a promise to 
provide an agreed asset: (1) at an agreed price, and (2) at an agreed future time, which may be 
settled by choosing from agreed alternatives.’59 
Swan extended his analysis further by explaining that promises can be exchanged (a 
swap), or a right to enter into a contract can be sold (an option). ‘An option confers no more 
than a contractual right to acquire property on payment of a consideration.’60 An option is 
neither an irrevocable offer nor a conditional contract but an asset in its own right: 
An offer is not strictly speaking either an offer or a conditional contract. It does not have all the 
incidents of the standard forms of either of these concepts. To that extent it is a relationship sui generis. 
But there are ways in which it resembles each of them. Each analogy is, in the proper context, a valid 
 
56 Report of the Board of Banking Supervision Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Collapse of Barings 
(1995). See Swan (n 15) 11 n 57. 
57 Financial Law Panel Transactions in Derivatives Legal Obligations of Banks to Customers: A Discussion 
Paper (May 1995) 9. See Swan (n 15) 12 n 59. 
58 D Southern & PricewaterhouseCoopers Tolley’s Taxation of Corporate Debt, Foreign Exchange and 
Derivative Contracts (2001) 317, 318. 
59 Swan (n 15) 17. 
60 Vandervell v IRC 43 TC 519 at 559. 
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way of characterising the situation created by an option’ (Spiro v Glencrown Properties Ltd (1991) All 
ER, per Hoffmann J at 606).61 
 
Hull commented on the last 30 years as follows: 
Derivatives are added to bond issues, used in executive compensation plans, embedded in capital 
investment opportunities … We have now reached the stage where anyone who works in finance needs 
to understand how derivatives work, how they are used, and how they are priced.62 
 
He defined derivatives as– 
a financial instrument whose value depends on (or derives from) the values of other, more basic, 
underlying variables. Very often the variables underlying derivatives are the prices of traded assets … 
However, derivatives can be dependent on almost any variable, from the price of hogs to the amount of 
snow falling at a certain ski resort.63 
 
Buffet, as practitioner and critic, provided a practical explanation of the instruments:  
[T]he word covers an extraordinarily wide range of financial contracts. Essentially, these instruments 
call for money to change hands at some future date, with the amount to be determined by one or more 
reference items, such as interest rates, stock prices, or currency values … Derivative contracts are of 
varying duration (running sometimes to 20 or more years), and their value is often tied to several 
variables. Unless derivative contracts are collateralised or guaranteed, their ultimate value depends on 
the creditworthiness of the counterparties to them. In the meantime, though, before a contract is settled, 
the counterparties record profits and losses – often huge in amount – in their current earnings 
statements without so much as a penny changing hands … The range of derivatives contracts is limited 
only by the imagination of man.64 
 
Lynch appropriately captures the status quo as follows: 
A derivative is invariably described in words to the following effect: ‘a financial instrument whose 
value depends on or is derived from the performance of a secondary source such as an underlying bond, 
currency, or commodity’, or ‘a financial instrument whose value depends on (or derives from) the value 
of other, more basic, underlying variables.’ This is the definition that is almost always used in legal 
scholarship and in policy discussions. But for legal and policy analysis purposes, this definition is 
 
61 D Southern Taxation of Loan Relationships and Derivative Contracts (2012) 18. 
62 J Hull Options, Futures, and other Derivatives (2009) 1. 
63 Ibid. 
64 CJ Loomis Tap Dancing to Work, Warren Buffet on Practically Everything, 1966-2012 (2012) 217. 
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inadequate—it is imprecise, incomplete, and fails to capture the nature and scope of modern derivative 
transactions.65  
 
In chapter 11 I propose a definition to improve on the legal understanding of these 
instruments, based on the literature reviewed. 
2.6 THE MARKET AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE 
Figure 2.1 provides a useful depiction of South African financial markets both with respect to 
asset classes and the cash and derivative markets. As can be observed, the derivatives market 
mirrors the physical cash market. The cash market comprises financial assets such as bonds 
and equity, while the physical asset market comprises assets such as property, metals, food or 
crude oil. This research focuses specifically on equity derivatives. 
 
Figure 2.1: Financial market infrastructure South Africa66 
 
The relative size of South Africa’s equity market as at November 2019, according to the 
World Federation of Exchanges statistics, is illustrated in Table 2.1: 
 
65 TE Lynch ‘Derivatives: A twenty-first century understanding’ (2011) 43 Loyola University Chicago Law 
Journal 1–50 at 10–11. 
66 National Treasury, South African Reserve Bank & the Financial Sector Conduct Authority Financial Markets 
Review Final Report (2019) 22. 
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Table 2.1: Relative size of the South African equity market67 
   
Trade in derivatives can be conducted either via a formal derivatives exchange (exchange 
traded) or between counterparties off-market (over-the-counter), via what today are largely 
standardised contract terms. As mentioned, significant regulatory efforts since the 2008 
financial crisis68 have been directed at bringing OTC derivatives within the formal clearing and 
settlement systems of regulated markets. According to the World Federation of Exchanges’ 
Annual Statistics Guide (December 2018), the relative size of the exchange-traded derivatives 
market as South Africa is as follows: 
  
 
67 Ibid 34. 
68 At the Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009, G20 leaders called for the implementation of a number of key 
measures to reform the financial markets. 
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Table 2.2: Relative size of South Africa’s exchange-traded derivatives market69 
 
Bekale, Botha and Vermeulen explained the regulation and derivative market infra-
structure in South Africa as follows: 
In the wake of the financial crisis, the Financial Markets Bill (FMB) of 2012 was adopted in South 
Africa to replace the Securities Services Act (2004) to adhere to the G-20’s new commitment for the 
standardisation of OTC derivatives, the clearing of these instruments through CCPs, and the reporting 
of all derivatives contracts to trade repositories … . The FMB prescribes the regulation and supervision 
of derivatives market institutions, and also emphasises the relationship of these institutions with their 
respective members in order to reduce systemic risk, ensure markets that are fair, efficient and 
transparent, and also to protect investors … . Moreover, new derivatives rules govern South Africa’s 
derivatives trading in agreement with the guidelines of the International Organisation of Securities 
Commission (IOSCO). These require the derivatives market to have prefunded resources from, 
altogether, the clearing members of SAFEX Clearing Company (SAFCOM) and the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (as the host of the South African Futures Exchange, SAFEX) on behalf of SAFCOM, 
which provides capital in addition to the collateral posted by market participants, and thus serves as a 
way for better counterparty risk management in the derivatives market … .70 
 
69 National Treasury et al (n 66) 35. 
70 AN Bekale, E Botha & J Vermeulen ‘Institutionalisation of Derivatives Trading and Economic Growth: 
Evidence from South Africa’ Economic Research Southern Africa, Paper 505 (2015) 6 (references omitted). 




Figure 2.2: South African financial market infrastructure transaction flows71 
2.7 DERIVATIVE BUILDING BLOCKS 
The absence of a statutory definition appears to be a pernicious legacy of a bygone era of federal 
taxation … when the rustic simplicity of the label … was sufficient.72  
 
Forwards and options are the building blocks upon which all derivatives are constructed. An 
understanding of these two derivative types enables an analysis of all other derivative 
constructs. As Hudson explained, ‘[t]he option is the basic technique which underpins all other 
derivatives in the mathematics of finance theory. A forward is generally thought of as a series 
of options, and a swap is typically priced and structured as a series of forwards.’73 
However, as Hudson pointed out, for a lawyer an option and forward are essentially 
different concepts. An option grants a right to its holder and a forward creates an obligation.  
Forwards and options can be traded bilaterally off exchange (over-the-counter contract 
or ‘OTC’) or through an exchange (with the exchange providing a guarantee that the contract 
 
71 National Treasury et al (n 66) 36. 
72 Kurzner v United States, 413 F.2d 97 at 99 (5th Cir. 1969), referring to the word ‘corporation’, in Plumb (n 42) 
at n 4.  
73 Hudson (n 50) 5-55. 
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will be honoured). A forward contract (OTC) and a future (listed on an exchange) refer to the 
same derivative type. Options can be OTC or listed. 
2.7.1 Options 
An option can be entered into in two converse formats: the option, secured by the payment of 
a premium, secures the right for the holder to buy the underlying asset by a certain date for a 
certain price, known as a call option. Likewise, an option can confer a right on a holder to sell 
the underlying asset, known as a put option. As Hull explained, ‘the price in the contract is 
known as the exercise price or strike price and the date in the contract is known as the 
expiration date or maturity.’74 Conlon and Aquilino paraphrased the usual language used for 
these instruments by stating that an option contract is ‘identical to a forward contract except 
that delivery and payment of the purchase price occur at the discretion of the holder or 
purchaser of the option. The party who is obligated to perform if the holder exercises the option 
is the writer of the option’.75 Unlike a forward contract, which is used to secure a lock-in price, 
an option presents an elective right at the risk of losing a premium if the option is not utilised. 
In this sense, the option can be used as an insurance policy against a price movement, at the 
price of a premium payment. 
2.7.2 Forward contracts 
Hull described a forward contract as an agreement to buy or sell an asset at a certain future time 
for a certain price.76 The concept can be compared to a spot contract, which is an agreement to 
buy or sell an asset today. ‘One of the parties to a forward contract assumes a long position and 
agrees to buy the underlying asset on a certain specified future date for a specified price. The 
other party assumes a short position and agrees to sell the asset on the same date for the same 
 
74 JC Hull Options, Futures, and other Derivatives (2009) 6. 
75 Conlon & Aquilino (n 7) A1.02[2][b] at A1-13. 
76 Hull (n 74) 3. 
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price’.77 As Conlon and Aquilino described, in the language of the market, a commitment to 
sell a particular commodity at a given price is going short and a commitment to purchase at a 
particular price is going long.78 A short sale can be achieved by either owning or borrowing a 
security (from a pension fund) as cover for delivery against the contract. It is possible to sell a 
security without owning it or borrowing the asset contracted for (assuming full financial risk 
of honouring that contract with any market movements of the asset), but naked shorting is not 
permitted in South Africa. Conlon and Aquilino explained the matter as follows: 
If X enters into a short sale but does not actually own the asset subject to the short sale, the short sale 
exposes X to market risk if the price of ABC stock rises, since X will ultimately have to purchase ABC 
stock and deliver it to Y (that is, cover its short position) on the delivery date at the price called for in 
the forward contract to effectively pay for the stock it borrowed in executing the short sale. X will 
profit from its short sale if the market price of the stock declines, since it will be able to cover its short 
position by purchasing the ABC stock at a lower price. Likewise, X will suffer a loss if the market 
value of the stock increases, because X will be required to pay a higher price for its ABC stock to cover 
its short position.79 
 
As mentioned above, the legal perspective of a forward is somewhat different from how 
the market conceives these instruments. In financial theory, a forward is conceived of as two 
synthetic options containing a right to buy or sell at an identified price in the future. As Hudson 
put it, ‘[t]he forward is a promise to supply’.80 With an option there is no such obligation.  
2.8 EQUITY DERIVATIVES 
The focus of this research is equity derivatives or derivatives that reference equity or share 
values, whether they are individual companies or a composite index. As discussed previously, 
exposure could be via forwards or options.  
 
77 Ibid 4. 
78 Conlon & Aquilino (n 7) A1.02[2][a] at A1-13. 
79 Ibid A1.02[2][a] at A1-13. 
80 Hudson (n 50) 5-92. 
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Equity derivatives are forward contracts (or futures, if listed) or options that reference 
the equity asset class. The distinction between debt and equity is a vast subject and has nothing 
to do with derivatives per se. However, the permeability of the boundary between debt and 
equity has presented fertile ground for derivative instruments used in tax planning. Equity is 
risk capital entirely subject to the gains and losses of the corporate venture. Corporations issue 
stock to shareholders, who receive dividends out of distributed earnings and may experience 
gains or losses on the capital value of the stock over time, driven by the company’s performance 
and a rating of what its prospects are, given its internal abilities, and the geography and markets 
in which it operates. Different types or classes of stock may include different rights. Debt, on 
the other hand, is an unqualified promise to pay a defined sum on a specified date at an agreed 
interest rate. The value of that debt (appreciation or depreciation) arises from changes in 
prevailing interest rates and the creditworthiness of the borrower. In the case of equity 
derivatives, the derivative instrument may reference underlying metrics that are derived from 
a number of equity sources. These underlying equity metrics can typically be accessed via OTC 
derivatives (a swap, an option or a forward), exchange traded derivatives (a future, an option 
or a listed structured product) or structured products involving equity derivatives (certificates, 
notes, units in a fund or warrants).  
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Figure 2.3: Possible underlying equity references81 
 
Divergent views on the relevance of applying existing principles of interpretation to 
equity derivatives include the following: 
1. No cash flows emanate from these instruments (such as dividends, interest or rental). 
2. The often short duration of the intrinsic instruments undermines the concept of an asset 
that could qualify for a long-term intention associated with an investment intention. 
3. The short-term contractual tenor implies that they are bought for sale and therefore 
utilised in a scheme of profit-making. 
4. The cash settlement of these instruments results in no physical asset ownership and is 
therefore synonymous with either a speculative motive or a change of intention. 
5. Leverage (economic amplification) is inherent in the instruments, which suggests a 
speculative motive. 
 








IBM, BP and 
Apple
Single index
S&P 500 FTSE 100
Basket of indices
S&P 500, FTSE 
100, CAC-40
40 
6. The ability exists to create a ‘short position’ or sale, thereby creating negative economic 
exposure to an asset not owned (‘naked short’), which is not permitted in South Africa. 
Concern therefore exists that any one or a combination of these might obscure any capital 
characterisation when used in an investment portfolio as a means to an end (see options below) 
or as an end in themselves (see synthetics below). 
2.8.1 Equity options 
The holder of an option acquires a ‘right’. EB Broomberg and Des Kruger, commenting on the 
tax effect of option moneys, pointed out that such a right could be in the nature of capital or 
income. An option may be seen as a step towards acquiring an asset. If the asset is in the nature 
of capital in the hands of the taxpayer, the option is capital. If, however, it is trading stock, it 
is revenue: 
It is supposed to be a basic principle of tax law that any money received in respect of an asset, without 
that asset changing hands, is to be regarded as income … However, the rule may not be an infallible 
test for income. Thus, where a taxpayer granted a right to prospect over her farm, and also granted the 
prospector an option to purchase the mineral rights, and the taxpayer received certain sums in 
consideration for the grant of these rights, all the courts, after a careful analysis of the nature and effect 
of the contract, have held that there was one conjoint and indivisible consideration – and this 
consideration was not for the grant of a lease, nor of a usufruct, but in respect of a contract sui generis. 
The reasoning then went as follows: Any proceeds received for the sale of the land and mineral rights 
themselves would represent receipts of a capital nature in the hands of this particular taxpayer. The 
grant of an option is merely a step, possibly an essential step, in the process of realizing an asset such 
as mineral rights. Accordingly, payments received in respect of such an option will in such a case also 
be of a capital nature. This line of reasoning was expressly approved of by the Appellate Division in 
SIR v Struben Minerals. The door is still open for draftsmen to use this principle. It does follow, of 
course, that if the asset itself is trading stock in the hands of the taxpayer, then any option moneys 
received by the taxpayer in respect of that asset would represent income in his hands …’.82 
2.8.2 Equity forwards and futures  
An investor may wish to use forwards (unlisted) or futures (listed) rather than buying physical 
equity for many reasons. They are useful where a portfolio manager wishes to increase or 
 
82 E Broomberg & D Kruger Tax Strategy 3 ed (1998) 24–5. 
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decrease financial exposure to an asset, and where there are liquidity, cash-flow, market or 
other reasons to defer the actual purchase of the stock. This would include the availability of 
tightly held stock, the efficiency of capital exposure by outlaying only a margin, and the costs 
associated with physical ownership. An investor may wish to gain general exposure to the 
market, but cannot physically construct such exposure quickly or might have insufficient 
capital to achieve that. An all share futures contract would achieve general exposure to the 
market. Despite these benefits, investors might be concerned about the risk that, 
notwithstanding an equivalent holding term of these derivatives, gains and losses might fall to 
be taxed as revenue on realisation. 
2.9 MIXING AND MATCHING: FINANCIAL EQUIVALENCE 
The legal analysis of a derivative product is not necessarily the same as its commercial or 
mathematical structure.83 Warren demonstrated through simple mathematics how 
combinations of the basic derivative building blocks could be used to achieve economic 
equivalence.84 If one appreciates that the ability to lock in a future price and delivery can be 
contractually achieved through a forward contract and that options provide a right but not an 
obligation to do the same, then the economic attributes of these two instruments can be 
combined to produce any variety of outcomes. 
The theory of put/call parity expresses this relationship as follows: 
 S + Pk = Zk + Ck 
Where: S = value of the stock 
 Z = value of the riskless zero-coupon bond 
 C = value of the call 
 P = value of the put 
 k = a particular strike price or maturity value of bond 
Assuming:  
 1) efficient markets for the stock, bonds and options; 
 2) stock pays no dividends and the bond is a zero-coupon bond; 
 
83 Hudson (n 50) 5-02. 
84 See AC Warren Jr ‘Commentary: Financial contract innovation and income tax policy’ (1993) 107 Harvard 
Law Review 460–92. 
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 3) there is no credit risk; 
 4) options are European-style options with identical exercise dates.85 
 
The above equation is nothing other than an expression of equivalent risk and 
opportunity.  
As Warren so aptly pointed out, this relationship intuitively makes sense.86 An investor 
who holds both a share and a ‘put’ at a strike price of k (indicated by the subscript) will at the 
date of exercise have assets worth S but no less than k, because he will exercise the put if S is 
less than k (expressed as S + Pk). Likewise, an investor who holds a zero-coupon bond that will 
pay k upon maturity and a call option with a strike price of k is guaranteed the value of k as the 
zero provides the minimum he would receive and the call option would be exercised if its value 
exceeded k. Thus, if the call was written on the stock S, equivalence would be achieved. This 
relationship is possible because of instrument values that are derived in relationship to another 
asset. 
It is therefore possible to construct a ‘synthetic’ share ‘S’ by expressing the equation as 
follows: S = Zk + Ck - Pk 
Or, for that matter, it is possible to express any other variable in terms of the others. 
It must of course be borne in mind that the result is an economic equivalence and does 
not amount in legal terms to a share. It is a combination of instruments that provides the holder 
with the financial equivalent of holding the share and is made possible precisely because of 
derived values. 
For example, using the concept of put–call parity, a firm can acquire equity interests in 
another firm through at least five different transactions: (1) directly purchasing shares; (2) 





a put (or entering a forward contract); and (5) buying a prepaid forward on equity. All five of 
these roughly equivalent transactions achieve similar ownership objectives, yet all are subject 
to disparate tax treatments.87 
 It is relevant at this juncture to mention the taxation dilemma that this presents: an actual 
share is subject to taxation on a realisations basis in most jurisdictions and a zero coupon bond 
may be subject to taxation on a yield-to-maturity basis (S24J). In order to resolve this taxation 
dilemma, tax authorities would have to define the synthetic in the same manner as the real 
instrument (the share), which of course it is not, and neither is it in the interests of the authorities 
to do so, as the taxable nature of what is sought would be subject to manipulation so as to 
achieve the desired result. Alternatively, bonds and shares would have to be taxed in identical 
fashion, to remove the distinction between the taxation of interest-bearing versus equity 
instruments. This flies in the face of long-accepted practice, which distinguishes between loan 
and equity finance, the latter affording title and a different risk set.  
The difficulty associated with the taxation of instruments therefore is that income tax has 
relied on distinctions that can be undermined by financial innovation. When discerning the 
character of income, the so-called ‘objective’ tests recognise the nature of income associated 
with bonds and equities, namely interest and dividends. Their tax treatment is a matter of fact 
and clearly established; no subjective assessment is involved. 
Financial derivatives, which are utilised in portfolio management, defy easy definition 
precisely because of their ability to take on the economic nature of an established instrument 
such as a bond or equity, without in law actually qualifying as such an instrument. In a 2011 
 
87 MP Donohoe Financial Derivatives in Corporate Tax Avoidance (PhD dissertation, University of Florida, 
2011), describing the discontinuity of the US tax code. See A Nesvetailova ‘Tax evasion and avoidance through 
financial engineering: The state of play in Europe’ Coffers EU Horizon 2020 Project (2018) 32. 
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report to the US Joint Committee on Taxation, this attribute of derivatives was summarised as 
follows: 
These five basic instruments [equity, debt, options, forward contracts and swaps] can be combined in 
various ways to replicate the economic returns of any underlying asset … This ability to combine basic 
instruments and to create new instruments represents financial innovation that might lower the cost of 
capital … or might mitigate the risk of new projects … [it] also creates great difficulties in the taxation 
of financial instruments.88 
 
Various methodologies have been suggested for dealing with these complexities, 
including: ‘(1) transactional analysis, which aggregates or disaggregates new transactions to 
conform them to existing legal categories, (2) taxation of changes in market value, rather than 
realization events, (3) taxation based on an assumed formula, and (4) anti-avoidance 
administrative approaches’.89 This research adopts a legal perspective that touches on approach 
(1) above. 
2.10 WHY USE DERIVATIVES IN AN INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO? 
The general consensus in the literature is that a taxpayer might enter into a derivative contract 
for two reasons: to earn income or to manage risk.90  
While income could be of either a capital or revenue nature, those taxpayers wishing to 
manage risk need to ensure that their well-meaning motives are not vulnerable to challenge, 
forcing them into a position of having, for example, hedging income categorised as revenue 
when it should be capital or vice versa. This is precisely what happened in Federal National 
Mortgage Association v Commissioner91 in the USA, despite clear procedures by its Asset and 
Liability Committee, proper minutes, and public disclosure as to intent. With a mortgage book 
 
88 Joint Committee on Taxation, Congress of the United States Present Law and Issues Related to the Taxation 
of Financial Instruments and Products (2011) 5. 
89 See AC Warren Jr ‘US income taxation of new financial products’ (2004) 88 Journal of Public Economics 
899. 
90 See Hudson (n 50) 2-20. 
91 Federal National Mortgage Association v Commissioner 100 TC 541 (1993). 
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of $95 billion, the enormity of the implications is clear. Other authors have categorised the 
nature of derivative transactions as falling within four broad groupings, namely speculation, 
hedging, asset liability management and arbitrage.92 More pertinent to the investment industry, 
the distinction may be made according to three purposes: speculation, investment or hedging.93 
2.10.1 Speculation 
The common perception in the derivatives market is that derivatives are deployed for 
straightforward speculative purposes.94 This is unsurprising, as the cost of entering a derivative 
contract for identical economic exposure is far less than purchasing or holding a physical 
equity. The large number of cases following Hazell v Hammersmith & Fulham95 (200 writs 
issued) dealing with void swap contracts entered into by municipal authorities in the UK arose 
because local authorities had assumed commercial intentions to improve their debt exposure 
(interest rate swaps) while generating some additional income for the municipalities. Lord 
Templeman’s view on the matter was that the authorities were engaging in ‘no other interest 
than seeking to profit from interest rate fluctuations’.96 Lynch cites a powerful example of how, 
in 2007, John Paulson earned over $3 billion in a single year and his hedge fund, Paulson & 
Co, earned $15 billion betting through a set of synthetic collateral debt obligations, referencing 
credit default swaps, which in turn referenced a set of sub-prime mortgages that the US housing 
market would falter.97 
Speculation is probably the least contentious issue as it is accepted in tax law that 
transactions concluded in ‘pursuance of a scheme of profit-making’ will be revenue in nature.98 
 
92 See Hudson (n 50) 2-11. 
93 S Hutton ‘The taxation of derivatives in South Africa’ (1998) 47 The Taxpayer 165. 
94 Hazell v Hammersmith & Fulham LBC (1991) 1 All ER 545 at 549, per Lord Templeman. 
95 Ibid. 
96 See generally Hudson (n 50) 2-12. 
97 TE Lynch ‘Gambling by another name? The challenge of purely speculative derivatives’ Indiana University 
Maurer School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series (2012) 3. See also  TE Brincker Taxation Principles 
of Interest and other Financing Transactions Issue 4 (2011) W-6-2. 
98 See Overseas Trust Corporation Ltd v CIR 1926 AD 442, 2 SATC 71. 
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Establishing whether there is indeed a scheme of profit-making is often subject to the test of 
‘intention’. What is more pernicious in implied logic is that the instrument itself, because of its 
design, is speculative. Perceived intention due to majority use within markets and prominent 
financial failures can influence how courts frame derivative market function and use.99 This 
struggle is evident in Morgan Grenfell v Welwyn and Hatfield DC,100 where Hobhouse J 
asserted that interest rate swaps were ‘at least potentially a speculative character deriving from 
the fact that the obligations of [the parties] are to be ascertained by reference to a fluctuating 
market rate which may be higher or lower than the fixed rate at any time.’101 
2.10.2 Hedging 
South Africa does not recognise hedging in the Income Tax Act. Even though hedging is not 
necessarily recognised in South African legislation, both the accounting and legal professions 
seem to appreciate the view that, of the categories of use, transactions concluded to ameliorate 
or offset risk should follow the income characteristics of the object of the hedge.  
It is thought that a hedging transaction is most like an insurance contract. In determining 
the character of the income of the hedge, the South African courts are most likely to follow the 
kind of reasoning first formulated in the English case of Burmah Steam Ship Co Ltd v IRC,102 
enquiring as to whether the proceeds fill a hole in the taxpayer’s profits (revenue) or income-
producing structure (capital).  
In ITC 594,103 the President of the Court said: 
It seems to be clear from the decided cases both in the Special Court and on the English decisions that 
where an amount is received in substitution for an amount which might have been received had it not 
 
99 See Hudson (n 50) 33 where Hudson also alluded to the dangers of perception, as contended in this thesis. 
100 Morgan Grenfell v Welwyn and Hatfield DC (1995) 1 All ER 1. 
101 Ibid 7. See Hudson (n 50) 34. 
102 Burmah Steam Ship Co Ltd v IRC (1930) 16 TC 67 (Court of Sessions), 1931 SC 156, cited in Hutton (n 93) 
166. 
103 14 SATC 249. 
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been for the intervention of the occurrence insured against, then the amount is coloured by, so to speak, 
or assumes the character of the accrual for which it is substituted.104 
 
Brincker similarly supports the view that the hedge should derive its character from the 
underlying asset, provided that both were acquired with a capital motive.105 Here, however, 
practical difficulties arise in the burden of proof required to show intent. When residual risk 
associated with a hedge produces profit, it is very difficult to convince SARS that intention to 
profit was not also present. This has been observed in practice, where it is very difficult, despite 
good record keeping, to defend a characterisation as capital, especially where there might be a 
string of hedging transactions over a few years in a portfolio that mostly produced net gains. 
In ITC 340, the taxpayer had a separate profit motive.  
One should thus be careful to use the judgement in ITC 340 to conclude that, as the 
forward exchange contracts were concluded to hedge the revenue cost of acquiring the 
taxpayer’s trading stock, the proceeds from the contracts were of a revenue nature.106 On the 
particular facts it was also found that the taxpayer had a separate purpose of making a profit.107 
Premised on the ‘floodgates’ argument, it is unlikely that derivative contracts could be 
regarded in themselves as insurance contracts. There is no intention to provide straightforward 
insurance. Hutton stated as follows: 
[A] taxpayer would generally have to show a match in the nature, extent and duration of the two 
transactions as well as the likely effectiveness of the hedge … for instance, by showing a high degree 
of correlation between changes in the value of the hedge and opposite changes in the value of the 
underlying position.108  
 
 
104 Ibid.  
105 See the discussion of the relevance of ITC 340 (1935) and ITC 1498 (1989) in J Maule The Income Tax 
Nature of Derivatives Hedges (2018) 63 and 64. 
106 Hutton (n 93) 168. 
107 See Brincker (n 97) W-7. 
108 Hutton (n 93) 169. 
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In Kleinwort Benson v Birmingham CC109 the Court of Appeal held that the hedge against 
a swap exposure entered into by the plaintiff bank with a local authority had to be de-coupled 
from the swap. The plaintiff had argued for passing on a loss generated by the hedge. In the 
wake of the House of Lords decision in Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC110 it was 
evident that the swap was void, and the plaintiff had an open exposure on the ‘hedge’. The 
Court of Appeal held that the hedging agreement was not part of the main agreement and that, 
notwithstanding the fact that the bank had argued that it had further swap transactions tied to 
the hedge with other parties, the loss could not be passed on to the local authority.111 Hudson 
contrasted this decision with an apparent willingness in Scotland112 to recognise market 
practice that both parties would have hedged their transactions and that the loss associated with 
the cost of funding and closing-out a hedge should be taken into account.113 In Australia and 
New Zealand Banking Group v Societe Generale,114 the inclusion of the loss on the hedge was 
disregarded because the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) master 
agreement stated recognition of loss on early termination was not related to the reason for loss 
realisation triggered by an official prohibition on payments in the Russian markets.115 
Maule’s observation that, based on existing case law, ‘no definitive tax precedent exists 
for adopting a capital position in respect of a derivative hedge’ and ‘similarly, there is no 
precedent for what is required to be shown in order to discharge the burden of proof’ seems 
correct.116  
 
109 Kleinwort Benson v Birmingham CC [1996] 4 All ER 733. 
110 Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [1992] 2 AC 1. 
111 See Hudson (n 50) 5-151, 153. 
112 Bank of Scotland v Dunedin Property Investment Co Ltd (No 1) 1998 SC 657. 
113 Hudson (n 50) 5-150. 
114 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group v Societe Generale [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 682 CA. 
115 Hudson (n 50) 5-149. 
116 Maule (n 105) 64. 
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2.10.3 Derivatives as an instrument of risk mitigation at the macro and portfolio 
management level 
There is growing official recognition of the role of derivatives in risk management. Were 
hedging done only through the use of physical assets, for example, bonds to manage interest 
rate risk, a major drawback would be encountered, given the shortage of available and liquid 
bonds with the correct maturities to match the moving pattern of cash flows, which would in 
turn result in a lot of trading. Derivatives therefore provide a more efficient and cost-effective 
means of implementing hedging, rather than trading in physical assets. Two general approaches 
are used: (1) duration matching, where the hedge matches the sensitivity of the assets and 
liabilities to interest rate movements; and (2) cash flow matching, where interest rates and 
sensitivity are matched for assets and liabilities. 
In an equity context, a portfolio manager may hedge out downside from equity exposures 
viewed as overvalued, by executing what is referred to as a long–short strategy. A ‘long’ 
position is taken on equity investments across the general market. An index could be used. At 
the same time a ‘short’ position could be taken for single shares using a contract for difference 
or an index future. Both positions are taken with a long-term view, but the short derivative 
positions normally have a duration of less than 12 months for the sake of cost efficiency, and 
reset. 
While there may be a conservative (eg risk mitigation or prudential) purpose at the time 
of implementation, the hedge, due to incorrect assumptions at the time of its design, may 
partially fail in its purpose due to market movements, thereby rendering the hedge itself a ‘risk-
bearing’ instrument. This performance (or basis) risk is difficult if not impossible to eliminate, 
but may also be willingly entertained because of the cost of a more perfect hedge, the 
conceptual inaccuracy of designing a ‘macro’ hedge of a broad portfolio exposure.  
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It may be asked how a derivative can in effect reduce risk when the popular view is that 
a derivative is a risky instrument. Through the markets, however, these instruments enable the 
shifting of risk to those who are amenable to bearing it. Why is this so? Speculators are willing 
to assume risk in the hope of making exceptional profit. The derivatives market therefore 
allows risks to be shifted and apportioned. In this sense they function at the macro level as 
hedges, assuming that risk concentration is prudentially managed. The fact that a trader, bank 
or prime broker might irresponsibly assume too much risk does not imply that the derivative 
market by definition creates risk.117 Efficient distribution of risks, by unbundling the risks and 
the gains or losses associated with those risks, provides a stabilisation of total profits in the 
world economy.118  
A central hindrance to effective regulation preceding the financial crisis was surely the 
lack of consensus or absence of a common view on how the financial system functions or fails 
to function to achieve the equilibrium necessary for the effective distribution of risk. Those in 
favour of ‘light touch’ regulation held that it was self-correcting over time (market rationality). 
Gallegati et al119 suggested that the interconnected world is both a safer and more dangerous 
place in which to live. The same system that disperses risk efficiently in normal markets 
transmits negative shocks in a way that can amplify its effect through the system. Conceived 
of as a system of financial nodes, risk can be transmitted in two ways: 
1. It can be entirely or partially transferred from one node to its neighbours in its original 
quantity, reducing as it is diffused (risk sharing). 
2. It can be multiplied in transmission to other nodes (contagion). 
 
117 See United Nations Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters on 
the work of its seventh meeting (1997) 76. 
118 Ibid. 
119 M Gallegati, B Greenwald, MT Richiardi & JE Stiglitz The Asymmetric Effect of Diffusion Processes: Risk 
Sharing and Contagion (2008). 
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In the former, under normal propagation, the mechanism results in a ‘reversion to the 
mean’; in the latter, the mechanism results in a ‘convergence to the bottom’. This is especially 
prevalent where all nodes are homogeneous and assets positively correlated; diversification 
simply provides a stronger conductor for transmission of the shock and co-movement in asset 
prices. In this context, contagion is an inevitable by-product of diversification. Battiston et al 
stated that the larger the number of connected neighbours, the smaller the risk of an individual 
collapse, but the higher the systemic risk: 
Risk sharing by itself would lead systemic risk to zero as the connectivity increases. Distress 
propagation and the bankruptcy cascade effect, together with trend reinforcement – i.e. the fact that 
individual financial fragility feeds back on itself – may amplify the effect of the initial shock and lead 
to a full-fledged systemic crises ….120 
 
Where hedging is not recognised, asymmetric taxation of the hedge and its underlying 
asset may result, leading to distortions. This may simply be explained by decomposing the 
return of a transaction into a risk free component (Ru) and a risk adjusted component (∆u), so 
that total return (Tu) can be expressed as Ru + ∆u = Tu.121 As will be explained in more detail 
below, a taxpayer wishing to hedge away risk needs to acquire a hedge that ideally could be 
represented as - ∆h. This would mean that the risk has been entirely offset and the return from 
the asset or portfolio is risk free, expressed Ru + ∆u - ∆h = Ru. The after-tax position may be 
somewhat different, however, if Return After Tax ≠ Ru * [1-Effective Tax Rate], especially if 
Return After Tax < Ru * [1-Effective Tax Rate]. In this instance the hedge has lost the taxpayer 
money by being tax-ineffective.122 Such tax asymmetries may result from various factors, such 
as split hedges, timing or character mismatches.123 Facilitation of the productive use of 
 
120 S Battiston, DD Gatti, M Gallegati, BCN Greenwald & JE Stiglitz ‘Liaisons dangereuses: Increasing 
connectivity, risk sharing and systemic risk’ (2012) 36(8) Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 1121–41. 




derivatives through legislation amounts to ‘allowing gains or losses from derivatives held as 
hedges to be co-ordinated, both in character and in time, with income and loss from the 
transaction being hedged.’124 
In Robert Foss Kennedy v Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein,125 a practical up-to-date 
explanation was given of how exposure to risk is assumed for the sake of achieving gain 
through price inefficiency and yet is hedged to limit downside. This brief extract from the 
Honourable Justice Langley’s rendition of what was explained in evidence provides an 
appropriate example of the fact that a hedge itself is not necessarily a benign instrument: ‘Some 
trades might, in effect, hedge each other. The risk in the aggregate position would be hedged 
daily by spot trades … risk management itself provides an opportunity for profit and a risk of 
loss.’126 
Hedging in a portfolio might therefore be imperfect for several reasons and may happen 
at portfolio level (macro) or instrument level (micro). Because of the imperfect nature of 
hedging strategies, which might in themselves be a result of limited instruments or price 
considerations, they may result in profits or losses. This adds complexity to discerning the 
character of the resulting income. Southern stated the following: 
The tax treatment of derivatives comes of age when it is established and accepted that the taxation of 
DFIs is not to be determined by reference to the tax treatment of the underlying instrument to which the 
derivative relates. Derivatives are to be treated as assets and liabilities in their own right with their own 
tax rules. This has the consequence that hedges will be de-recognised as hedges, in that they will be 
regarded as transactions in their own right, not as part of some larger transaction. This in turn entails 
that there is no inherent likelihood that hedges which work pre-tax will work post-tax.127  
 
 
124 See United Nations Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters on 
the work of its seventh meeting (1998) 75. 
125 Robert Foss Kennedy v Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, 
Commercial Court Case No 2002 Folio 1186. 
126 At [27]. Emphasis my own.  
127 D Southern ‘The taxation of derivatives’ (1998) 4 British Tax Review 348–63. 
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It is clear that characterising income based on the presence of a ‘hedge’ is fraught with 
practical difficulties. This leads one to the third motive, more readily accepted today than when 
Southern published his article 20 years ago. 
2.10.4 Investing 
As the market for derivatives has developed, it has become increasingly accepted that 
derivatives can facilitate efficient portfolio management128 and can become integrated in the 
investment strategy. 
Long-term investment strategies might be put in place by organizing a range of options to acquire 
specific assets at a variety of prices so that the purchaser is able to acquire the underlying asset 
whenever its market value is greater than the price identified in the option ....129 
 
‘Investing’ implies utilising the instruments themselves as ‘fixed’ capital assets.130 When 
Brincker suggests that ‘synthetics would be of a capital nature’,131 he is referring to derivatives 
constructed using the put–call parity theorem as described in section 2.8 above, where the 
economic equivalent of a share (S = Zk + Ck − Pk ) is held in the place of a share as it provides 
identical economic exposure. 
The riskier the asset, the more difficult it becomes to hold the asset on a ‘for keeps’ or 
‘for better or worse’ basis.132 This tends to mitigate against an investment intention and makes 
the burden of proof for the taxpayer that much more onerous. For example, it is much easier to 
acquire a plot of land with a speculative motive, sell it a few years later, and justify it as an 
investment, than it is to purchase a much riskier asset such as a share, with an investment 
motive, be prudentially obliged to sell it because the fundamentals change, and then justify that 
 
128 This is a colloquial term, even used by regulators, which lacks technical definition. It is intended to imply 
that derivatives are used to optimise a portfolio strategy, such as using futures to gain exposure to a share, while 
the physical share is being acquired in the market. This might be necessary as the shares do not trade often.  
129 Hudson (n 50) 2-17. 
130 As opposed to floating capital. 
131 Brincker (n 97) W-6-3. 
132 CIR v Barnato Holdings Ltd 1978 (2) SA 440 (A). 
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it was not speculation. This is a problem associated with the nature of the asset. Furthermore, 
the volatility of the market wherein the asset is acquired directly affects the basis on which the 
investment can be made. With derivative instruments, increased market volatility requires a far 
more vigilant and agile approach. But, to take the step in logic that this alone is evidence of ‘a 
gain made by an operation of business’133 is too great. In CIR v Middelman134 the view was 
taken that a taxpayer following an active investment policy to maintain the yield on a portfolio 
of securities does not necessarily imply that there is trading in securities. In CIR v Guardian 
Assurance Co SA Ltd,135 authority from CIR v Richmond Estates136 was quoted, wherein 
reference was made to LHC Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v CIR,137 that ‘continuous monitoring 
… by LIBAM in the performance of its steward mandate … did not serve to convert what had 
been compiled as a capital base … into a pool of floating capital’. Furthermore, it is a well-
established principle138 that realisation of a capital asset does not constitute a change of 
intention; nor does realisation to best advantage render the proceeds of revenue income. The 
Chairman of the International Accounting Standards Board made the following insightful 
remarks on 9 April 2013: 
Finally, I would like to stress that even long-term investors cannot afford to ignore short-term 
fluctuations, if only because you never know how short the short-term will be … 
It is estimated that an airplane flying from London to New York will only spend 10% of the time 
pointing in the right direction. The direction of the plane is not determined by the pilot alone, but also 
by external factors such a wind, speed and direction. 
The pilot needs to make continuous short-term corrections in order to achieve the long-term goal – 
to arrive safely in New York. Business is no different. The renowned Swedish long-term investor, 
Boerje Ekholm, recently said that while his company always has a long-term objective, ‘we’ll be 
 
133 In Overseas Trust Corporation Ltd v CIR 1926 AD 441 the Chief Justice stated the following at 453: ‘Where 
an asset is realized at a profit as a mere change of investment there is no difference in character between the 
amount of enhancement and the balance of the proceeds. But where the profit is, in the words of an eminent 
Scottish judge, “a gain made by an operation of business in carrying out a scheme for profit-making then it is 
revenue derived from capital productively employed and must be income”.’ 
134 CIR v Middelman 1991 (1) SA 200 (C). 
135 CIR v Guardian Assurance Co SA Ltd 1991 (3) SA 1 (A). 
136 CIR v Richmond Estates 1956 (1) SA 602 (A). 
137 LHC Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1950 (4) SA 640 (A). 
138 CIR v Stott 1928 AD 252, 3 SATC 253; CIR v Paul 1956 (3) SA 335 (A), 21 SATC 1. 
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terriers in the short term on how you run the business’. He stressed that in reaching your long-term 
objective, you have to evaluate every day. If you do not adjust your business in time, the risk of a much 
larger correction further down the line grows exponentially. 
So, beware of people who tell you that they only care about the long term and who do not want to 
be bothered by market values.139 
 
2.11 INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION 
CONTRACTS 
Standardisation of documentation for derivatives140 is widely practised through the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA).141 Most of these documents are based 
on the UK and US legal systems. Civil-code jurisdictions such as France and Germany have 
sought to develop their own contracts informed by their own commercial codes.142  
The ISDA model contract is an attempt at standardisation to bring certainty and order to 
the markets for OTC derivatives traded ‘off-market’. The ‘Master Agreement’ and all the 
Confirmations form a single agreement between the parties.143 This allows a netting across 
transactions within the umbrella agreement. There are three tiers of derivatives documentation: 
 
139 H Hoogervorst, at http://www.ifrs.org/-Alerts/Conference/Pages/HH-speech-April-2013.aspx (accessed 28 
April 2013): ‘Accounting and long term investment – “Buy and hold” should not mean “buy and hope”’. 
140 The standard documentation is designed to be used to document many different categories of OTC 
derivatives transactions such as interest rate swaps, currency swaps, credit default swaps, commodity swaps, 
equity swaps, caps, collars and floors, currency options, foreign exchange transactions and options of various 
types. 
141 ISDA is a not-for-profit corporation incorporated in the State of New York in 1985. It reportedly has over 
820 member institutions. 
142 A Hudson ‘Dealing with derivatives’ 23 (undated). Available at 
http://www.alastairhudson.com/financelaw/derivativeslawcourse.pdf (accessed 28 April 2014). 
143 See Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson Inc (2010) EWHC 3372 [118] (Longmore LJ), where this is affirmed by the 
Appeal Court (Lord Justices Longmore, Patten and Tomlinson presiding): 
We also agree with Mr Kimmins and Mr Zacaroli that Flaux J’s approach is inconsistent with the 
‘Single Agreement’ provision in Section 1(c) of the Master Agreement. That provides:- 
‘Single Agreement’ All Transactions are entered into in reliance on the fact that this Master 
Agreement and all Confirmations form a single agreement between the parties (collectively referred 
to as this ‘Agreement’), and the parties would not otherwise enter into any Transactions. The effect of 
Section 1(c) is that the parties are agreeing that the obligations contained in ‘all Transactions … 
entered into’ are not to be treated as separate and distinct, but are made subject to the contractual 
framework constituted by the Master Agreement, including when an Early Termination Date occurs. 
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the confirmation recording each individual transaction; the master agreement that sets out the 
general terms; and the credit support document that provides for collateral or guarantees.144 
The ISDA Master Agreement has evolved through three editions in 1987, 1992 and 2002. 
The 2002 version closely resembles the 1992 version and they are often used 
interchangeably.145 On 19 September 2018, ISDA published the ISDA Benchmarks 
Supplement, which allows adhering entities to amend the contractual triggers and fallbacks of 
OTC derivatives documentation that references interest rate, FX, equity and commodities 
benchmarks, under current ISDA definitions incorporated into transactions using ISDA 
derivatives documentation. This follows concerns associated with the exit of the UK from the 
EU: 
The contractual continuity issue arises because, after Brexit, UK and EU-27 regulated firms will no 
longer benefit from the single market passport which currently allows them to engage in regulated 
activities in the EU-27 and the UK respectively without the need for an additional local licence. This 
raises issues for certain longer-dated OTC derivative contracts, which were entered before Brexit, when 
the entity held the relevant passport, but where the contract continues beyond Brexit. In such cases, 
some so-called ‘lifecycle events’ that arise during the life of the contract may be regarded as 
constituting regulated activities in the jurisdiction where the client or counterparty is located, thus 
triggering the application of local licensing requirements if the firm retains those contracts after 
Brexit.146 
 
The commercial convenience of combining all agreements under a master document for 
the purpose of economic consolidation does not necessarily hold in law, with insolvency and 
tax law being cases in point. Hudson noted that the House of Lords has permitted set-off where 
there are mutual debts owed, but not between multiple parties.147 In tax law, the artificiality 
becomes problematic. For example, in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Scottish Provident 
 
144 See Hudson (n 50) 6-01. 
145 Ibid 6-96. 
146 ISDA Contractual Continuity in OTC Derivatives Challenges with Transfers (2018) 4. 
147 See Hudson (n 50) 115. 
57 
Institution,148 which is discussed later, the options and the collateral agreement were held to be 
separate.  
In Lomas, Mr Justice Briggs described this contract as ‘probably the most important 
standard market agreement used in the financial world’. Hudson estimated that the ISDA 
architecture is standard for 90 per cent of all OTC transactions.149 
In the case of equity derivatives, the contract typically references a share. The 2011 ISDA 
Equity Derivatives Definitions defines a share with reference to a referring derivative contract: 
2.5.4 ‘Share’ means a financial instrument issued by a company that is in legal form a share, a 
stock or a unit in the equity capital of that company and, in relation to an ED Transaction 
and/or ED Leg, means: 
(i)  any Share Specified as an ED Leg Reference Underlier; 
(ii) in relation to a Basket or Index that is an ED Leg Underlier, any Share that is a Basket 
Component of that Basket or an Index Component of that Index, as the case may be; and 
(iii)  in relation to a Derivatives Contract, any Derivatives Contract Underlier that is a Share. 
 
At this point, no branch or coherent body of law relating to derivatives exists. As Hudson 
put it, there is no law of derivatives, but rather the law on derivatives. ‘However, there are 
concepts, cobbled together from other legal disciplines which form a complete set which could 
be called “the law affecting derivative products”.’150 
So, the law of finance is created out of those central concepts of the substantive law: including contract 
law, property law, criminal law, tort law, equity and private international law which are relevant to 
derivative transactions but which operate across the entirety of our law beyond financial markets.151 
 
148 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Scottish Provident Institution (2003) STC 1035. Also see Hudson (n 50) 
116. 
149 Hudson (n 50) 106 and 150, based on Briggs J’s acceptance of ISDA’s estimate of usage in Lomas v JFB 
Firth Rixson Inc (2010) EWHC 3372 (ch); (2011) 2 BCLC 120. From a commercial perspective ISDA 
architecture has the following practical functions: 
1. Frames all the documentation under one umbrella for the purposes of standardisation and netting; 
2. Individual transactions are documented by a ‘confirmation’; 
3. The Master Agreement can be altered via a ‘schedule’ and alterations or enhancements to credit terms 
are set out in ‘credit support documents’; 
4. It specifies governing law, jurisdiction for remedy and termination etc. 
150 Hudson (n 50) 6-03. 




Chapter 2 alone could easily comprise a thesis. I have therefore attempted to simply introduce 
the essential building blocks from which all derivatives are constructed. If options and forward 
contracts can be combined in various ways to replicate the economic returns of any underlying 
asset, then the analysis must firstly assess the most basic building blocks of these financial 
instruments. To simplify further, only one asset class, equity, is considered in this research. A 
distinction is drawn between speculation, hedging and investing, all of which lack finite 
definition. Although hedging is an essential component of investing (protecting against 
downside risk), it is distinct from accepting a derivative as an asset in its own right. 
Furthermore, the key distinction between speculating and investing within the financial system 
is that, at a macro level, it is speculators who have the risk appetite to sit on the other side of 
trades when portfolio managers want to minimise risk. In this manner, risk is apportioned to 
wherever it can be accommodated. However, when a manager is tempted to assume speculative 
positions to increase returns, the portfolio management function moves into a sphere of 
operation that is out of character. There are therefore two sides to a transaction, which might 
be quite dissimilar in nature. This research is concerned with one defined leg of the transaction 
only.  
On 14 September 2018, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA) issued a warning 
to managers of collective investment schemes following a concern about excessive trading in 
portfolios:  
The Financial Sector Conduct Authority (‘the Authority’) would like to reiterate the principles which 
CIS Managers have to adhere to in the administration of a collective investment scheme and more 
specifically section 2(1) of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act, No 45 of 2002, which 
stipulates that: ‘A manager must administer a collective investment scheme honestly and fairly, with 
skill, care and diligence and in the interest of investors and the collective investment scheme industry.’ 
… Any CIS Manager engaged in the above-mentioned … is hereby reminded that the Authority views 
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such practices as not being in the interests of investors and the industry and regards such a CIS 
Manager as not acting with due honesty.152
 
152 FSCA Possible Tax Avoidance Schemes in Collective Investment Schemes Industry (2018). 
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING TREATMENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As has been stated above, this thesis includes three approaches to tax policy on financial 
derivatives: (1) a common-law approach; (2) an accounting policy approach; and (3) a highly 
codified system, as used in the USA. This chapter is devoted to a basic outline of the accounting 
treatment of financial derivatives. Accounting cannot be divorced from the subject matter as 
our own Act now references IFRS in section 24JB for ‘covered persons’. The policy reasons 
are not hard to find: In the 2012 Explanatory Memorandum to the Taxation Laws Amendment 
Bill, the National Treasury makes the following statement: 
In respect of financial instruments, the rules pertaining to income tax and financial accounting have 
completely diverged. This divergence has proven to be a challenge … From a SARS standpoint, the 
divergence between tax and accounting has become so great that accounting is often no longer a useful 
benchmark for assessing risk vis- à-vis the accuracy of taxable income.1 
 
In resolving the above, the National Treasury has looked to accounting standards as a 
pragmatic basis for resolving some uncertainties and narrowing the gap between the two 
treatments. Section 24JB is a legislative innovation that circumvents dealing with income 
characterisation according to common-law principles by deeming a certain category of 
taxpayers (principally, banks)2 as subject to ordinary treatment because it matches the business 
model. On the other hand, the section excludes ‘all amounts in respect of financial assets and 
financial liabilities of that covered person that are recognised in profit or loss in the statement 
of comprehensive income’3 under IFRS 9 for certain financial assets such as a share, an 
 
1 National Treasury Taxation Laws Amendment Bill Explanatory Memorandum (2012) 57. 
2 Section 24JB(1). 
3 Section 24JB(2). 
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endowment policy, an interest in a collective investment scheme, a trust, a non-trading 
partnership, or a domestic or foreign dividend earned by a covered person. This category of 
‘amounts’ that falls within the excluded perimeter of income defined by section 24JB is the 
subject of this research, using collective investment schemes as the proxy. 
South Africa subscribes to the accounting standards as determined by the IFRS 
Foundation and its standard setting body, the IASB. IFRS 9, which became effective in January 
2015 (replacing IAS 39 and 32), sets the standard for the recognition of financial instruments 
and is discussed below.  
 
Box 4.1: Extract from the 2012 Taxation Laws Amendment Bill Explanatory 
Memorandum4 
In general, income tax systems impose tax on a realisation basis when calculating gain or loss 
in respect of asset values … However, in recent years, a growing trend exists toward notional 
realisation in respect of liquid financial instruments (e.g. listed and over-the-counter shares, 
bonds and derivatives) … Legislation exists that provides for mark-to-market taxation in 
respect of certain financial instruments (e.g. debt, interest-rate swaps and certain options); 
otherwise, the overall income tax system remains on a realisation basis. 
In respect of financial instruments, the rules pertaining to income tax and financial 
accounting have completely diverged. This divergence has proven to be a challenge for both 
taxpayers and SARS alike. From a taxpayer compliance standpoint, the resultant divergence 
has proven costly in terms of systems for financial institutions. The sheer volume of financial 
transactions for large financial institutions requires expensive systems that require constant 
adjustment. Tax deviations are often then accounted for manually, thereby being prone to 
inaccuracies. From a SARS standpoint, the divergence between tax and accounting has become 
so great that accounting is often no longer a useful benchmark for assessing risk vis-à-vis the 
accuracy of taxable income. 
Admittedly, current law contains a specific rule that allows taxpayers to utilise annual 
mark-to-market fair value methodology. However, this election in favour of annual fair value 
methodology is incomplete because this election only caters for specific instruments (e.g. debt), 
thereby leaving equity and other instruments under the realisation principle.  
 
 
4 National Treasury Taxation Laws Amendment Bill Explanatory Memorandum (2012) 56–8. 
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3.2 GENERAL ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF DERIVATIVES 
Prior to IAS 39, derivatives were often not recognised in financial statements, as they required 
little or no initial investment. IAS 39 (effective 2001) and IAS 32 (effective 2005) have since 
been the accounting standards applicable to financial instruments. The instruments are divided 
into four main categories: 
a) fair value through profit and loss, which has two sub-categories: 
i) held for trading (derivatives are always categorised as held for trading 
unless accounted for as hedges); and 
ii) voluntary designation; 
b) held to maturity assets; 
c) loans and receivables; 
d) available-for-sale assets. 
IFRS 9 replaces IAS 39 and IAS 32, with effect from 2015. IFRS 9 was developed to 
simplify the treatment of financial instruments and move towards a more principles-based 
approach. IFRS 9 requires income from financial instruments to be recognised based on the 
business model in use by the accounting entity and the nature of the cash flows. The distinction 
made is between assets held to collect a contractual income stream (debt) and those held to 
collect fair value proceeds that are realised to produce an income stream.  
Paragraph 4.2(a) of IFRS 9 states: 
A financial asset shall be measured at amortised cost if both of the following conditions are met:  
(a) the asset is held within a business model whose objective is to hold assets in order to collect 
contractual cash flows.  
(b) the contractual terms of the financial asset give rise on specified dates to cash flows that are solely 
payments of principal and interest on the principal amount outstanding.  
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The exception to the above is the use of a hedge or an equity instrument held as an 
investment. Paragraph 5.4.4 specifically requires the accounting entity to make an (irrevocable) 
election concerning the nature of the asset at initial recognition. 
Paragraph 4.4.1 provides that: 
A gain or loss on a financial asset that is measured at fair value and is not part of a hedging 
relationship (see paragraphs 89–102 of IAS 39) shall be recognised in profit or loss unless the financial 
asset is an investment in an equity instrument and the entity has elected to present gains and losses on 
that investment in other comprehensive income in accordance with paragraph 5.4.4.  
 
Paragraph 5.4.4 states that ‘[a]t initial recognition, an entity may make an irrevocable 
election to present in other comprehensive income subsequent changes in the fair value of an 
investment in an equity instrument within the scope of this IFRS that is not held for trading.’5 
It is noteworthy that IFRS 9 (which retains this definition from IAS 39) defines ‘held for 
trading’ as a financial asset or financial liability that: 
(a) is acquired or incurred principally for the purpose of selling or repurchasing it in the near term;  
(b) on initial recognition is part of a portfolio of identified financial instruments that are managed 
together and for which there is evidence of a recent actual pattern of short-term profit-taking; or  
(c) is a derivative (except for a derivative that is a financial guarantee contract or a designated and 
effective hedging instrument).6 
 
Therefore, derivatives as an instrument class are always regarded as being associated 
with a trading motive, other than when used as a hedge. This precludes derivatives from being 
considered for categorisation under paragraph 4.1 relative to the ‘business model’ of the entity. 
The ‘business model’ concept has as its objective whether instruments are held to maturity to 
collect their income stream (contractual interest or dividends), rather than realisations from fair 
value. However, this is not determined on an instrument-by-instrument basis, but at a portfolio 
level. It is acknowledged that not all instruments might comply with an investment mandate 
 
5 Emphasis my own. 
6 See IFRS 9, Appendix A. Emphasis my own. 
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through to maturity, for example, due to a credit deterioration and re-rating. However, if the 
number of sales is more than infrequent, then the investment fund should assess whether such 
sales are consistent with the business model objective. The standard provides no bright-line 
measure of an acceptable frequency. The application guidance in Appendix B of the standard 
explains the principles as follows: 
1. The business model is a matter of fact, identified by the way the business is managed and 
performance evaluated (e.g. if fair value is used in determining fees, it speaks to an ordinary 
revenue motive).7 
2. This determination is not driven by a single factor, but includes: 
a. How performance is reported; 
b. How managers are compensated; and 
c. The frequency, timing and volume of sales planned and made historically.8 
This logic, however, is not extended to derivatives, implying that these instruments 
cannot be recognised as investment assets in their own right within a portfolio. This places 
great emphasis on the definition of ‘hedging’, as it is the only means by which derivative use 
would not be recognised through profit and loss.  
IFRS 9 defines a derivative as: 
A financial instrument or other contract within the scope of this IFRS (see paragraph 2.1) with 
all three of the following characteristics: 
(a)  Its value changes in response to the change in a specified interest rate, financial instrument 
price, commodity price, foreign exchange rate, index of prices or rates, credit rating or 
credit index, or other variable, provided in the case of a non-financial variable that the 
variable is not specific to a party to the contract (sometimes called the ‘underlying’). 
(b)  It requires no initial net investment or an initial net investment that is smaller than would 
be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response 
to changes in market factors. 
(c)  It is settled at a future date.9 
 
 
7 Paragraph B4.1.2A. 
8 Paragraph B4.1.3. 
9 This is the same definition that is used in the South African Income Tax Act. 
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Leverage is regarded as indicative of non-standard cash flow characteristics by paragraph 
4.1.9. The guidance note states: ‘More than insignificant leverage increases the variability of 
the contractual cash flows with the result that they do not have the economic characteristics of 
interest’.10 Here, economic characteristics are used as the determinant. 
3.3 HEDGE ACCOUNTING 
3.3.1 Instrument-based hedging 
The ‘Basis for Conclusions’ published under IFRS 9 for Hedge Accounting11 states: 
The implementation guidance accompanying IAS 39 provided the rationale for not permitting 
derivatives to be designated hedged items. It stated that derivative instruments were always deemed to 
be held for trading and measured at fair value with gains or losses recognised in profit or loss unless 
they are designated as hedging instruments.12 
 
However, the ‘Basis for Conclusions’ goes on to state that ‘this rationale is difficult to 
justify’ as some purchased options have been allowed under hedging rules to qualify as items 
that may be the object of a hedge.  
Notwithstanding this revision, however, the general hedge accounting regime under 
IFRS 9 is prescriptive. The qualifying criteria in paragraph 6.4 of IFRS 9 provide the following: 
1. The hedging relationship must consist of both eligible hedging instruments and eligible hedged 
items. 
2. There must be a formal designation and documentation of the hedging relationship, which includes 
the entity’s risk management objective and strategy for undertaking the hedge. 
3. There must be compliance with the following hedge effectiveness requirements: 
a. There is an economic relationship between the hedged item and the hedging instrument; 
b. The effect of credit risk does not dominate the value changes that result from that relationship; 
c. Quantitative restrictions on the hedge ratio, so that the actual hedged item and its hedging 
instrument bear quantitative resemblance to the ratio and that no imbalances exist which 
subvert the desired accounting outcome. 
 
 
10 Examples given include stand-alone options, forwards and swap contracts. 
11 IFRS Foundation ‘IFRS 9, Chapter 6: Hedge Accounting’ 18. 
12 Emphasis my own. 
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The standard recognises three types of hedging relationships: 
1. fair value hedges – a hedge of the exposure to changes in fair value (market movement); 
2. cash flow hedges – a hedge against variability in cash flows; 
3. hedge of a net investment in a foreign operation (defined in IAS 21). 
It seems that these categories and their boundaries in IFRS 9 are accounting attempts to 
keep the representation of intent (the risk management objective) aligned with economic 
execution, due to the ease with which derivative positions may be stated as hedges that are 
imperfect, but actually represent attempts at profit- or loss-making. 
In summary, it can be said that IFRS 9 distinguishes derivatives by the nature of the asset, 
unless it is used for hedging (purpose). 
3.3.2 Dynamic hedging 
The inability of the IAS 39 standard to frame a portfolio approach to dynamic hedging or risk 
management through simple modification within IFRS 9 resulted in the standard being issued, 
with this section to be published at a later date.13 In April 2014, the IASB and IFRS issued a 
discussion paper, stating the following: 
Risk management is complex and developing an accounting approach to reflect the underlying 
economics of such activities that is operationally feasible and that provides information that is useful to 
users of financial statements has been challenging. The IASB originally sought to better reflect risk 
 
13 IFRS Foundation (n 11) 6–7: ‘The IASB began its deliberations on the Accounting for Macro Hedging project 
in September 2010. The drivers for initiating the project were the difficulties associated with applying existing 
hedge accounting requirements to a dynamically managed portfolio with continuous or frequent changes in the 
risk positions that are being hedged.1 In effect, open portfolios are forced into closed portfolios for hedge 
accounting purposes. These constraints make it difficult to reflect dynamic risk management in financial 
statements. In addition, the existing portfolio hedge accounting requirements in IAS 39 Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement are limited to interest rate risk only. For these reasons, the IASB decided to 
consider a new accounting model for dynamic risk management … In May 2012 the IASB tentatively decided to 
develop a DP as the initial due process step. The IASB noted that the development of an accounting model for 
dynamic risk management was not a modification to hedge accounting requirements but that it would instead be 
a fundamental change in how risk management is considered for the purposes of financial reporting. Given the 
complexities involved, the DP allows the IASB to seek feedback on a broader range of alternatives and variations. 
The IASB also realised that the development of a new accounting model for dynamic risk management would 
take time. This conflicted with the timeline for IFRS 9 Financial Instruments. Consequently, in May 2012 the 
IASB separated the two projects, allowing it to finalise IFRS 9 while progressing with the accounting for dynamic 
risk management as a separate project.’ 
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management in the accounting by amending IAS 39 Financial Instrument: Recognition and 
Measurement to incorporate fair value hedge accounting for a portfolio hedge of interest rate risk. 
However, the scope of that amendment was limited to interest rate risk and banks have found those 
particular hedge accounting requirements difficult to apply in practice. This is because banks’ risk 
management of interest rate risk is usually performed dynamically, and is based on open portfolios to 
accommodate the constant changes in risk exposures faced by the bank.14 
 
The paper comprises 115 pages and is almost exclusively focused on interest rate risk as 
understood within a banking enterprise. Even though the paper admits this and the public 
consultation process seeks application to other industries, the quick resolution of something as 
broad and complex as a general accounting standard will take time. The reasons given for the 
review of hedge accounting are relevant to the analysis for this study, rather than the discussion 
paper’s proposed valuation solution. This is especially relevant when reviewing the UK and 
Australia, where accounting standards have been used as an approach to rewriting tax statutes. 
Some of the inadequacy or artificiality of the IAS 39 fair value approach is the following: 
• Hedge accounting uses an instrument approach, whereas in practice risk 
management is conducted on a portfolio basis on net open risk positions, rather 
than gross exposures. 
• The need for such one-to-one designation between the hedged item and the hedging 
instrument in effect forces an open portfolio scenario into a series of closed 
portfolios with an artificial short life.  
• The accounting standards designate what are considered eligible hedged items, 
rather than business reality. 
• Recognition and measurement approaches are designed for the hedging of static 
exposures, which does not reflect practice. In other words, the static model of 
 
14 IASB and IFRS Foundation Discussion Paper DP/2014/1: Accounting for Dynamic Risk Management: A 
Portfolio Re-evaluation Approach to Macro Hedging (2014) 5. 
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hedging would be relevant if no new exposures were added or cancelled or 
removed.15 
3.4 SUMMARY 
Box 4.1 above expresses the National Treasury’s concern with the divergence between 
accounting and taxation.  
In respect of financial instruments, the rules pertaining to income tax and financial accounting have 
completely diverged. This divergence has proven to be a challenge for both taxpayers and SARS alike 
… From a SARS standpoint, the divergence between tax and accounting has become so great that 
accounting is often no longer a useful benchmark for assessing risk vis-à-vis the accuracy of taxable 
income.16 
 
Income classification does not have the same significance in accounting that it has in 
taxation. Accounting focuses particularly on the final result of an enterprise and does not pay 
the same attention to the nature of income. Accounting does not focus much on individuals, 
whereas tax laws cannot avoid them. Mark-to-market methodologies may work for a bank, but 
do not work well for individuals due to the liquidity constraints of individuals. Section 24JB is 
a helpful route towards certainty if its assumptions hold for excluded taxpayers in section 
24JB(1)(d) and financial assets in section 24JB(2)(a). However, within these categories of 
excluded taxpayer entities and financial assets, uncertainty still prevails.
 
15 Ibid 10–13. 




SOUTH AFRICA: REGULATION AND CASE LAW 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Modern day financial transactions are changing rapidly and are becoming increasingly sophisticated 
and complex as new financial arrangements are developed … On the other hand the general principles 
of our present tax law were developed prior to the introduction of many of these instruments and it is 
therefore becoming increasingly difficult to deal with the tax consequences of a number of these 
financial instruments under our current tax laws.1 
 
The Tax Advisory Committee’s 1994 report considered the need for a means to include 
derivative instruments in tax legislation, but ultimately deferred the matter, pending further 
research.2 A comprehensive framework for financial arrangements, as was proposed, has not 
as yet been developed for South Africa.3 The committee largely supported Australian policy 
concepts, but proposed the following on the subject of income character for financial 
arrangements: ‘Australia proposes that all gains and losses will be on revenue account, whereas 
the Committee is in favour of applying normal tax principles.’4 
This research confirms this approach many years later. An examination of US, UK and 
Australia tax policy for this thesis revealed that the USA has largely been dissatisfied with its 
complex rule-based system and is striving to move towards a mark-to-market system for all 
gains and losses. Australia and the UK have opted to follow an accounting approach and have 
since been trying to refine legislation to this effect. In 2012, the SA Taxation Laws Amendment 
Act introduced section 24JB, applicable to JSE-licensed stockbrokers and banks, which also 
 
1 Tax Advisory Committee (SA) Consultative Document on the Tax Treatment of Financial Arrangements 
(1994) 1. 
2 Relayed to me by the late Dr De Villiers Graaff, who was a member of the committee. He suggested that the 
USA, the UK and Australia should be researched for guidelines. 
3 Tax Advisory Committee (SA) (n 1) 2. 
4 Ibid. 
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follows accounting standards, with the definitions of ‘derivative’, ‘financial instrument’, 
‘financial assets’ and ‘financial liabilities’ being referenced in the statute to IFRS 9.    
Section 24JB(2) specifically excludes shares not held for trading, an endowment policy, 
and an interest in a collective investment scheme. No specific provision exists for determining 
the tax character of financial derivative instruments within regulated investment portfolios, in 
keeping with the Act’s silence on characterisation in general. Beyond the remit of section 24JB, 
the situation is therefore largely unchanged since the Tax Advisory Committee made its 
remarks in 1994.  
This uncertainty is particularly relevant to investment portfolios (collective investment 
schemes and insurance portfolios), even when professionally regulated and managed.  
Despite the fact that portfolios are regulated by the Financial Sector Conduct Authority 
and have approved investment mandates with limited investment powers under statute and 
regulation, the Commissioner can determine that a transaction within that portfolio during a 
year of assessment has in fact not been one of investment, but one of profit-making. However, 
the onus of proving that an amount is capital or revenue rests on the taxpayer under section 102 
of the Tax Administration Act. For example, even though section 24JB specifically excludes 
derivative transactions in collective investment schemes in terms of its deeming provision, this 
does not imply that there is any certainty associated with this class of instrument. As was stated 
at the beginning of this thesis, the concern here is not with any specific type of portfolio such 
as collective investment schemes or life portfolios, and the point is simply made to illustrate 
that uncertainty continues to prevail. There is no comprehensive legislative framework for 
character determination, a lack of clarity within existing case law, and many strong, but not 
necessarily substantiated, views among the authorities. The SARS Tax Guide for Share 
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Owners5 does not provide clarity either. This is not the fault of any particular party, but simply 
a reflection of the difficulties associated with resolving fundamental points of principle with 
respect to these instruments, as evidenced in the varied approaches of other jurisdictions. This 
research therefore attempts to clarify a single point, based on existing case law on income 
character determination, which will hopefully strengthen certainty. What follows assumes that 
the reader has knowledge of the extensive case law on character determination in SA and does 
not attempt to re-examine this case law as part of the thesis. 
4.2 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK APPLICABLE TO THE SAVINGS 
INDUSTRY 
The South African savings and investments industry manages three pools of savings:6 
1. collective investment schemes (R2,448 billion); 
2. retirement funds (R3,607 billion); and 
3. life insurance portfolios (R1,922 billion) 
In addition to the above, the asset management industry also manages small pools of 
assets on behalf of short-term insurers and medical schemes.  
In South Africa, policy pertaining to the third-party investment of public money is set by 
the National Treasury. The regulations that frame that policy and the enforcement thereof are 
the functions of the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (the FSCA, previously the Financial 
Services Board (FSB)) and the Prudential Authority (PA), under the auspices of the South 
African Reserve Bank (SARB).  
Following the financial crisis of 2008, the government published a policy reform paper 
in 2011, entitled A Safer Financial Sector to Serve South Africa Better. In February 2013, a 
 
5 SARS Tax Guide for Share Owners Issue 7 (2020). 
6 These figures are drawn from the most recently available data in the SARB QB (December 2019), ASISA 
statistics (June and September 2019) and FSCA (2018) reports. 
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detailed follow-up document was published, entitled Implementing a Twin Peaks Model of 
Financial Regulation in South Africa.7 In December 2013, the Financial Sector Regulation Bill 
was published to give effect to Twin Peaks.8 The Financial Sector Regulation Act came into 
effect on 1 April 2018. On 11 December 2018, the FSCA published the draft Conduct of 
Financial Institutions (COFI) Bill, which deals with the conduct of financial institutions and 
the treatment of customers. A second draft is awaited. Figure 4.1 provides a useful overview 
of how the financial services industry is categorised by legislative instrument and regulating 
authority. 
 
Figure 4.1: Overview of the FSR Bill regulatory framework9 
 
7 See National Treasury Response and Explanatory Document Accompanying the Second Draft of the Financial 
Sector Regulation Bill (2014) 8. ‘Many countries have chosen a Twin Peaks approach, including Australia, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. However, each has implemented their own 
unique version of the model. For example, the UK’s Prudential Regulatory Authority operates as a subsidiary of 
the Bank of England and is responsible only for the prudential regulation of systemic institutions like banks, 
insurers and some asset managers, while the Financial Conduct Authority is responsible for market conduct 
supervision, both credit and all other financial institutions, and some prudential supervision. The Australian 
Prudential Regulatory Authority is completely separate from the Reserve Bank of Australia. In Belgium and the 
Netherlands, account has to be taken of the role of the European Union and the European Central Bank, hence 
the domestic central bank is responsible for prudential oversight, but not for monetary policy.’  
8 See, generally, National Treasury (n 7). 
9 National Treasury ‘Stakeholder consultation workshop: Second draft of the Financial Sector Regulation Bill 
Jan–Feb 2015’, slide 14. ‘PA’ refers to ‘Prudential Authority’; ‘FSCA’ refers to ‘Financial Sector Conduct 
Authority’; and ‘CMS’ refers to ‘Council for Medical Schemes’. 
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4.3 REGULATED SAVINGS VEHICLES 
4.3.1 Retirement funds 
Retirement funds are not subject to tax in the fund and are therefore not affected by income 
characterisation. This also applies to the use of financial derivative instruments. Section 36(1) 
of the Pension Funds Act of 1956, as effected by regulation 28, empowers the Minister of 
Finance to stipulate prudential limits for retirement funds. This includes investment in 
regulation 28-compliant collective investment schemes.  
4.3.2 Long-term insurance 
The long-term insurance industry is regulated by the Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 
(LTIA). The LTIA came into effect on 1 July 2018, with a two-year transitional period.  
The insurance business model is by its nature pre-funded by premiums and has long-term 
liabilities that need to be matched (or hedged) on the balance sheet. Section 34 of the LTIA 
prohibits speculative or geared positions. Regulation therefore imposes strict prudential 
requirements on insurers to ensure that these corporations can honour promises made to policy 
holders. Instruments such as derivatives may be used only for mitigating risk or efficient 
portfolio management.10 What this encompasses under the new solvency requirements 
developed by the FSCA has been extensively examined in the calculation of the Solvency 
Capital Requirement (SCR),11 as derivative exposure may be allowed only in respect of assets 
in excess of the assets required to meet the short- or long-term insurer’s liabilities under their 
respective policies.  
 
 
10 Section 34(2) of the LTIA. 
11 FSCA ‘Solvency Assessment and Management: Pillar 1’ – Sub Committee, Capital Requirements Task Group 
Discussion Document 75 (v3), Treatment of risk-mitigation techniques in the SCR. 
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4.3.3 Collective investment schemes 
Collective investment schemes are regulated by the Collective Investment Schemes Control 
Act 45 of 2002 (CISCA). Section 46 of CISCA empowers the registrar to determine investment 
powers for these portfolios: 
(1) The registrar may, after consultation with the advisory committee, determine the manner in which 
and the limits and conditions subject to which securities or classes of securities may be included in a 
portfolio of a collective investment scheme in securities. 
(2) The registrar may, after consultation with the advisory committee, determine different manners, 
limits and conditions for different securities or classes of securities or different portfolios of a collective 
investment scheme in securities. 
 
The FSCA Board Notices 90 and 52 specify in detail the investment powers of CIS 
portfolios. These include qualifying securities and instruments, conditions and limits of 
inclusion. 
4.4 APPROACH OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COURTS TO INCOME 
CHARACTER DETERMINATION 
Unfortunately, our courts provide little specific guidance on the characterisation of derivative 
transactions. The SARS Tax Guide for Share Owners12 cites one domestic case, ITC 175613 
and an English decision, dated 1969, in Wisdom v Chamberlain (Inspector of Taxes)14 to 
support a view that ‘[t]he proceeds are more likely to be of a revenue nature when the type of 
share purchased does not produce dividends’.15 The former case resulted in the court not 
considering the character of a futures contract once it had established that the transaction fell 
outside of the tax year under consideration. The latter case considered a commodity transaction 
 
12 SARS Tax Guide for Share Owners Issue 7 (2020). 
13 ITC 1756 (1997) 65 SATC 375 (C). Other cases such as ITC 43 (1925) 2 SATC 115 involving grain futures, 
ITC 340 (1935) involving a forward exchange contract, and ITC 1498 (1989) also involving a foreign exchange 
contract are not relevant to the equity derivatives being considered here. However, ITC 1498 supports the 
concept of hedging with a derivative on capital account. 
14 Wisdom v Chamberlain (Inspector of Taxes) (1969) 1 All ER 332 (CA).   
15 SARS (n 12) 6. 
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in silver. The SARS Guide states: ‘The sale of futures contracts is likely to be on revenue 
account, even if used as a hedge against losses on underlying shares held as capital assets (ITC 
1756; Wisdom v Chamberlain (Inspector of Taxes).’16 
Futures contracts, which can be used to acquire an economic exposure to an asset when 
the physical asset is not readily available, could be of an equity nature. The Guide, however, 
declares all futures contracts as likely to be on revenue account as they do not produce an 
income, namely dividends. The purpose, such as hedging, is of no effect.  
Our courts have confirmed that, while not universally valid, the test consistently applied 
when determining income character is whether a scheme is one of profit-making. Smalberger 
JA confirmed in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase 
Trust17 that ‘[t]he appropriate test in a matter such as the present is a well-established one. The 
receipts accruing … will be revenue if they constitute a “gain made by an operation of business 
in carrying out a scheme for profit-making.”’ As Van der Merwe AJA (as he then was) 
explained more recently,18 ‘[t]hat expression refers to the use of the taxpayer’s resources and 
skills to generate profits, usually, but not always, of an ongoing nature.’19  
CIR v Pick ’n Pay concerned a share purchase trust established in 1977 by Pick ’n Pay 
Stores Ltd for the benefit of its employees. The scheme was administered by the financial 
director of the Pick ’n Pay group and overseen by a board of trustees. For the years of 





17 CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 1992 (4) SA 39 (A) 54, SATC 271; TS Emslie & DM 
Davis Income Tax: Cases and Materials (2011) 306. 
18 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd (20844/2015) [2016] ZASCA 
2 at 24. 
19 Ibid 26. 




The Commissioner appealed against a decision of the Cape Income Tax Special Court 
that the above amounts were of a capital nature. On appeal, the court held that the amounts 
were capital in nature.21 Given the dissenting opinion of Nicholas AJA that the amounts 
constituted floating capital, Smalberger JA (with Goldstone JA and Howie AJA concurring) 
stated that the transactions in shares should be viewed no differently from transactions ‘in 
respect of any other property’: ‘Transactions involving shares do not differ from transactions 
in respect of any other property and the capital or revenue nature of a receipt is determined in 
the same way whether one is dealing with land or shares.’22  
As the facts of the case were not in dispute, the determination, given the above statement, 
had to be inferred from the facts. While acknowledging the ‘variety of tests’ enunciated by our 
courts, Smalberger referred to them as ‘guidelines only’ and not of ‘invariable application’.23 
The appropriate test in these circumstances is whether the receipts constitute ‘a gain made by 
an operation of business in carrying out a scheme for profit-making’.24 The facts of the case 
and ‘sound commercial and good sense’25 pointed to character of a capital nature for the 
following reasons:26 
1. A distinction is drawn between the conducting of a business that involves a series or pattern 
of transactions and a scheme that may more appropriately refer to a single transaction. 
2. However, how the receipts that flow from that business are characterised depends on the 






25 Quoting Friedman J in ITC 1450 51 SATC 70 at 76. 
26 CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust (n 17) 56. 
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for employees to acquire shares under the rules of the scheme. ‘There was no intention on 
the part of the trust to conduct a business in shares’27 as a dealer in shares would do, by 
buying and selling to make a profit. The trust, by contrast, was executed according to the 
obligations and constraints placed upon the trustees. This did not include the making of 
profits from shares bought and sold in meeting those obligations. From a commercial 
viewpoint, this had no comparable likeness to a dealer in shares. 
3. Profits or losses from transacting in the shares were therefore purely an incidental by-
product of the main business of the trust and ‘contemplation [of profit] is not to be confused 
with intention’.28 ‘The sole purpose of acquiring, holding and selling the shares was to place 
them in the hands of eligible employees’.29  
4. Furthermore, ‘the manner in which the Trust held and dealt with the shares makes that 
conclusion [that they were floating capital] untenable’.30 ‘Where no trade is conducted there 
cannot be floating capital’.31 
In CIR v Stott,32 Wessels JA stated that ‘[t]o convert what was an ordinary investment 
into a profit-making business, there had to be proof of some special acts which show that the 
taxpayer had embarked on a scheme of profit-making.’33 What that proof comprises may 
include any number of circumstantial facts. In John Bell & Co (Pty) Ltd v Secretary for Inland 







32 CIR v Stott 1928 AD 252, 3 SATC 253. 
33 Ibid 264; Emslie & Davis (n 17) 190. 
34 John Bell & Co (Pty) Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1976 (4) SA 415 (A), 38 SATC 87. 
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metamorphose the character of the asset and so render its proceeds gross income.’35 A mere 
change of intention to dispose of an asset held as capital was not enough.  
In CIR v Nussbaum,36 ‘frequency’ was seen as indicative of a scheme of profit-making. 
Nussbaum was a teacher by profession and had inherited a share portfolio in 1946. He had 
managed it himself over the years, adding to it as he had surplus funds. At the end of the 1984 
tax year, he held shares in 150 companies. He had in the previous three tax years concluded 
47, 75 and 61 sales and 120, 159 and 118 purchases of shares, which is almost one transaction 
every business day.37 The Commissioner sought to tax the proceeds on the basis that he was 
employing his shares as stock-in-trade. The taxpayer’s appeal to a full bench of the Cape 
Provincial Division succeeded, with the court accepting his contention that his efforts were 
directed at maximising dividend income and that the manner in which he had done so did not 
detract from the fact that he was an investor and not engaging in speculation. The Appellate 
Division, however, found in favour of the Commissioner. Howie JA held as follows:38 
1. Although not conclusive, the scale and frequency of the taxpayer’s share transactions were of 
major importance. 
2. By keeping a constant watch over his portfolio and ‘farming’ it assiduously, the taxpayer had 
manifested a secondary purpose of dealing in shares for a profit, notwithstanding that his primary 
purpose had been to maximise dividend income. 
3. Looking beyond his ipse dixit to all the facts of the case, the taxpayer’s profit-making activities 
could not be regarded as being merely incidental to his investment activities. 
4. The taxpayer had not discharged the onus of showing that he was not engaged in a scheme of 
profit-making as a secondary activity. 
5. The profits made during the years in question were therefore taxable. 
6. The appeal was allowed with costs.39 
 
35 Ibid 429. Wessels JA provided an example of the taxpayer already trading in similar assets or then and there 
starting a business or a scheme of profit-making. 
36 CIR v Nussbaum 1996 (4) SA 1156 (A), 58 SATC 283; Emslie & Davis (n 17) 213. 
37 Emslie & Davis (n 17) 213. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid 212. 
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In CIR v Richmond Estates (Pty) Ltd,40 Centlivres CJ stated, quoting the sixth edition of 
Gunns Commonwealth Income Tax,41 ‘it is as difficult to make the change [from revenue to 
capital] for taxation purposes as it is for a rope to pass through the eye of a needle’. In ITC 
154742 this in fact happened after land that was held as trading stock by the taxpayer was 
expropriated. The taxpayer contended for a change in original intention, but failed to discharge 
the onus of proof to the satisfaction of the court. With regard to SIR v Rile Investments (Pty) 
Ltd,43 Clegg stated as follows: 
Rile establishes that it is possible for a taxpayer to change its intention in relation to a particular asset 
not once but twice (or more) … Another interesting facet of Rile’s judgment is that it casts further light 
on the ‘something more’ necessary to metamorphose the nature of an asset held by the taxpayer. 44  
 
Corbett JA divided the holding period of the asset into three phases, corresponding with 
changes in shareholding in Rile. Without exploring the complexity of the facts, it is enough to 
state that, in the second period, the learned judge held that the intentions were mixed, or of a 
dualistic nature, but by the third phase when Nedbank became a shareholder in Rile, ‘it [Rile] 
no longer had a dual intention but intended to pursue only the object of developing the property 
as a permanent investment’. Corbett JA, in his judgment, pointed to the need for a court to have 
objective evidence to substantiate such a finding, stating that ‘there was sufficient evidence of 
more than a mere change of intention to justify the finding of the court a quo’. The taxpayer 
had to show to the satisfaction of the court that he meant to cease trading in the asset and to 
hold the asset on a long-term basis on capital account.  
In COT v Levy,45 the court held that, where mixed intentions exist, the dominant intention 
should be used in deciding intention: 
 
40 CIR v Richmond Estates (Pty) Ltd 1956 (1) SA 602 (A). 
41 Ibid 653. 
42 55 SATC 19. 
43 SIR v Rile Investments (Pty) Ltd 40 SATC 135, 1978 (3) SA 732 (A). 
44 DJM Clegg Tax Law through the Cases (1991) 111. 
45 COT v Levy 1952 (2) SA 413 (A), 18 SATC 127. 
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Where the purposes of an individual taxpayer are mixed, the only course, on principle as well as for 
practical reasons, is to seek and give effect to the dominant factor operating to induce him to effect the 
purchase … [U]nless one were to hold, what the legislature could not have intended, that the taxpayer 
must exclude the slightest contemplation of a profitable resale of the property, it seems to me that the 
only test to apply is that of the main or dominant purpose.46 
 
The same test was applied in CIR v Paul.47 Although the case involved an individual, it 
was pointed out in Levy’s case48 that the test may be slightly different in the case of a trading 
company versus an individual, according to CIR v Leydenberg Platinum.49 
When deciding whether there were mixed intentions, a distinction may be made between 
a main purpose and a dominant purpose. As Steyn CJ said in African Life Investment 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd v SIR:50 ‘Whether or not a purpose is dominant in the sense that another 
co-existing purpose may be effected at a profit without attracting liability for tax, is a matter of 
degree depending on the circumstances of the case’.51 
How this might apply to individuals is clearly illustrated in CIR v Nussbaum.52 The court 
contrasted the case with CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust,53 where the profits 
were merely incidental. In Nussbaum,54 the court held that Nussbaum had ‘farmed’ his large 
portfolio.55  
In CIR v Guardian Assurance Company (SA) Ltd,56 the Commissioner sought to tax the 
profits from the sales of shares in a share portfolio according to his policy to treat short-term 
insurers as ‘all-in companies’, that is, that all its investments were trading stock. The company 
 
46 Clegg (n 44) 122. 
47 CIR v Paul 1956 (3) SA 335 (A), 21 SATC 1. 
48 COT v Levy (n 45) 420. 
49 CIR v Leydenberg Platinum Ltd 1929 AD 137, 4 SATC 8 at 145; Emslie & Davis (n 17) 203. 
50 African Life Investment Corporation (Pty) Ltd v SIR 1969 (4) SA 259 (A), 31 SATC 163. 
51 Ibid 269. 
52 CIR v Nussbaum (n 36). 
53 CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust (n 17). 
54 CIR v Nussbaum (n 36). 
55 Ibid 1166. 
56 CIR v Guardian Assurance Company (SA) Ltd 1991 (3) SA 1 (A). 
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contended that the insurance business and the investment portfolio were run as separate entities 
within the company. The court accepted the evidence and held that the proceeds constituted 
receipts of a capital nature. 
In CIR v Middelman,57 the taxpayer sold his quoted shares to maximise his long-term 
investment income. The sale of the shares was held to be incidental to his main objective and 
not taxable. In ITC 1509,58 the court held that it would be quite incorrect to generally classify 
a taxpayer as a dealer in shares and to adopt the approach that a taxpayer operating as a share 
dealer would always be considered a share dealer. The court expressed the view that it is 
necessary to look at the purpose for which the taxpayer acquired each particular counter and 
the circumstances under which he came to sell that particular counter. 
In ITC 1185,59 Miller J stated the following with regard to determining a taxpayer’s 
intention at the time of acquiring a property: 
[T]he ipse dixit of the taxpayer as to his intent and purpose should not lightly be regarded as decisive. It 
is the function of the court to determine on an objective review of all the relevant facts and 
circumstances what the motive, purpose and intention of the taxpayer were. Not the least important of 
the facts will be the course of conduct of the taxpayer in relation to the transactions in issue, the nature 
of his business or occupation and the frequency or otherwise of his past involvement or participation in 
similar transactions. 
 
As Miller J stated, the distinction can be drawn into question in ‘the course of conduct’ 
of the taxpayer. No conduct can be universally interpreted and therefore the onus of proving 
the relative merits of transactions in different circumstances is vexed with complexity. In this 
respect, the length of a holding period is itself an inferior test. In Natal Estates,60 farmland that 
had been held for 50 years was nevertheless taxed on revenue account because it had been 
 
57 CIR v Middelman 1991 (1) SA 200 (C). 
58 ITC 1509 54 SATC 18. 
59 (1972) 35 SATC 122 (N) 123–4. See SARS Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax Issue 7 (2018) 17. 
60 Natal Estates Limited v CIR 1975 (4) SA 177 (A), 37 SATC 193. 
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converted into trading stock, while in ITC 118561 the proceeds from the sale of property held 
for a mere seven months were taxed as capital because of an intervening economic 
circumstance. In finding that the profit was of a capital nature, Miller J stated the following:62 
The fact that a property is sold for a substantial profit very soon after it has been acquired is, in most 
cases, an important one in considering whether an inference adverse to the taxpayer should be drawn, 
but it loses a great deal of its importance when there has been a nova causa interveniens. 
 
In ITC 862,63 the period was 50 years. In CSARS v Capstone,64 the holding period was 
22 months (June 2002 to April 2004). On appeal, the court had to decide the nature of a single 
transaction. The case had been decided in the Commissioner’s favour in the Tax Court, Cape 
Town, and overturned before a full bench of the Western Cape Division on appeal to the High 
Court. The Supreme Court of Appeal then gave the Commissioner special leave to appeal 
against the High Court’s decision. The case involved the rescue of Profurn, a company listed 
on the JSE, which had by 2001 run into serious financial difficulty. It owed FirstRand Bank 
over R900 million and somewhere in the region of R70 to R90 million to Steinhoff. The head 
of FirstRand Corporate, Dr Theunie Lategan, approached Mr Claus Daun, a wealthy 
businessman and shareholder in Profurn and Steinhoff, to inject capital into Profurn to reduce 
its debt to a more sustainable R300 million. Mr Daun agreed, on condition that Mr David 
Sussman of JD Group Limited (JDG) managed Profurn to turn it around. The resulting 
transaction involved Profurn converting R600 million in debt to equity through a rights offer, 
which was underwritten by FirstRand. A merger thereafter between Profurn and JDG resulted 
in an exchange of Profurn shares for JDG shares. The JDG shares were sold to special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs). Mr Daun used a German private holding company controlled by him to inject 
 
61 ITC 1185 (1974) 35 SATC 122. 
62 Ibid 128. See Emslie & Davis (n 17) 195. 
63 ITC 862 22 SATC 301. 
64 CSARS v Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 341 (SCA), 78 SATC 231. 
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R300 million into the structure. Preference shares were issued for R200 million and the 
remaining R100 million was funded by way of a loan from FirstRand.  
The inquiry concerned the share sale by the taxpayer, Capstone, of approximately 17.5 
million shares in JDG, through which it made a profit of almost R400 million. Van der Merwe 
AJA cited the well-known view of the courts that there is no ‘halfway house’.65 ‘It follows that 
Capstone could only discharge the onus by showing, on a balance of probabilities, that the 
proceeds were capital … on the particular facts of each case, for which there is no single 
infallible test.’66  
He quoted Innes CJ67 in Overseas Trust Corporation Ltd v Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue:68 ‘Where an asset is realised at a profit as a mere change of investment there is no 
difference in character between the amount of enhancement and the balance of proceeds.’ 
Citing Hefer AP69 in Samril Investments (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner,70 Van der Merwe 
AJA noted that profit-making is also an element of capital accumulation. ‘Thus the mere 
intention to profit is not conclusive. There must be “an operation of business in carrying out a 
scheme for profit making” for a receipt to be income.’71 Acknowledging that the distinction 
may be a fine one, a number of factors were set out that need to be assessed, apart from the 
intention of the taxpayer: ‘it is therefore essential to consider the “business activities in which 
the taxpayer is ordinarily engaged”; the period for which the asset is held (“the longer that 
period the more likely it is that the disposal is a realisation of capital rather than a receipt of 
 
65 Ibid para 22, citing Cowe v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1930 AD 122 at 129. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid para 23. 
68 Overseas Trust Corporation Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1926 AD 444 at 452–3. 
69 CIR v Capstone (n 64) para 26. 
70 Samril Investments (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2003] ZASCA 118, 2003 (1) 
SA 658 (SCA) [2]. 
71 CIR v Capstone (n 64) para 26. 
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income”; the nature of the risk undertaken which is either directed at building up a capital asset 
or generating revenue and profit.’72 
Of particular interest is the reference to McCreath J on behalf of the full bench in 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v General Motors SA (Pty) Ltd:73  
Finally, I consider that the correct approach in a matter of this nature is not that of a narrow legalistic 
nature. What has to be considered is the commercial operation as such and the character of the 
expenditure arising therefrom. This is perhaps but another way of expressing the concept that it is the 
substance and reality of the original loan transaction that is the decisive factor. 
 
Further, the court references the remarks of Lord Hoffmann74 in MacNiven (Inspector of 
Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd:75 
The innovation in the Ramsay case was to give the statutory concepts … a commercial meaning. The 
new principle of the construction was a recognition that the statutory language was intended to refer to 
commercial concepts … the court was required to take a view of the facts which transcended the 
juristic individuality of the various parts of a preplanned series of transactions. 
 
Therefore, ‘the transaction must be considered in its entirety from a commercial 
perspective and not be broken into component parts or subjected to narrow legalistic 
scrutiny.’76  
4.5 SUMMARY 
The discussion of the cases above makes it clear that certainty is lacking. The SARS tax guide 
relies on the construct and nature of financial derivatives as proof of a revenue nature because 
derivatives do not produce dividends. If the nature of the instrument is by definition seen to be 
that of revenue, then there can be no ‘special act’, according to CIR v Stott, or metamorphisis, 
according to John Bell & Co (Pty) Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue, to convert its tax nature 
 
72 Ibid para 32. 
73 Ibid para 34. 
74 Ibid. 
75 MacNiven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 865 [32]. 
76 CIR v Capstone (n 64) para 34. 
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to capital – it is intrinsic. The nature of these contracts is discussed in chapters 8 and 11, with 
reference to leading decisions, involving rights under derivative contracts, which followed the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. CIR v Nussbaum, on the other hand, is heavily weighted  
towards ‘frequency’ as a determinant of income character. Financial derivatives can be of a 
very long duration, but their pricing becomes increasingly expensive the longer the period, due 
to unquantifiable risks. They can also be used as a step towards acquiring the physical asset or 
may be traded vigorously at a lower cost than the physical. All these circumstances provide an 
appearance that is analagous to Nussbaum. An analysis in chapter 11 therefore contrasts 
Nussbaum and CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust, as the court chose to do in 
Nussbaum, but substituting derivatives for shares.
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CHAPTER 5 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY 
OUTLINE FOR FINANCIAL DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The USA leads the culture of derivatives regulation. The USA is still seen as the source of that sort of 
capitalism which gave rise to financial derivatives, just as the US dollar remains the world’s safe haven 
currency in spite of its causative role in the global economic pandemonium of 2008–2009 …1 
 
Of the jurisdictions under consideration, the USA has the most developed tax code on 
derivatives. The US Treasury quantifies its derivative market at $200 trillion (notional), which 
is seven times its equity market.2 The USA is therefore relevant internationally as a capital 
market and to South Africa in that it has a common-law tradition and has developed legislation 
in an attempt to unify statute and common law. This seems tempting as a policy direction for 
South Africa. However, the game of catch-up with the market has by consequence led to a 
complexity of code unequalled by any of the other jurisdictions considered in this thesis. In 
2011, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in the USA released an analysis of the use 
of financial instruments for tax avoidance by the business sector. The GAO established that 
these instruments are the main means deployed by multinationals to avoid tax compliance.3 
Work done on behalf of the EU cites a set of literature that has evolved recently in the USA, 
focusing on the role of financial derivatives in tax planning by financial and non-financial 
corporations. ‘Of this, the work of Michael Donohoe stands apart.’4 Donohoe sought to 
empirically quantify the use of derivatives by US corporations in reducing tax liabilities and 
 
1 A Hudson The Law on Financial Derivatives 6 ed (2018) 2-15. 
2 US Department of the Treasury A Financial System that Creates Opportunities, Capital Markets (2017) 5. 
3 US Government Accountability Office Financial Derivatives: Disparate Tax Treatment and Information Gaps 
Create Uncertainty and Potential Abuse (2011). 
4 A Nesvetailova, A Guter-Sandu & R Palan Tax Evasion and Avoidance through Financial Engineering: 
Implications for Policy (2018) 10 [references omitted]. 
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demonstrates that, despite the extensive anti-avoidance tax code, significant fiscal leakage 
occurs: 
Donohoe conducted a series of studies of US corporations showing that many of those investigated 
attained reductions in current taxes and cash taxes paid in the four years subsequent to deployment of 
derivatives. He established that these benefits increase with the magnitude of derivatives employed; 
they result mainly from tax deferral opportunities, and are not driven by effective hedging of economic 
risks. Further, Donohoe and colleagues estimate that Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) facilitate over 
$330 billion of incremental cash tax savings, or roughly 6% of total U.S. federal corporate income tax 
collections during 1997-2016. In his later work, he estimated the corporate tax savings from financial 
derivatives amounts to between 3.6 and 4.4 percentage point reduction in three-year current and cash 
effective tax rates (ETRs). The decline in cash ETR equates to $10.69 million in tax savings for 
average firm and $4.0 billion for the entire sample of 375 new derivatives users. Of these amounts, 
$8.75 million and $3.3 billion, respectively, are incremental to tax savings that theory suggests are a 
byproduct of risk management.5 
 
 From a regulatory perspective, the USA and Europe have been the two principal 
drivers of change following the 2008 financial crisis. The Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 (the Dodd-Frank Act) has been the key instrument for regulatory change 
in the USA. This includes a new framework for the regulation of swaps and derivative markets,  
risk retention for securitised products, mandating the clearing of certain derivatives through 
central counterparties, and the designation of systemically important financial market utilities. 
Within the banking sector, the Volker Rule prohibits banks from doing proprietary trading on 
their balance sheets (principally derivative trading) and thereby risking solvency.  
The US Investment Company Act of 1940 (the ICA) is the principal statute regulating 
investment companies in the USA. The US Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Advisers 
Act) regulates registration, reporting and operations of external fund managers to portfolios. 
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) is the primary regulator of investment 
companies and asset managers in the USA.6  
 
5 Ibid 7 [references omitted]. 
6 See generally P Dickson The Asset Management Review (2012) 450–1. 
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5.2 TAX WITHIN THE REGULATED INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK 
The asset management industry in the USA is typically divided into two segments: those that 
offer access to a public pool of assets (anyone can participate), and those that offer access to 
private pools (by agreement). The former comprise principally unitised schemes (mutual funds 
or unit trusts) and the latter comprise hedge and private equity funds and real estate funds 
available to investors of some means and experience. 
The legislative vehicles for public pools and private pools of professionally managed 
money typically seek to achieve tax neutrality so as to distribute income and capital gains and 
losses to the investors without incurring tax within the entity. Publicly accessible vehicles have 
to be registered with the SEC as a regulated investment company (RIC). Distributions from an 
RIC are generally taxed as ordinary income if dividends are accruing to US citizens. Long-
term and short-term capital gains are taxed at reduced rates (21 per cent) if retained in the fund. 
If they are distributed, short-term gains are taxed at the maximum marginal rate (37 per cent).7 
Foreign investors are subject to a 30 per cent withholding tax on dividends from an RIC. 
Disposal of shares in a RIC will be treated as capital ‘to the extent the payment is treated as 
payment in exchange for the stock’ and, conversely, as ordinary if ‘essentially equivalent to a 
dividend’.8 In the same fashion, private investment pools are normally held in partnerships 
where the conduit nature of these arrangements enables tax neutrality at the entity level. ‘The 
source and character of partnership items is generally determined at the entity level.’9 
Bergman et al summarised income character determination within the investment 
industry as follows: 
Investing is not considered to be a ‘trade or business’, regardless of the extent, continuity, variety and 
regularity of the investment activity. An overseas investor is not considered to be engaged in a trade or 
 
7 Bloomberg Law Portfolio 740-3rd Taxation of Regulated Investment Companies and their Shareholders 
(2020).   
8 Ibid 461. 
9 Ibid 462. 
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business by investing in a fund that trades in stock, securities and commodities (although lending and 
other activities undertaken by a fund may give rise to a trade or business).10 
 
5.3 TAX LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR DERIVATIVES 
On 18 May 2016, Senator Ron Wyden introduced a discussion document to standardise and 
simplify the legislative treatment of derivatives and move towards a broad mark-to-market 
policy regime. On 2 May 2017, this was followed with the Modernisation of Derivatives Act 
of 2017, as a Bill to Congress. He described the existing law on the treatment of derivatives as 
follows: 
There are no general principles governing the taxation of derivative contracts in the United States, but 
instead a complex set of tax rules and regulations that evolved in piecemeal fashion over time. The 
existing rules provide differential treatment based on many factors, including: character of tax attribute 
(ordinary vs. capital), timing of recognition (short-term versus long-term), type of derivative instrument 
(option, future, forward, or swap, and whether over-the-counter or exchange-traded), disposition of the 
contract (terminated, exercised, or lapsed), type of settlement (cash vs. physical delivery), intended use 
of the instrument (investment vs. business hedge), nature of the taxpayer (dealer, trader, or investor; 
corporation or individual), source of the transaction (U.S. or foreign), and whether the counterparty is a 
U.S. or foreign person. In addition, taxpayers must consider numerous anti-abuse rules (e.g., straddle 
and wash sales rules) when they engage in certain derivative transactions. Moreover, these tax rules 
prescribe federal tax treatment of derivative instruments without regard to their treatment under 
accounting rules.11 
 
The USA has the most intricate legislative framework for derivative instruments amongst 
those surveyed. What can be described as a rules-based system has increasingly tried to cater 
for more and more permutations in the use and design of these instruments. While it is not 
possible for this analysis to consider every legislative contour, it is also not possible to 
appreciate the rationale of the courts without understanding the structure of the tax statute. 
Most of the derivative provisions seem to be motivated by anti-avoidance. Attempts by drafters 
 
10 See Bloomberg Law (n 7) 463. The description of the regulatory environment is principally informed by this 
publication at 450–64. 
11 R Wyden Modernisation of Tax Act of 2017, Section-by-Section (2017). 
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to be more specific in response to rulings by the courts have resulted in an ever-tightening 
legislative noose that, by virtue of its specificity, then spawns exceptions not previously 
envisaged. The legislation therefore uses specific targeted provisions that override the general 
treatment. These specific provisions provide categorical taxing solutions for specific users, 
uses and products (instruments). The tax treatment is affected by whether the taxpayer is an 
end-user, a trader or a dealer, and whether the transaction is part of a specific derivative strategy 
such as a hedge, a straddle or a conversion transaction. In general, gains follow the nature of 
the underlying asset and those of an ordinary nature are included in ordinary income and are 
taxed at the marginal rate within each tax cycle. Different treatment may apply to cash-settled 
as opposed to physically settled derivatives. The treatment of losses is determined by the legal 
nature of the taxpayer (corporate or individual). Capital gains and losses may receive different 
treatment. Gains may be taxed at a lower rate (20 per cent) and losses in excess of gains for the 
tax cycle may be limited. Box 5.1 below lists both the general and special provisions. Section 
5.4 then provides a brief description of each before the interpretative challenges in chapter 6 
are addressed. 
Box 5.1: Outline of legislative provisions 
General provisions 
Section Purpose 
1221 General rules for determining capital gains and losses 
1222 General rule applicable as to whether gain short-term or long-term 
1223 Basic rules for holding period 
1234 Basic rules concerning character of gain or loss of options  
1234A Special rules for determining capital gains or losses for options 
1234B Special rules for determining capital gains or losses for futures 
Specific provisions 
Section Purpose 
475 Dealer mark-to-market rules (user defined) 
988 Foreign currency hedging rules (defined by use) 
1092 and 263 (g) Straddle rules (defined by use) 
1221 Business hedging regulations (defined by use) 
1233 Short sale rules (defined by use) 
1256  Mark-to-market rules 
1258 Conversion rules 
1259 Constructive sale rules 
1260 Constructive ownership rules 
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Treasury Reg. sec. 1.1275-6 Debt hedging rules 
 
5.4 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF GENERAL PROVISIONS12 
5.4.1 Section 1221 – General rules for determining capital gains and losses 
The term ‘capital asset’ is defined in legislation in the USA by the exclusion of what ‘capital’ 
does not include amongst property held by the taxpayer.  
5.4.2 Section 1222 – General rule applicable as to whether gain is short-term or long-
term 
The USA distinguishes between short- and long-term capital gains. ‘Short-term’ capital gains 
recognise the fact that a holding period is not always a defining quality in the characterisation 
of income. Section 1222 defines such a gain as being triggered by a sale or exchange of a capital 
asset held for not more than one year in the computation of gross income.  
5.4.3 Section 1223 – Basic rules for holding period 
As the holding period set down in section 1222 has a determining function in the 
characterisation of a gain or loss, section 1223 defines the basis for calculating the holding 
period.13 
 
12 Coming to grips with the complexity of the US legislation and case law was no easy task. To validate sources 
I wrote to Professor Alvin Warren at Harvard University at the start of my research to verify the main works on 
the topic. Conlon and Aquilino’s treatise was then mostly used to inform the original contents of this chapter. 
Given the date of Conlon and Aquilino’s work I needed to ensure that the summary remained accurate. This 
chapter has therefore been cross-referenced to the report prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation, entitled 
Present Law and Issues Related to the Taxation of Financial Instruments and Products (JCX-56-11) 2 
December 2011. The report was requested following the financial crisis on federal tax rules relating to the 
taxation of financial instruments. The many journal articles are cited and require no further mention. 
Verification was repeated in 2018 by cross-referencing this chapter to a very helpful document sent to me by the 
Investment Company Institute in the USA. The Congress of the US Joint Committee on Taxation prepared an 
analysis for Senator Ron Wyden dated 18 May 2016, wherein the existing law was analysed as part of a 
comparative analysis to the discussion document and Bill that he was preparing for introduction to Congress to 
modernise derivative taxation. While the ICI’s assistance was in response to a request from me given challenges 
the investment industry was facing following a proposal in the draft 2018 Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, I am 
nonetheless grateful that it has also been helpful for this research. I have also accessed a 2017 version that was 
prepared for Senator Wyden to match the Bill that followed the discussion document. 
13 See also Treasury Regulation section 1.1223-1(a). 
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5.4.4 Section 1234 – Basic rules concerning character of gain or loss 
Section 1234 sets out the basic rules concerning income character for options. The deduction 
of capital losses incurred by companies is limited to the extent of capital gains and, for other 
taxpayers, a cap on the excess of capital gains that can be set off against ordinary income in 
any year applies. 
The characterisation of the term of the gain or loss as either short- or long-term may be 
affected by the provisions of the straddle or wash sale rules.14 
Section 1234 also prescribes when premiums are taken into account. For federal income 
tax purposes, two fundamental principles underscore the taxation of option premiums: 
1. Premiums paid by a holder are capitalisable, not deductible, either immediately or over 
time. 
2. Premiums received are not immediately treated as income to the writer.15 Ordinary 
income arises if the option is not exercised. If the option is with respect to ‘property’ 
that includes shares, securities and commodities futures, the gain or loss is a short-term 
capital gain or loss.16 
5.4.5 Section 1234A – Special rules for determining capital gains and losses 
The character of options follows the nature of the underlying asset.17 If the option is cash-
settled, then the nature will be determined by the holding period, which needs to be more than 
a year for the option to qualify as a long-term capital gain.18 If the option purchaser exercises 
 
14 Steven D Conlon & Vincent Aquilino Principles of Financial Derivatives, US and International Taxation 
(2000) B1.05, B1-33. 
15 Rev. Rul. 71-521, 1971-2 CB 313, cited in Conlon & Aquilino (n 14) B1.05[4][c]. 
16 Section 1234(b) and 1234(b)(2)(B). 
17 Section 1234(a)(1). 
18 Rev. Rul. 88-31, 1988-1 C.B. 302; Joint Committee on Taxation Description of the Modernization of 
Derivatives Tax Act of 2016 2. 
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a physically settled option, the holding period will be calculated from the date of exercise for 
the referenced or underlying property.19 
5.4.6 Section 1234B – Special rules for determining capital gains and losses (futures 
contracts) 
Section 1234B references the character of the futures contract to the nature of the asset to which 
it refers as follows: 
Gain or loss attributable to the sale, exchange, or termination of a securities futures contract shall be 
considered gain or loss from the sale or exchange of property which has the same character as the 
property to which the contract relates has in the hands of the taxpayer (or would have in the hands of 
the taxpayer if acquired by the taxpayer).20  
 
It also deems the gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset as short-term, 
other than in certain circumstances. 
5.5 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS 
5.5.1 Section 475 – Dealers in securities 
Enacted in 1993, section 475 sets out the rules applicable to dealers in securities (taxpayers 
who are engaged in selling securities to third parties). Section 475 represents a departure from 
realisations-based taxation, recognising gains and losses on the last day of the tax year, based 
on fair market value. Prior to the introduction of this provision, dealers were permitted to value 
inventory in securities at (1) cost; (2) the lower of cost or market; or (3) fair market value 
(mark-to-market). However, the ability of dealers to avoid the recognition of gains while 
recognising unrealised losses in terms of this approach resulted in the design of the section 475 
rules. The character of gains and losses under section 475 is ordinary.21 As is self-evident, 
almost all transactions would have, on at least one side, a taxpayer subject to section 475. 
 
19 Section 1223(5). 
20 26 USCS 1234B(a)(1). 
21 Section 475(c)(3). 
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5.5.2 Section 988 – Foreign currency hedging rules22 
Section 988 is an exemption to the mark-to-market rules applicable under section 1256, 
although excluding regulated futures contracts or non-equity options. Section 988 recognises 
the need for hedges against foreign currency fluctuations as prudent business practice. Its ambit 
therefore includes hedges relative to property held or to be held or borrowings and obligations. 
The condition, however, is that with all business hedges the transaction has to be properly 
identified as such by the taxpayer. A ‘qualified fund’ is entitled to use this provision. 
5.5.3 Sections 1092 and 263(g) – Straddles23 
The provisions in these co-joined sections are anti-abuse rules directed at the use of straddles. 
Typically, the buyer of a straddle believes that the price of an underlying asset will be volatile, 
but may not have any particular view on the directions of movement of the price. Offsetting 
positions are therefore purchased, using a call and put option on the same asset with identical 
maturity and strike prices.24 A taxpayer’s holding period on a position does not run while a 
straddle is in force for that position. The character of the position preceding a straddle remains 
intact during the term of the straddle.25  
This section is directed at preventing the ability of users of this strategy to transform 
short-term capital gains into long-term capital gains while not bearing the economic risks 
associated with holding the underlying asset for the long term. 
This section, which is complex in design, serves therefore to restrict taxpayers’ timing of 
loss recognition and, consequently, the holding period of an asset, so as to prevent the creation 
of artificial tax losses and the translation of short-term gains into long-term gains. 
This approach is encapsulated in the legislation as follows: 
 
22 Conlon & Aquilino (n 14) B1.06[4][d]. 
23 Ibid B3.03. 
24 A Inglis-Taylor Dictionary of Derivatives (1995) 111. 
25 Treasury Regulation section 1.1092(b)-2T(a)(1). See Joint Committee on Taxation (n 18) 12. 
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Any loss with respect to one or more positions shall be taken into account for any taxable year only to 
the extent that the amount of such loss exceeds the unrecognised gain (if any) with respect to [one] or 
more positions which were offsetting positions with respect to [one] or more positions from which the 
loss arose.26 
 
Section 263(g) requires the capitalisation of interest and carrying charges and therefore 
prevents a taxpayer from deducting these against ordinary income on an ongoing basis during 
the period of the straddle. 
5.5.4 Section 1221 – Business hedging27 
Whether derivatives that are used to hedge business risks were capital or ordinary items, and how they 
should be accounted for, was a matter of case law28 and administrative guidance until Treasury 
regulations were published in 1993 and 1994. These regulations governed the timing and character of 
hedging transactions under sections 1221 and 446 respectively. In 1999, Congress amended section 
1221 to include business hedging transactions as exceptions to the definition of capital asset, and in 
2002 final Treasury regulations were published under the new legislation. Regulations under section 
446 governing the timing of hedging transactions were not changed.29 
 
Hedging is used to insure against an adverse change in the price of an asset held or to be 
acquired.30 Section 1221(b)(2) defines a hedging transaction as one entered into in the normal 
course of the taxpayer’s trade, primarily to manage risk of price changes or currency 
fluctuations. The section does not define ‘primarily to manage risk’, relying instead on a facts 
and circumstances determination.31 Those that fall within this definition are afforded ordinary 
treatment. Hedging of capital assets is not covered by the definition of a business hedge. 
The relevance from a legislative perspective for these regulations is a recognition of the 
economic distortion that results when a hedge has ordinary income as its one component and 
 
26 IRC 1092(a)(1) in Conlon & Aquilino (n 14) B3.03[3][a]. 
27 Conlon & Aquino (n 14) B3.04. 
28 Corn Prods Ref Co v Commissioner 350 US 46 (1955); Arkansas Best Corp v Commissioner 485 
US 2 at 12 (1988); Federal National Mortgage Ass’n v Commissioner JOO TC 541 (1993). See Joint Committee 
on Taxation (n 18) 14. 
29 Joint Committee on Taxation (n 18) 14. 
30 Inglis-Taylor (n 24) 65. 
31 Treasury Regulation section 1.1221-2(c)(4)(i). See Joint Committee on Taxation (n 18) 14. 
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the loss from the offsetting position is capital, resulting in an economic solution that is 
ineffective from a tax perspective, as capital losses cannot be used to offset income gains. 
Whereas taxpayers may seek to avoid the anti-abuse provisions of the straddle and wash sale 
rules, these rules are beneficial and the difficulty is often overcoming a narrow application on 
the part of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).32  
5.5.5 Section 1233 – Short sales 
Where an asset is sold for delivery at a later date, it is referred to as a short sale. Subject to 
possible section 1259 application, a taxpayer entering into a short sale does not recognise a 
gain or loss until the property is delivered to close the deal. For the purposes of federal income 
tax, a short sale is a matter of circumstance rather than regulation. The key test is the intention 
of the seller. Section 1233 is aimed at preventing abuse whereby taxpayers convert short-term 
gains into long-term gains and long-term losses into short-term losses. To this end, section 
1233(a) determines that property acquired to close a short sale is deemed to be capital in nature, 
and section 1233(b) characterises the gains and losses from short sales as short-term. The 
straddle rules of section 1092 have largely surpassed the provisions of this section in 
application. 
5.5.6 Sections 1222 and 1223 – Term of gain 
Section 1222 provides the general rules for determining when a gain should be characterised 
as short-term, that is, subject to the higher tax rate of 40 per cent, for instruments ‘held’ for one 
year or less. Section 1223 sets out the rules for determining how long an option has been held.33 
 
32 Conlon & Aquilino (n 14) B3.04[1] at B3-24. 
33 Ibid B1.05 n 103. 
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5.5.7 Section 1256 – Mark-to-market34 
The application of this section, which requires the recognition of gains or losses on the last day 
of the tax year, includes: 
1. regulated futures contracts; 
2. foreign currency contracts; 
3. all non-equity options; and 
4. all dealer equity options.  
However, the section excludes: 
1. business hedging transactions in terms of section 1221; 
2. foreign currency hedges in terms of section 988; and 
3. securities within the ambit of the dealer mark-to-market rules of section 475(a). 
This section therefore departs from the realisations-based methodology of recognising 
gains or losses and deems the realisation by treating the contract as sold. The annual recognition 
of gains or losses requires these to be tracked over time so that, at the disposition of the contract, 
the appropriate adjustment for tax purposes can be made. All gains or losses are treated as 
capital and the term of the gain is deemed as 40 per cent short-term and 60 per cent long-term. 
The section is not subject to the straddle loss deferral (if all the offsetting positions consist 
of section 1256 contracts) or capitalisation rules. However, there is an important exception 
whereby a taxpayer may make a mixed straddle election when using a section 1256 contract as 
one of its offsetting positions. This is irrevocable. 
The other key exception is for hedging transactions. This provision served as the basis 
for the formulation of the business hedging regulations of section 1221. Section 1256 provides 
 
34 Ibid B1.06[1], B1-34 to 47. 
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that a gain recognised with respect to personal property that is part of a hedge will not be 
characterised as capital in nature. This section defines a hedge as a transaction: 
1. entered into in the normal course of the taxpayer’s trade or business primarily35 to reduce 
the risk of price change or currency fluctuations with respect to property held by the 
taxpayer or to reduce the risk of interest rate or price changes or currency fluctuations 
with respect to borrowings or obligations (including future borrowings or obligations) of 
the taxpayer; 
2. the gain or loss on such transactions is treated as ordinary36 income or loss; and 
3. the taxpayer clearly identifies the transaction as a hedging transaction before the close of 
the day37 on which such a transaction was entered into.38 
5.5.7.1 Carryback of losses39 
When a deeming provision is employed in the mark-to-market methodology, it is of course 
deemed and not a matter of finality in practical life. In the interests of equity, the question as 
to the application of losses arises. In this regard, section 1212 provides for an elective carryback 
(but not for companies, estates or trusts). Should this election be made, the loss is carried back 
three years and, to the extent that it is not utilised, it is carried forward a year at a time in terms 
of the carryforward rules of section 1212(b)(1), until fully utilised. The loss bears a statutorily 
defined 40 per cent short-term, 60 per cent long-term definition in terms of section 1256. 
 
35 Conlon & Aquilino (n 14) B1.06[4][b], B1-40 unsurprisingly state that the qualification that the transaction 
must ‘reduce’ risk is troublesome. Most commentators preferred the term ‘manage risk’. However, the term 
seems to be liberally applied by the IRS. 
36 This qualification proved troublesome in Arkansas Best v Commissioner (n 28). The provisions of section 
1256(e)(2)(B) are in effect dealt with by the business hedging rules because of this. 
37 To circumvent the tendency of taxpayers to ‘cherrypick’ with hindsight. 
38 IRC 1256(e)(2), cited in Conlon & Aquilino (n 14) B1.06[4][b], B1-39. 
39 Ibid B1.06[4][e], B1-45, 46. 
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5.5.7.2 Trading of section 1256 contracts 
Because futures contracts are regarded as being prone to manipulation, section 1256 of the 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) treats such contracts as sold at the end of each year for fair market 
value. Under this mark-to-market system, eventual taxable value at sale will reflect set-off of 
gains and losses during the holding period. Gains or losses are treated as capital in nature. This 
is not applicable to any hedging transactions if the loss therefrom might be categorised as 
ordinary. 
5.5.8 Section 1259 – Constructive sales 
Section 1259, which includes futures, forwards, short sales and options, was introduced by the 
Clinton Administration in 1996 and enacted in 1997. This anti-abuse legislation addressed the 
economic and tax inconsistency when short sales are made on an appreciated asset. 
The practice of short selling, which is used quite extensively for equities, typically 
involves selling short shares that are held and then borrowing scrip, using the owned shares as 
collateral. Under the previous law, the gain or loss from a short sale was taxed once the 
underlying shares were either bought or delivered to the lender. This delay in the taxation 
‘event’, which was triggered by the repayment or close out of the loan, meant that the taxpayer 
in an economic sense was able to achieve a determinable outcome in the form of either a gain 
or loss at the time of entering into the short sale (as he or she owned the property) and yet no 
accrual for tax occurred. 
The concept of a constructive sale arose out of this concern. This concept deems 
‘appreciated financial positions’ as sold. A short sale is triggered if a taxpayer enters into: 
1. a short sale of the same or substantially identical property; 
2. an offsetting notional principal contract with respect to the same or substantially identical property; 
3. a futures or forward contract to deliver the same or substantially identical property; or 
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4. an appreciated financial position that is a short sale or a contract described in items 2 or 3 with 
respect to any property, and acquires the same or substantially identical property.40 
 
There are a few exceptions in the rules, as well as a special rule relating to the treatment 
of subsequent sales of a position that had been deemed sold in terms of this section. 
Section 1259 does not explicitly provide for an option, or combination of options, as one of the 
transactions that could result in the requirement to realize gain, perhaps because a single option would 
not ‘have the effect of eliminating’ substantially all of the taxpayer’s risk of loss and opportunity for 
income or gain with respect to a position. The legislative history notes that combinations of options, 
such as a put and call on the same underlying with the same or close strike prices, and ‘in-the-money’ 
options (e.g., a put option where the strike price is significantly above the current market price of the 
referenced underlying) may have substantially the same effect as the financial positions explicitly 
addressed by section 1259. The legislative history anticipates Treasury guidance addressing proper 
treatment of such positions under section 1259. To date, no such regulations have been published.41 
5.6 TAXATION OF SWAPS, CAPS, FLOORS AND OTHER NOTIONAL 
PRINCIPAL CONTRACTS 
The tax consequences of the above categories of derivative instruments seem far less certain in 
the USA, and although certain principles appear to have established themselves, general 
guidance regarding character definition is outstanding.  
Final Treasury regulations do not address the character of notional principal contract 
payments. However, regulations proposed in 2004 under section l234A provide that any 
periodic or nonperiodic payment generally constitutes ordinary income or expense.42 
Regarding the character of payments, the substitution or mimicking of dividends or 
interest, for instance, does not entitle such payments to like treatment. For instance, if swap 
payments are in lieu of dividend payments,43 they are not treated as such, and neither are 
 
40 IRC 1259(c)(1)(E); Conlon & Aquilino (n 14) B1.07, B1-50. 
41 See Joint Committee on Taxation (n 18) 16. 
42 Prop. Treasury Regulation section 1.1234A-1. See Joint Committee on Taxation (n 18) 7. 
43 Section 301 of federal income tax law defines dividends as distributions with respect to stock, according to 
Conlon & Aquilino (n 14) B1.09[2], B1-54. 
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swapped payments on debt instruments.44 The notional principal amount or object of the 
contract is merely used as a reference for the purposes of calculating the payments. In a 1997 
technical advice memorandum, the IRS adopted the view that periodic payments pursuant to a 
commodity swap resulted in ordinary income and expense.45 
Swaps, caps, floors and similar notional principal contracts46 have three categories of 
payments associated with their execution, namely ‘periodic payments’, ‘non-periodic 
payments’ and ‘termination payments’. Ongoing payments are widely believed to be viewed 
as ordinary because they do not possess the realisation trigger necessary to be categorised as a 
capital item. A similar argument could be made for termination payments, but the regulations 
released in 199347 by the IRS identified them as capital. Section 1234A fulfils the purpose of a 
character rule deeming ‘cancellation’, ‘lapse’, ‘expiration’ or ‘other termination’ as capital by 
nature, ostensibly to remove what would have been an elective choice on the part of a taxpayer 
to have the payments characterised at will between ordinary for a termination and capital when 
sold. 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a detailed outline of the US tax code on derivatives. This is necessary as 
an example of a particular policy approach unequalled in the other jurisdictions under review, 
and essential as a backdrop to chapter 6, which considers case law development in the USA. 
Table 5.1 below provides a useful summary that illustrates that character generally follows the 
 
44 Deputy v Dupont 308 US 488 at 497 (1940) is the definitive case in the USA on the definition of the term 
‘interest’. Conlon & Aquilino (n 14) B1.09[2]n 224, B1-53 pointed out that even though the payments resemble 
interest, they are not in fact for the ‘use or forbearance of money’. 
45 Technical Advice Memorandum 9730004 (10 April 1997), cited in Conlon & Aquilino (n 14) B1.09[2] n 225, 
B1-53. 
46 Notional principal contracts are believed to include swaps, floors, caps and collars, but exclude contracts that 
rely on indices or permit changes in the notional principal amount, contracts between a taxpayer and qualified 
business units, section 1256 contracts, futures contracts, forward contracts, options and debt instruments. See 
Conlon & Aquilino (n 14) B1.09[3][a], B1-57. 
47 These regulations focused on timing issues and not income characterisation. They were somewhat refined in 
1997. 
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nature of the underlying asset. Much of the US tax code seeks to then manage exceptions to 
minimise avoidance. Derivatives are defined for taxation purposes by the type of instrument, 
intention (referred to as motive below), the nature of the taxpayer (referred to as status below), 
timing (long-term versus short-term), settlement (cash or physical), and intended use of the 
instrument (investment versus business hedge) when determining character. Notwithstanding 
the comprehensive and granular treatment, the system of taxation is criticised as lacking in 
principle and suffering from piecemeal construction (see section 5.3 above).  
Table 5.1: Federal taxation of derivative transactions48 
 
 
48 MP Donohoe Financial Derivatives in Corporate Tax Avoidance (PhD dissertation, University of Florida, 
2011) 38. See http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0043096/00001. 
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CHAPTER 6 
UNITED STATES TREATMENT OF INCOME CHARACTER  
6.1 DEFINITION OF INCOME 
The most commonly accepted economic definition of income in the US literature seems to be 
the ‘Haig-Simons’ definition.1 Also known as ‘mark-to-market’, this definition explains 
income as the net change in the taxpayer’s financial position during the tax year, ‘the sum of 
amounts spent on consumption plus net accretions to wealth during the taxable period’.2 This, 
Haig-Simons argued, should be subject to uniform taxation to avoid distorting investment 
decisions. As Simons had stated in Personal Income Taxation:3 
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in 
consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and 
end of the period in question. In other words, it is merely the result obtained by adding consumption 
during the period to ‘wealth’ at the end of the period and then subtracting ‘wealth’ at the beginning. 
The sine qua non of income is gain, as our courts have recognised in their more lucid moments – and 
gain to someone during a specified time interval. Moreover, this gain may be measured and defined 
most easily by positing a dual objective or purpose, consumption and accumulation, each of which may 
be estimated in a common unit by appeal to market prices. 
 
This position, if tenable, must suggest the folly of describing income as a flow and, more emphatically, 
of regarding it as a quantity of goods, services, receipts, fruits, etc. As Schäffle has said so pointedly, 
‘Das Einkommen hat nur buchhalterische Existenz’. It is indeed merely an arithmetic answer and exists 
only as the end result of appropriate calculations. To conceive of income in terms of things is to invite 
all the confusion of the elementary student in accounting who insists upon identifying ‘surplus’ and 
‘cash’. If one views society as a kind of giant partnership, one may conceive of a person’s income as 
the sum of his withdrawals (consumption) and the change in the value of his equity or interest in the 
enterprise. The essential connotation of income, to repeat, is gain – gain to someone during a specified 
period and measured according to objective market standards. 
 
1 See TR Chorvat ‘Perception and income: The behavioral economics of the realization doctrine’ (2003) 36 
Connecticut Law Review 2. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Personal Income Taxation 1938 (1980 reprint) 50–51, cited in RW Parsons Income Taxation in Australia, 
Principles of Income, Deductibility and Tax Accounting (2011) 1.46. 
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By distinction, section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code utilises a realisations doctrine 
for tax gains and losses from the sale or exchange of property. This distinction, which relies on 
an event, creates a deferment benefit, the longer the asset is held. In Eisner v Macomber,4 the 
Supreme Court held that income had to be ‘separated’ from capital to be realised and taxed, 
but supported a global approach to taxation. Almost 20 years later, Helvering v Bruun5 found 
this not to be necessary. In Cottage Savings Ass’n v Commissioner,6 the Supreme Court held 
that holding a materially different asset is proof that realisation has been triggered. Therefore, 
if the description of the asset has changed significantly, the result is a realisation event.7 
Exceptions to the realisation principle include securities dealers (who regularly buy 
securities from customers and sell securities to customers), the constructive sales rules under 
section 1259, discussed in the previous chapter, an original issue discount instrument (eg zero-
coupon bond, where a single interest payment is made at the end of the instrument’s life) where 
accrual occurs over the life of the instrument, and exchange-traded futures contracts under 
section 1256. 
6.2 CHARACTER: DEFINED BY THE STATUTORY NATURE OF THE ASSET 
6.2.1 Concept of ‘capital asset’: Historical development 
Given the USA’s historical ties with England and Continental Europe, it stands to reason that 
US definitions of what constitutes capital borrow from these jurisdictions. However, unlike the 
English beginnings, with the concept of income as separable from a largely inalienable estate 
in an agrarian system, the availability and tradability of land in the USA called for a different 
approach. 
 
4 252 US 189 (1920). See Chorvat (n 1) n 31. 
5 309 US 461 (1940). See Chorvat (n 1) n 34.  
6 499 US 554 (1991). See Chorvat (n 1) n 45. 
7 Chorvat (n 1) 2–3.  
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Using English common law and categorising capital investments as a res, Congress 
included gains to such assets in income for taxation in the Revenue Act of 1862.8 
In Gray v Darlington9 the Supreme Court ruled that accretion should be assessed only in 
the tax year of sale;10 this was the beginning of a realisations-based methodology. In Stratton’s 
Independence Ltd v Howbert,11 a broad understanding of income was framed as ‘the gain 
derived from capital, from labour, or from both combined’.12 In Eisner v Macomber13 the 
majority followed Stratton’s Independence but added that ‘it be understood to include profit 
gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets’.14 Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
stressed the necessity on constitutional grounds for realisation as a prerequisite to taxing gains, 
identifying ‘severance from the capital’ and availability for ‘separate use, benefit and disposal’ 
as elements of income from capital. How realisation was achieved was soon identified as 
including receipt of any exchangeable property, and was not limited to the receipt of money.15 
[T]he essential matter [is]: not a gain accruing to capital, not a growth or increment of value in the 
investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding from the property, 
severed from the capital … and coming in, being ‘derived’ ….16 
 
In Helvering v Horst17 the realisations requirement was subsequently interpreted as an 
‘administrative convenience’; in Helvering v Bruun18 that a landlord realised a gain on a 
 
8 Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, section 90, 12 Stat. 432, 473. See Lawrence H Seltzer The Nature and Tax 
Treatment of Capital Gains and Losses (1951) 26, cited in JB Cartee ‘A historical essay and economic assay of 
the capital asset definition: The taxpayer and courts are still mindfully guessing while Congress doesn’t seem to 
(have a) mind’ (1993) William & Mary Law Review 16. 
9 The case concerned an accretion of $20 000 on a bond held for four years. 82 US (15 Wall.) 63 (1872). See 
Cartee (n 8) 17. 
10 The Civil War Income Tax Act of 1867 stipulated that it should be assessed for income tax annually. See 
Cartee (n 8) 3.  
11 231 US 399 (1913). See Cartee (n 8) 4. 
12 231 US 399 (1913) at 415. 
13 252 US 189 (1920). See Cartee (n 8) 4. 
14 252 US 189 at 207. 
15 See Peabody v Eisner 247 US 347 at 349–50 (1918) in Cartee (n 8) 18. 
16 Eisner v Macomber 252 US 189 at 207 (1920), quoting Doyle v Mitchell Bros Co 247 US 179 at 185 (1918). 
See Cartee (n 8) 19. 
17 Helvering v Horst US 112 at 116 (1940). Statutorily reversed by IRC section 109. See Cartee (n 8) 19. 
18 Helvering v Bruun 309 US 461 at 469 (1940). See Cartee (n 8) 19. 
106 
lessee’s capital improvement upon repossession; and in United States v Kirby Lumber Co19 that 
a corporation realised income when it purchased its own bonds at less than issue price. 
The moment when an asset traverses the border between capital and ordinary income has 
been influenced by the significance, purpose, nature, frequency and regularity of a transaction. 
In Higgins v Commissioner20 the court held that investing for one’s own account does not 
constitute a trade or business; in Reese v Commissioner21 the court held that a single venture 
without expectation of continuation in the field is not ordinarily a business; and in International 
Shoe Mach Corp v United States22 the court found that although the taxpayer leased machines, 
he held the machines primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business. Securities will 
normally be regarded as being on capital account if no sales to clients are engaged in, although 
in Carl Marks & Co v Commissioner23 certain securities held by the dealer were nonetheless 
regarded as being on capital account. The ‘to customers’ requirement is a legislative 
amendment affected in 1934 to which we will return. These issues are explained in more detail 
below. 
6.2.2 Defined by statute exclusion – the US capital asset definition 
‘Capital assets’, as defined in section 117(a) of the Revenue Act of 1934, is used within the 
ambit of its ordinary meaning of capital invested, plus all surplus accounts or undivided 
profits.24 Congress’ recognition of a different category of income in justifying a relief 
 
19 United States v Kirby Lumber Co. 284 US 1 at 2–3 (1931). See Cartee (n 8) 19. 
20 312 US 212 at 218 (1941). See Cartee (n 8) 19. 
21 615 F.2d 226 at 230–1 (5th Cir. 1980). See Cartee (n 8) 19. 
22 491 F.2d 157 at 160–1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 US 834 (1974). See Cartee (n 8) 19. 
23 12 TC 1196 at 1200 (1949). 
24 Commissioner v Shapiro (1942 CA6) 125 F2d 532, 42-1 USTC P 9260, 28 AFTR 1079, 144 ALR 349. See 26 
USCS section 1221 at 8. 
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recognised the hardship effects of realisation proceeds after holding an asset for a substantial 
period of time.25  
In the USA, the taxation of capital transactions has been afforded special treatment dating 
back to the Revenue Act of 1921. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 198626 (TRA 1986), 
individual and other non-corporate taxpayers could deduct 60 per cent of the amount of any net 
capital gain from gross income, resulting in a net rate of 20 per cent (50 per cent maximum 
individual tax rate times the 40 per cent of net capital gain included in adjusted gross income). 
Congress believed that–  
[t]his will result in a tremendous amount of simplification for many taxpayers since their tax will no 
longer depend upon the characterisation of income as ordinary or capital gain. In addition, this will 
eliminate any requirement that capital assets be held by the taxpayer for any extended period of time in 
order to obtain favourable treatment. This will result in greater willingness to invest in assets that are 
freely traded (e.g. stocks) and make investment decisions more neutral.27 
 
TRA 1986 ended a 65-year legacy of taxing long-term capital assets at a preferential rate. 
However, the legislative framework was kept intact. IRC section 1221, which defines capital 
assets by exclusion remained, as did the netting rules in IRC section 1222 and the holding 
period rules of IRC section 1223. The 2003 Tax Act28 again reduced the tax rate on long-term 
capital gains, increasing the incentive once again for higher marginal rate taxpayers to qualify 
for the long-term rate of 15 per cent. 
‘Capital assets’ includes all property held by a taxpayer, regardless of duration, 
irrespective of whether the property is used in the taxpayer’s business or trade. Receipts from 
 
25 Commissioner v Gillette Motor Transport, Inc (1960) 364 US 130, 4 L Ed 2d 1617, 80 S Ct 1497, 60-2 USTC 
P 9556, 5 AFTR 2d 1770; United States v Midland-Ross Corp (1965) 381 US 54, 14 L Ed 2d 214, 85 S Ct 1308, 
65-1 USTC P 9387, 15 AFTR 2d 836. 
26 United States Tax Reform Act of 1986 (H.R. 3838, 99th Congress; Public Law 99-514). 
27 Joint Committee on Taxation Staff Paper on the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
28 United States Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (May 
28, 2003) (2003 Tax Act). 
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the assets described in IRC section 1221 or 1231 (assets used in the taxpayer’s trade or 
business) are excluded from the definition of ‘gross receipts’ as follows: 
(a) In general 
For purposes of this subtitle, the term ‘capital asset’ means property held by the taxpayer (whether or not 
connected with his trade or business), but does not include—  
(1)  stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly be included in the 
inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer 
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business;  
(2)  property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for 
depreciation provided in section 167, or real property used in his trade or business; … 
(6)  any commodities derivative financial instrument held by a commodities derivatives dealer, unless—  
(a)  it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that such instrument has no connection to 
the activities of such dealer as a dealer, and  
(b)  such instrument is clearly identified in such dealer’s records as being described in 
subparagraph (A) before the close of the day on which it was acquired, originated, or entered 
into (or such other time as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe);  
(7)  any hedging transaction which is clearly identified as such before the close of the day on which it 
was acquired, originated, or entered into (or such other time as the Secretary may by regulations 
prescribe); or 
(8) supplies of a type regularly used or consumed by the taxpayer in the ordinary course of a trade or 
business of the taxpayer.29 
 
IRC section 1221 therefore specifically excludes any commodity derivative financial 
instruments30 held by a commodities dealer,31 unless an instrument can be specifically 
identified as having no connection with the business of the dealer.32 There is therefore an onus 
 
29 26 US Code 1221, RC 5751.01(F)(2)(c). 
30 See Β1221(a)(1)(B): 
‘(B) Commodities derivative financial instrument. 
 (i) In general. The term ‘commodities derivative financial instrument’ means any contract or financial instrument 
with respect to commodities (other than a share of stock in a corporation, a beneficial interest in a partnership or 
trust, a note, bond, debenture, or other evidence of indebtedness, or a section 1256 contract (as defined in section 
1256(b) [26 USCS ß 1256(b)])), the value or settlement price of which is calculated by or determined by reference 
to a specified index’. 
31 See Β1221(a)(1)(A): 
‘(A) Commodities derivatives dealer. The term ‘commodities derivatives dealer’ means a person who regularly 
offers to enter into, assume, offset, assign, or terminate positions in commodities derivative financial instruments 
with customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business.’ 
32 Β1221(a)(6)(A), (B). 
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on the dealer to clearly identify such instrument on the day it was acquired, originated or 
entered into. It does not, however, exclude any other derivatives from capital treatment.  
6.2.3. IRC section 1221 and the Corn Products vs Arkansas Best doctrines 
Two landmark cases have featured prominently in the interpretation of the application of IRC 
section 1221. Both concern the latitude allowed by the court for the interpretation of IRC 
section 1221, and yet both, in trying to favour the intent of Congress, adopted divergent views: 
a ‘slavish literalism and a brushing aside of formulations to reach what the Court rightly sensed 
to be the correct result’.33 
Corn Products v Commissioner34 concerned a business, Corn Products Refining, which 
manufactured products made from corn. The business was unable to store sufficient corn and 
found itself in an unfavourable market for its raw product (from which it produced corn sugar) 
in 1934 and 1936. This led to the practice of purchasing corn futures to ensure price stability. 
Having realised a profit of $680 000 on its futures in 1940 and a loss of $110 000 in 1942, the 
business claimed the proceeds were capital in nature, being a distinct activity from its core 
manufacturing or processing business. The Tax Court, the Court of Appeal and the US Supreme 
Court found otherwise. The courts found that the hedging activity was integral to the 
company’s trade and therefore revenue in nature. To find otherwise would present the taxpayer 
with an opportunity to either sell the futures and realise a capital gain (with preferential tax rate 
treatment) or take physical delivery under the contract at a loss against its trading income, 
thereby reducing its tax liability. 
 
33 M Grauer ‘A case for congressional facilitation of a collaborative model of statutory interpretation in the tax 
area: Lessons to be learned from the Corn Products and Arkansas Best cases and the historical development of 
the statutory definition of “capital asset(s)”’ (1996) Kentucky Law Journal 4. 
34 Corn Prod Ref Co v Commissioner 16 TC 395 (1951), 11 TCM (CCH) 721 (1952), supplemented by 20 TC 
503 (1953), aff’d in part and review dismissed in part, 215 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1954), aff’d, 350 US 46 (1955). 
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This finding by the court spawned a hedging exception, known as the ‘Corn Products 
doctrine’, which included a business motive test to distinguish between an investment or 
speculative motive and the core business engaged in. Although the decision was unfavourable 
to the taxpayer, it was used and broadened over the next 23 years to allow taxpayers to deduct 
losses against trading income, whereas capital gains were seldom challenged in court. This 
allowed a ‘whipsaw’ effect whereby the IRS was disadvantaged on both counts.35 
Arkansas Best Corporation v Commissioner36 resulted in a profound reversal, based on 
a narrow interpretation of the meaning of ‘capital asset’.37 The issue in this case was whether 
a corporate taxpayer is entitled to ordinary loss treatment for losses incurred on transactions in 
the capital stock of another corporation.  
In 1968, Arkansas Best, a diversified holding company, acquired 65 percent of the stock of National 
Bank of Commerce in Dallas, Texas (NBC). As the Dallas real estate market declined, so did the 
financial condition of NBC. The taxpayer sought to protect its business reputation by buying additional 
stock in an effort to prevent NBC’s failure. The NBC stock became unmarketable. In 1975, the 
taxpayer sold a substantial portion of its NBC stock at a loss. On its 1975 tax return, the taxpayer 
claimed an ordinary loss deduction on the stock, and the IRS challenged the deduction. All parties 
agreed that the taxpayer’s NBC stock fell within the capital assets definition in IRC §1221.2. As 
Arkansas Best Corporation was a holding company and earned income in the form of fees for 
management services and dividend income, rather than to trade in its holdings, the transactions could 
not qualify for the provisions applicable to securities dealers in terms of 26 USC §1236, which grants 
special recognition in this regard to securities dealers.38 
 
35 See generally the discussions in Steven D Conlon & Vincent Aquilino Principles of Financial Derivatives, US 
and International Taxation (2000) B3.04[2][b]; Grauer (n 33); D Tolman ‘The Arkansas Best decision: Taking 
Corn Products off the taxpayer menu’ (1989) 8 Virginia Tax Review 705; and Cartee (n 8). 
36 Arkansas Best Corp v Comm’r 485 US 212 (1988). 
37 ‘Whether these arguments have merit depends upon whether any of the Bank stock that Arkansas Best acquired 
can be characterized as not being a “capital asset” within the meaning of 26 USC §1221. This section establishes 
a general rule defining capital asset as “property held by the taxpayer” (whether or not connected with his trade 
or business) .... The corresponding federal regulation, 26 CFR § 1.1221-1(a) states that the term “capital assets” 
includes all classes of property not specifically excluded by section 1221. The property that section 1221 excludes 
from the general rule is (1) stock in trade or inventory; (2) business property subject to the depreciation allowance 
or real property used in business; (3) copyrights, literary or artistic compositions, and similar property; (4) 
business-related accounts or notes receivable; and (5) federal government publications. Because capital stock 
plainly does not fall into any of the last four categories, we consider only the first exception, 26 USC §1221(1), 
which excludes from “capital asset” stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly 
be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the 
taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business ... ’. Ibid [217 II]. 
38 A Kramer Financial Products: Taxation, Regulation and Design (1999) 24,007.  
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Arkansas Best argued that all the purchases of bank stock that it made after declaring that 
it would divest itself of the stock were made in the ordinary course of business. Distinguishing 
its concededly pre-August 1971 investment motives for buying the bank stock, Arkansas Best 
asserted that its subsequent purchases were intended to preserve its business reputation by 
preventing the bank from failing, and that losses incurred on the sale of the stock so acquired 
were ordinary business expenses that it could deduct in full from gross income. Arkansas Best 
effectively argued that its purpose or motive in acquiring or selling the stock determined its 
character. The court, unsurprisingly, disagreed. Mixed motives in the holding of stock by 
holding companies is not uncommon. The courts usually treat such assets as capital.39 The 
Supreme Court found that ‘the taxpayer’s motivation in acquiring an asset is not relevant in 
determining whether that asset is capital or ordinary’ and that there was no link between the 
transactions that were geared towards the protection of an investment and the business 
operations.40 
In the judgment cited below, the effect of statutory definition within a framework of long-
established common law is evident. What might be described as an attempt by lower courts to 
previously meld common law with statute, by inferring the intent of Congress, was swept away: 
We conclude that a taxpayer’s motivation in purchasing an asset is irrelevant to the question whether 
the asset is ‘property held by a taxpayer (whether or not connected with his business)’ and is thus 
within §1221’s general definition of ‘capital asset’. Because the capital stock held by petitioner falls 
within the broad definition of the term ‘capital asset’ in §1221 and is outside the classes of property 
excluded from capital-asset status, the loss arising from the sale of the stock is a capital loss. Corn 
Products Refining Co. v Commissioner, supra, which we interpret as involving a broad reading of the 
inventory exclusion of §1221, has no application in the present context. Accordingly, the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered.41 
 
39 Ibid 22 nn 10 and 13. 
40 Arkansas Best Corporation (n 36) 223. 
41 Ibid. 
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6.2.3.1 Impact on the capital/revenue treatment distinction 
The narrow interpretation of what constitutes an ordinary transaction according to this case 
impacted negatively on the requirement that, for hedging purposes, a transaction had to be 
ordinary in nature. The Supreme Court effectively declared that the Corn Products decision 
did not provide a non-statutory ‘business purpose’ exception from capital asset treatment. The 
court explained the Corn Products interpretation as applying to a very narrow capital asset 
exception for transactions that were ‘an integral part of the business inventory–purchase 
system’, under the inventory exception for capital classification. This made many hedging 
transactions vulnerable to attack by the IRS, justified by the Corn Products doctrine, and 
resulted in uncertainties and inefficiencies in the market.42 Section 1256(e)(2)(B) of the 
business hedging regulations sought, at least in part, to address these concerns.43 
Businesses that may wish to avoid the storage of physical goods in anticipation of 
seasonal demand, for example, may purchase long positions in commodities (sold in the 
ordinary course of their business), but the transaction does not constitute a hedge as they do 
not reduce risk, nor do they receive ordinary treatment as a ‘surrogate for inventory’.44  
The antagonism45 in the judgment towards the progeny of the Corn Products doctrine 
may be traced to the appellate court’s approach to interpretation, which sought to divine the 
intention of those involved in passing the law. The Arkansas Best decision requires a literal 
application of the statute. In this sense, this case represents a clash of two doctrines of 
 
42 Conlon & Aquilino (n 35) B3.04[2][c], B3-27. 
43 Ibid B1-41. 
44 Ibid B3.04[3][g], B3-37. 
45 ‘Corn Products and its progeny, which we respectfully view as misbegotten, have done precisely that, leading 
to increased recourse to the administrative and judicial processes to resolve conflicting contentions about 
taxpayers' motivations in purchasing capital stock. Congress could have written section 1221 to incorporate some 
sort of exception regarding capital stock, just as it recognized the unique position of securities dealers in 26 USC 
§1236, but it did not do so. We believe that the judiciary lacks authority to create exceptions to section 1221 that 
Congress did not choose to make’. See Arkansas Best v Comm’r (US) 485 US 212 (1988) [22]. 
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interpretation.46 This decision effectively concluded that ‘the Corn Products doctrine never 
existed … This provided the Service the opportunity to challenge the character of a wide range 
of hedging transactions … causing ongoing inefficiencies in the federal taxation of hedging 
transactions’.47  
The Solicitor General, in his brief on behalf of the IRS, referred to the Corn Products 
doctrine as a ‘frolic by the lower courts’.48 The Supreme Court stated that the Corn Products 
doctrine should be limited to narrow application where hedging transactions ‘that are an 
integral part of an “inventory purchase system” fall within the inventory exclusion in IRC 
§1221.’49 
This ruling by the Supreme Court caused much practical difficulty for financial services 
companies and corporate treasuries that used hedging as part of their business, unrelated to 
inventory.  
The Treasury eventually responded to the confusion raised by Arkansas Best by issuing 
business hedging regulations under Treasury Regulation §1.1221-2. In addition, statutory 
amendments have been made to IRC §1221 to ‘clarify’ that business hedges and the positions 
of derivatives dealers, and ‘supplies’ obtain ordinary income or loss.50 
While I am less concerned with the doctrine of interpretation here, the following aspects 
are of practical interest: 
 
46 ‘The underlying purpose of section 1221 and its legislative history reinforce our conclusion. According to 
H.R. Rep. 704, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934), the purpose of the tax code amendments, part of which defined 
“capital asset”, was to increase revenue by preventing tax avoidance. … Elsewhere, the report specifically refers 
to the definition of capital asset: “It will be noted that the definition includes all property, except as specifically 
excluded”. … See dissenting opinion by Hanson, “It appears to me, however, that Corn Products was merely an 
attempt to divine congressional intent. As such, it is a compelling rejoinder to those who believe "that legislative 
draftsmen and the tax-writing committees of the Congress are the most desirable forum for illuminating a 
subject matter they themselves made obscure and interminable”.’ 
47 See Conlon & Aquilino (n 35) B3.04[2][d], B3-28. 
48 See Kramer (n 38) 24,008 n 31. Brief for the Respondent at 37, Arkansas Best Corp. v Comm’r (n 36) 274. 
49 Kramer (n 38) 24,009. 
50 Ibid. See footnote 39, IRC sections 1221(a)(6) to (8). See, eg, Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 106th 
Cong, 1st Sess, Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2000 Budget 
Proposal 132 (Joint Comm Print 1999); Treasury Summary of Tax Simplification Plan, Including T3, 97 TNT 
72-16 (15 April 1997). 
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a) In both cases the courts were trying to protect the fiscus, which in both cases led to 
unintended consequences: in the case of Corn Products, a whipsaw effect for the fiscus 
on losses, and in the case of Arkansas Best, a contrived result that narrowly favoured 
IRC section 1221, to the exclusion of business reality in many instances, requiring 
statutory amendment. 
b) From a purely doctrinal standpoint, the cases overturned the intent test which features 
so prominently in determining the facts of the case in income character determinations 
(the dominant doctrine in South Africa). 
c) The cases overturned the business purpose doctrine, which is now enshrined in 
Accounting Standard IFRS 9. 
d) In 1999, Congress amended section 1221 to include business hedging transactions as 
exceptions to the definition of capital.51 
6.3 CHARACTER: DEFINED BY THE PURPOSE OF THE TAXPAYER  
In the USA, a distinction is drawn between traders, dealers and investors. An investor is 
someone who typically holds capital assets with a view to appreciation over a long term 
(generally longer than 12 months).52 A dealer, on the other hand, holds assets as inventory, 
which is on-sold to customers. Traders lie somewhere in between the two groups. A taxpayer 
may qualify for simultaneous characterisations based on different instruments.53 
6.3.1 Dealer – the ‘to customers’ requirement 
The concept of a securities dealer in the USA is a combination of deductions as expected in the 
ordinary course of business and, yet, a characterisation of ‘capital’ is given to his or her trading 
 
51 See Joint Committee on Taxation Description of the Modernization of Derivatives Tax Act of 2017 (2017) 14. 
52 IRC sections 1(h)(1), 1222(3), 1222(4). 
53 Joint Committee on Taxation Present Law and Issues Related to the Taxation of Financial Instruments and 
Products (2011) 14. 
115 
stock. This is the product of a legislative amendment in 1934 to the capital asset statute, which 
excludes rather than defines capital assets as follows: 
§1221. Capital asset defined 
(a) In general. For purposes of this subtitle [26 USCS §§1 et seq.], the term ‘capital asset’ means 
property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not 
include: 
(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly be included in 
the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the 
taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.54 
 
This 1934 legislative amendment55 results in the character of income not being defined 
by whether a trade or business is being engaged in by the taxpayer, but rather by exclusion 
from the definition of ‘capital asset’ as defined. An examination of the Conference Report 
indicates that it was a measure motivated by Congressional concerns (no doubt following the 
1929 crash) that the State was vulnerable to ‘stock traders (or “speculators” as they were then 
called) from contending that they were eligible for ordinary gain and (more pertinently) 
ordinary losses from their trading activities’.56 
While it is important to note this legislative exception so as to understand the thinking of 
the courts, it is of course a legislative intervention to sidestep a natural logic that applied 
before57 and thus create a policy ‘carve out’. Whether the taxpayer is marking up stock 
(securities) for on-selling to others as a securities dealer or holding them as trading inventory 
in a business of securities dealing for his or her own account seems to be equivalent in concept. 
In both cases those assets seem to represent working capital, were it not for the ‘to customers’ 
 
54 IRC section 1221. 
55 United States Revenue Act of 1934 Pub L. No. 73-216, ß 117(b), 48 Stat 680, 714 (1934). See S Oei ‘A 
structural critique of trader taxation’ (2008) 8(10) Florida Tax Review 1113. 
56 Oei (n 55) 1040. 
57 See Schwinn v Commissioner, which was decided before 1934, where it was referred to as inventory. Oei (n 
55) 1040. 
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requirement of IRC section 1221. Attempts to argue that counterparties were ‘customers’ have 
failed in the courts.58 
6.3.2 Trader 
A trader ‘devotes a major portion of his time to speculating on the stock exchange’,59 as first 
defined in Snyder v Comm’r in 1935, but does not have clients.60 Unlike the case in South 
Africa, designation as a trader affords the taxpayer preferential tax treatment, whereby the 
assets are held on capital account, yet various expenses attributable to the trading are 
deductible.61 Traders are also allowed an election under IRC section 475(f) whereby they can 
be subject to a ‘mark-to-market’ taxation of gains and losses from their securities dealing on 
the last business day of the tax year, and they can convert such gains or losses to ordinary rather 
than capital proceeds.62 The IRC does not define the term ‘trade or business’.63 Therefore, the 
issue of qualifying for the status has been examined by the US courts over the decades.64 As 
 
58 Oei (n 55) n 137: ‘See, e.g., Archaya, 225 F.App’x 391 (7th Cir. 2007) (Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 nonprecedential 
disposition) (taxpayer argued that the people who bought the securities he had sold were “customers”); Marrin, 
73 TCM (CCH) at 1751 (taxpayer argued that the broker-dealers were his customers, or, alternatively, that the 
customers of the broker-dealers were his customers under agency law); see also, generally, Groetzinger, 480 US 
at 33-34 n.12 (citing Boyle, What is a Trade or Business? 39 Tax Lawyer 737, 763 (1986) (“It takes a buyer to 
make a seller and it takes an opposing gambler to make a bet”).’  
59 Snyder v Comm’r 295 US 134 (1935) at 139 (citing Schwinn v Comm’r 9 BTA 1304 (1928); Elliott v Comm’r 
15 BTA 494 (1929); Hodgson v Comm’r 24 BTA 256 (1931); Schermerhorn v Comm’r 26 BTA 1031(1932)). See 
Oei (n 55) n 20. 
60 B Bittker & L Lokken Federal Income Taxation of Income, Estates & Gifts 3 ed (2005) 47.2 (‘the terms 
“dealer” and “trader”, which do not appear in ß 1221(a)(1) itself, are simply labels – the “dealer” referring to a 
taxpayer who holds securities for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business and the “trader” 
to a taxpayer who does not have “customers” even though he or she buys and sells securities with great 
frequency’). See Oei (n 55) n 23.  
61 These include ‘all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on 
any trade or business’ in terms of IRC section 162; interest deductions under IRC 163; the depreciation of 
property under IRC section 179(a); start-up expenses under IRC section 195; home office deductions under IRC 
section 280A(a); and various other deductions such as depreciation and net operating loss deductions. See Oei (n 
55) 4 and 5. 
62 Oei (n 55) 2. 
63 Commissioner v Groetzinger 480 US 23 at 27 (1987); Estate of Yaeger v Commissioner 889 F.2d 29 at 33 (2d 
Cir. 1989). 
64 Oei (n 55) nn 21 and 22. Comm’r v Groetzinger 480 US 23 at 33–4 (1987) (noting Justice Brandeis’ 
‘[implication] that a full-time trader may qualify as being in a trade or business’. In this instance the taxpayer was 
a full-time gambler); Higgins v Comm’r 312 US 212 (1941); Chen v Comm’r 2004 TCM (RIA) 2004-132; Archaya 
v Comm’r No. 9461-05 (7th Cir. 2007) (Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 non-precedential disposition). 
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categorisation as a trader in the US affords favourable tax treatment,65 the burden of proof is 
that much more onerous than in South Africa, where it is often petitioned against, because of 
the tax differential between capital and revenue income. The following essential tests are used 
by the courts to determine whether a taxpayer is ‘engaged in a trade or business’:66 
6.3.3 Frequent, regular and continuous securities trading 
In Fuld v Commissioner,67 a brother and sister changed their intention from investing to trading 
in October 1930. The Commissioner, however, refused to allow the offsets on the ground that 
the losses resulted from the sale of capital assets and were, therefore, capital and not ordinary 
losses: 
From 1930 and during 1933 Leonhard Fuld devoted an average of eight hours per day to the study of 
new texts, reading services, charting prices of securities, conferring with his broker, attending meetings 
of corporations in which he owned securities, and consulting with corporate executives .… He spent 
about one or two hours per day at the broker’s office. Florentine Fuld similarly … The main source of 
livelihood of both petitioners was from their securities transactions. They maintained no business 
office, had no customers to whom they might sell securities, practically never sold securities short, and 
never advertised or held themselves out to the public as dealers. However, Leonhard Fuld was 
registered with the Securities Exchange Commission as a dealer and as an investment counselor and 
was listed in the stock directories throughout the United States. … Some of the securities held by 
petitioners for more than 2 years and sold in 1933 were acquired prior to the beginning of their new 
policy, October 9, 1930, and some of such securities were acquired subsequent to that date. In 1933, 
Leonhard Fuld made approximately 249 sales of securities held for more than 2 years and 
approximately 98 held for 2 years or less. Also, in the same year Florentine Fuld made approximately 
 
65 Such as IRC section 162 trade or business deductions, IRC section 280A home office deductions, unlimited 
interest deductions under IRC section 163, the election to deduct ‘section 179 property’, the election to deduct 
start-up expenses under IRC section 195, and the mark-to-market election under IRC section 475(f). ‘See, e.g., 
Yaeger, 889 F.2d at 29 (finding that taxpayer was an investor not engaged in a trade or business meant that he 
was subject to the IRC ß 163(d) investment interest limitation); Paoli, 62 TCM (CCH) 275 (same); Hart, 73 
TCM (CCH) 1684 (same); Boatner, 74 TCM (CCH) at 345 (determination that taxpayer was not engaged in the 
trade or business of buying and selling stock meant that he was not eligible for business deductions but rather 
had to itemize deductions); Moller, 721 F.2d 810 (finding that taxpayer was an investor and not in the “trade or 
business” resulted in disallowance of IRC ß 280A home office expense deductions); Cameron, 2007 TCM 
(RIA) 2007-260, 94 TCM (CCH) 245 (taxpayer who was an investor, not a trader, was disallowed IRC ß 162 
trade or business deduction); Mayer v Commissioner, 67 TCM (CCH) 2949 (same)’. Ibid at 10 and note 112 
respectively. 
66 The Internal Revenue Code does not define the term ‘trade or business’. Although the term ‘engaged in a trade 
or business’ appears in the Code, it is not defined. 
67 Fuld v Comm’r 139 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1943), aff’g 44 BTA 1268 (1941).  
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229 sales of securities held for more than 2 years and approximately 89 held for 2 years or less. The 
sales of both petitioners ranged as high as 1,000 shares per transaction. 
 
The tax court found that from October 1930 until 1933, the taxpayers were indeed 
‘engaged in the business of trading in securities’. The court therefore emphasised the 
continuity, dedication and intensity of their activities, as well as their reliance on this as a sole 
source of income.  
In Chen v Commissioner,68 the taxpayer did not qualify as a ‘trader in securities’. The 
taxpayer conducted 94 per cent of his securities trades during only three months of the year, 
and he held a full-time job; accordingly, the taxpayer could only deduct $3,000 of his net loss. 
In Mayer,69 citing Higgins v Commissioner,70 the court reiterated that even ‘full-time 
market activity in managing and preserving one’s own estate is not embraced within the phrase 
“carrying on a business”.’ The fact that the taxpayer had substantial investments, devoted 
considerable time to the oversight of investments and maintained two offices, one in New York 
and the other in Paris, employing an office manager, accountant, an assistant and a clerk in 
New York and a staff member in Paris, did not in the opinion of the court amount to a trade or 
business. ‘Thus, we find that despite the scope and extent of his activity,71 Mr. Mayer was an 
investor, not a trader.’72 He merely had a very well-resourced investment management 
operation for his own account. No matter how extensive these managerial activities were, they 
did not amount to carrying on a business. 
In Cameron v Commissioner,73 the taxpayer began trading a portfolio of shares after a 
car accident rendered him unable to work. However, because the volume of trades was not 
 
68 Chen v Comm’r No. 1271-03 , UNITED STATES TAX COURT, TC Memo 2004-132; 2004 Tax Ct. Memo 
LEXIS 131; 87 TCM (CCH) 1388, June 1, 2004, Filed. 
69 Mayer 67 TCM (CCH) 2949 at 2949-4 to 2949-5 (1994).  
70 Higgins v Commissioner (n 65) 213. 
71 Over 1,100 executed sales and purchases in each of the years in issue. 
72 Mayer (n 69) 2950. 
73 Cameron v Comm’r 2007 TCM (RIA) 2007-260 at 1510. 
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viewed as substantial, that is ‘frequent, regular, and continuous’, the court found in favour of 
the respondent.  
The above cases illustrate that in the USA, unlike in South Africa, there is an onerous 
burden of proof to establish the status of a trader or, more descriptively, a taxpayer who runs a 
business of share dealing for his or her own account. Oei pointed out that the exact level of 
trading activity is not clear and that the hurdle set by the courts is substantial: ‘proving that 
one’s investment activities rise to the level of carrying on a trade or business is a difficult hill 
to climb’.74 The only guidance from the Service is found on Form 104075 and Publication 550,76 
where the qualifications for successful categorisation are given as follows: 
You are a trader in securities if you are engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for 
you own account. To be engaged in business as a trader in securities: 
• You must seek to profit from daily market movements in the prices of securities and not 
from dividends, interest, or capital appreciation. 
• Your activity must be substantial. 
• You must carry on the activity with continuity and regularity. 
• The following facts and circumstances should be considered in determining if your activity 
is a business: 
o Typical holding period for securities bought and sold 
o The frequency and dollar amount of your trades during the year 
o The extent to which you pursue the activity to produce income for a livelihood 
o The amount of time you devote to the activity. 
• You are considered an investor, and not a trader, if your activity does not meet the above 
definition of a business. It does not matter whether you call yourself a trader or a ‘day 
trader’. 
 
74 See Federal Tax Coordinator (RIA) 2d at section L-1112 (‘[p]roving that one’s investment activities rise to 
the level of carrying on a trade or business is a difficult hill to climb), cited by Oei (n 55) n 100. 
75 Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, 2002 1040 Instructions D-3 (2002), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040.pdf. See GP Schwartz ‘How many trades must a trader make to be in the 
trading business?’ (2003) Virginia Tax Review 429 n 186. 
76 Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, Publication 550: Investment Income and Expenses 68 
(2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p550.pdf. See Schwartz (n 75) 429 n 189. 
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6.3.4 The nature of the income derived from the activity and intent 
In Deputy v Pont,77 Justice Frankfurter held that ‘trade or business’ implies ‘holding one’s self 
out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services’. In the US context of ‘trader’ this 
would imply that no amount of trading, no matter how frequent or extensive, would qualify the 
taxpayer. However, the court rejected this interpretation, implying that one can be engaged in 
a trade or business without doing so on behalf of others. This makes logical sense, since the 
individual is trading with others via the market, in the business of securities trading, as one 
would be in the market for the trading of a commodity. In Groetzinger,78 a case that involved 
a gambler, the court expressed itself as follows: 
If a taxpayer, as Groetzinger is stipulated to have done in 1978, devotes his full-time activity to 
gambling, and it is his intended livelihood source, it would seem that basic concepts of fairness (if there 
be much of that in the income tax law) demand that his activity be regarded as a trade or business just 
as any other readily accepted activity, such as being a retail store proprietor or, to come closer 
categorically, as being a casino operator or as being an active trader on the exchanges .... . We accept 
the fact that to be engaged in a trade or business, the taxpayer must be involved in the activity with 
continuity and regularity and that the taxpayer's primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be 
for income or profit.79 
 
The comparisons are clearly drawn, although ironically here, for a case involving a 
gambler. Even though Groetzinger was not a casino operator or placing bets on behalf of others, 
he engaged in gambling via the market as a ‘trade or business’ for his own account. He did not 
have to take bets on behalf of clients or operate a casino or exchange. A taxpayer can therefore 
have income that is in its nature ‘business’ income, without that impinging on what might be 
considered extensive professional self-management of the taxpayer’s investment portfolio.80 
The key to the distinction is therefore intention, with the facts merely illustrating intent. 
 
77 308 US 488 (1940). See Schwartz (n 75) n 186. 
78 Groetzinger 480 US paras 27, 33–6. 
79 Ibid para 33. 
80 Higgins v Commissioner (n 65). 
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6.4 CHARACTER: DEFINED BY THE HOLDING PERIOD 
In Yaeger v Commissioner81 the taxpayer had initiated over 2,000 securities transactions in 
1979 and 1980. He had done so ‘vigorously and extensively’. However, the court noted that 
most of the taxpayer’s securities were held for longer than a year, and he did not sell any 
securities held for less than three months. His profits were by nature82 dividends, interest and 
capital appreciation (as a consequence of the holding period).83 The court found that the holding 
periods were unacceptably long and that the taxpayer was not trying to ‘catch the swings in the 
daily market movements and profit thereby on a short-term basis’.84 Clearly, this distinction 
amounts to one of degree. How degree is defined seems to be greatly influenced by the 
advantage that the legislation affords the taxpayer. If that position is favourable for the 
taxpayer, proving that he or she is a trader becomes a hard hill to climb.  
6.5 CONCLUSION 
The US treatment of derivatives provides an interesting policy contrast to a pure ‘facts and 
circumstances’ determination as to whether a ‘scheme of profit-making’ exists.85 Capital assets 
are defined by exclusion in statute,86 and yet this has not limited litigation, as seen in the Corn 
Products and Arkansas Best cases. The contrasts between Yaeger v Commissioner, Cameron v 
Commissioner, Mayer, Chen v Commissioner and the South African case CIR v Nussbaum, 
discussed in chapter 5, make for interesting countervailing perspectives, no doubt influenced 
by legislative context rather than the facts and circumstances associated with common-law 
principles. 
Furthermore, the generally accepted US principle that the nature of the derivative follows 
the underlying asset seems clear enough at first, but soon becomes ensnared in exceptions, such 
as the straddle rules in section 1092, the business hedging rules in section 1221, the short sale 
 
81 Yaeger v Commissioner 92 TC 180 (TC 1989).  
82 See also Moller v Commissioner 721 F.2d 810 where 98 per cent of the taxpayer’s income constituted interest 
and dividends. See Oei (n 55) 9. 
83 Ibid. Yaeger 889 F.2d at 34. 
84 Ibid. 
85 CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 1992 (4) SA 39 (A), 54 SATC 271. 
86 Section 1221. 
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rules in section 1233, the conversion rules in section 1258, and the constructive sale rules in 
section 1259, which are but some examples. Notwithstanding all these exceptions which try to 
capture market developments and protect the fiscus through anti-avoidance rules, the measures 
inevitably seem inadequate and late in design and promulgation. By way of example, a 2014 
US Senate investigation87 into the abuse of structured products by Barclays Bank PLC and 
Deutsche Bank AG found that the two banks had sold what were called ‘basket options’ to 13 
hedge funds in securities transactions, totalling $100 billion and trading profits of $34 billion, 
where many of the transactions lasted only seconds88 and most used the structure to 
recharacterise short-term gains as long-term. The concluding remarks in the report point to the 
fact that these are not isolated examples:89 
[T]he financial sector and the corporate community are using derivatives to try to achieve a variety of 
favorable outcomes in accounting, tax, financial, and other regulatory contexts, even when the 
derivative instruments mimic economic activities that by themselves yield different results. Two 
examples have been highlighted in this report. Congress and the appropriate agencies should closely 
examine the growing use of derivatives to circumvent accounting, tax, or regulatory rules, and what 
steps should be taken to prevent disparate outcomes, particularly when they may pose a threat to the 
transparency, safety, soundness of our financial system or the economy as a whole.90 
 
The two banks started selling these products in 1998 and 2002.91 The abuse was identified 
in 2010 and the investigation report cited above was dated 2014. At this point none of the 
 
87 US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Reports and Hearings Abuse of Structured Financial 
Products: Misusing Basket Options to Avoid Taxes and Leverage Limits (30 September 2014). 
88 Ibid 3: ‘In some cases reviewed by the Subcommittee, the investment advisor used algorithms to engage in a 
high volume of trading, executing more than 100,000 transactions per day. Many of those trading positions lasted 
minutes, and the overall composition of the securities basket changed on a second-to-second basis. One basket 
option account later reviewed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was found to have 
experienced 129 million orders in a year. In other cases, the investment adviser purchased securities whose 
positions remained unchanged for weeks, but all of the basket option accounts reviewed by the Subcommittee 
were dominated by short-term trading involving assets held less than one year.’ 
89 Ibid. See US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Reports and Hearings Fishtail, Bacchus, 
Sundance, and Slapshot: Four Enron Transactions Funded and Facilitated by U.S. Financial Institutions S. 
Prt.107-82 (1/2/2003) n 503; ‘U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial 
Professionals’ S. Hrg. 108-473 (11/18 and 20/2003); ‘Tax Haven Abuses: The Enablers, the Tools and Secrecy’ 
S. Hrg 109-797 (8/1/2006); ‘Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance’ S. Hrg. 110-614; ‘Dividend Tax Abuse: 
How Offshore Entities Dodge Taxes on U.S. Stock Dividends’ S.Hrg. 110-778 (9/11/2008). 
90 US Senate Permanent Subcommittee (n 87) 91. 
91 Ibid 2. 
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evaded taxes had been recovered. This practically illustrates why there have been calls for a 
complete revision of the tax code on derivatives.92 The currently favoured approach seems to 
be a broadening of the mark-to-market methodology currently applied to dealers, which would 
in effect create a deemed realisation event every tax year for these instruments.93 
 
92 See Joint Committee on Taxation Description of the Modernization of Derivatives Tax Act of 2017 n 2: ‘For 
additional reading regarding the issues discussed herein, see, for example, American Bar Association Section of 
Taxation, “Options for Tax Reform in the Financial Transactions Tax Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,” 
2011; Eric Toder and Alan D. Viard, “Replacing Corporate Tax Revenues with a Mark-To-Market Tax on 
Shareholder Income,” National Tax Journal, Vol. 69(3), 2016; Alex Raskolnikov, “Taxation of Financial 
Products: Options for Fundamental Reform,” Tax Notes, Vol. 133, 20 I I, p. 1549; Reed Shuldiner, “A General 
Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments,” Texas Law Review, Vol. 71, 1992, p. 243; David A. 
Weisbach, “Tax Responses to Financial Contract Innovation,” Tax Law Review, Vol. 50, 1995, p. 491; Alvin C. 
Warren, Jr., “Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 107, 1993, p. 
460.’ 
93 See Joint Committee on Taxation (n 92). 
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CHAPTER 7 
UNITED KINGDOM: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY OUTLINE 
7.1 FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Notwithstanding the UK’s exit from the EU following the referendum of 23 June 2016, it is 
relevant to consider UK regulation within an EU context as it will still have to provide some 
form of equivalence to enable business within Europe. Financial regulation is increasingly 
determined within economic groupings, such as the G20, of which South Africa is a member. 
The Financial Stability Board has a central influence over regulatory norms and members are 
expected to conform to retain their membership.  
For members of the EU, regulatory development is influenced by directives, which frame 
best practice or principles as agreed at a collective level, but are of no legal effect until 
transposed in some version within domestic legislation. A four-level legislative process for the 
development of financial services legislation, known as the Lamfalussy approach,1 is applied. 
Key EU institutions include: 
1. the European Community, which represents the interests of the EU in its entirety, and has 
the sole right to propose new legislation; 
2. the Council of the European Union, which represents the interests of the member states; 
and 
3. the European Parliament, which represents the interests of EU citizens and is elected by 
them.2 
 
1 Named after its proposer, Alexandre Lamfalussy. 
2 P Dickson The Asset Management Review (2012) 2. 
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Macro-prudential oversight is provided via the European Systemic Risk Board and 
micro-prudential financial supervision is conducted through three pan-European Supervisory 
Authorities: 
1. the European Banking Authority (EBA); 
2. the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA); and 
3. the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). 
What began as purely advisory powers by the EU committees have evolved to include 
binding powers over member states under certain circumstances.3 Examples of directives that 
have been transposed into domestic legislation, all falling under a like naming convention 
within Europe, include the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID or MiFID II 
from 3 January 2018) and the Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable 
Securities (UCITS) regime. The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) was 
published in 2011 and deals with OTC derivative clearing and trade repository regulation.4 The 
Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR) was also published in 2011, with the 
intention of bringing derivative trading onto multilateral trading platforms that would improve 
price disclosure.5 Coupled with EMIR, this provides for a more orderly alignment within the 
market through better price discovery, regulatory visibility and trading, and legal settlement 
synchronisation. These initiatives are aimed at harmonising the legislative and regulatory 
systems, which provide for the portability of products within the EU and some parity of 
regulatory standards, although application across Europe can vary significantly in practice. 
Prudential standards such as Basel III for banks and Solvency II for insurers are aimed at 
shoring up capital structures after the 2008 crisis and ensuring better risk management. As a 
matter of interest and relevance, South Africa, as a member of the G20, subscribes to these 
 
3 Ibid 3. 
4 A Hudson The Law on Financial Derivatives 6 ed (2018) 3-27. 
5 Ibid 3-56. 
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standards within a permitted national discretion. With respect to derivatives, the European 
Regulation on short selling6 and credit default swaps was published in the Official Journal on 
24 March 2012 and took effect on 1 November 2012. This EU Regulation does not require any 
transposition into national law and is aimed at harmonising short-selling across the EU for the 
first time.7 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) is the central statutory 
instrument governing the law of finance in the UK.8 
On 31 January 2020, the UK exited the European Union. Negotiations on the terms of 
that exit continue during the 2020 transition period until 31 December 2020. The potential 
failures of retained EU law need to be reviewed to ensure the effective operation of financial 
services and markets. Much of this is centred on how equivalence can be maintained. Whereas 
the European Commission fulfils the function of determining equivalence for countries, Her 
Majesty’s Treasury will in future be responsible for making these determinations. Amending 
regulations for the entire breadth of financial sector legislation needs to be considered under 
the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (EUWA 2018).9 
 
7.2 TAX LAW WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
By contrast, there is as yet no tax harmonisation across EU member states affecting the policy 
and legislative independence of the various jurisdictions, due to the discretion afforded to 
member states. Directive 2013/34 of the European Parliament and Council regulates the 
taxation of financial instruments, including derivatives.10 Fair value accounting is the chosen 
 
6 The practice of selling a share or other instrument that one does not own in the expectation that the price will 
drop. 
7 Dickson (n 2) 35 and 36. 
8 Hudson (n 4) 4-01. 
9 Explanatory Memorandum, Financial Services (Miscellaneous Amendments) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020, No 
628, para 2.4.1. 
10 Amending Directive 2006/43/EC and repealing Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC. See A Nesvetailova 
et al ‘Tax evasion and avoidance through financial engineering: The state of play in Europe’ Coffers EU Horizon 
2020 Project (2018) 50. 
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basis of taxation within the EU, which includes derivatives, according to Articles 8, 16 and 17. 
However, Articles 4, 5 and 6 allow exceptions to the general principle in member states, 
resulting in differences in application A recent EU-funded study examining tax evasion and 
avoidance concluded that ‘the EU’s position on the taxation of derivatives deployment by 
companies remains highly varied across the block, with main expertise driven by the industry 
itself, and with many existing provisions allowing considerable discretion to the companies 
and member states.’11 The OECD and G20’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project, 
initiated in 2013, was intended to reduce regulatory divergences that provided opportunities 
for tax manipulation by corporations. However, this EU-funded study12 finds that BEPS has 
tended to be more concerned with the transactional form of international money flows as 
opposed to the economic positions that they reflect and does not explicitly deal with financial 
engineering: 
Despite the relative appreciation and success that BEPS has enjoyed to date, as far as we can estimate, 
BEPS does have a potentially major blind spot in its scope. That is the issue of sophisticated financial 
instruments put to use by MNCs for tax planning purposes. BEPS itself makes no mention, for instance, of 
financial derivatives, which are, as argued above, part and parcel of the financial toolkit that MNCs deploy 
in managing the various international risks to which they are exposed.13 
7.3 TAX LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
7.3.1 General derivative treatment 
Whereas regulatory authorities and governments in the EU, the US and the UK have taken many years 
to begin the work of regulating derivatives, the taxing authorities in the UK (‘HMRC’) have long 
addressed the problem, to their eternal credit.14 
 
Previously the UK had a schedule-based tax system, with various categories of income set out 
on six separate schedules. The Tax Law Rewrite project, which began in 1997, sought to 
 
11 Ibid 52. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid 43. 
14 Hudson (n 4) 18-03. 
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improve consistency and simplify the system. Inland Revenue Technical Note, dated 8 
November 2000, notes a marked and notable shift in tax policy with the Finance Acts of 1993, 
1994 and 1996, the policy of which was to bring profits on debt and debt-based products into 
income taxation, while leaving gains on shares and equity-linked instruments within the capital 
gains rules:15 
[The Acts] effected a revolution … [They] abolished a cornerstone of UK tax law – the distinction 
between capital and revenue – in taxing profits from these instruments. It started the trend … of tying 
the tax result much more closely to the profit figure revealed in a company’s [financial] accounts.16 
 
Derivative contract tax legislation is now contained in the Corporation Tax Act (CTA) 
2009, as amended by the Finance (No. 2) Act 2015 and by the Finance (No. 2) Act 2016.17 
Derivative contracts are catered for in Part 7 of CTA 2009 and are defined as:18 
(a)  an option; 
(b)  a future; or 
(c)  a contract for differences. 
The principle in the derivative tax code is that gains and losses are ordinarily treated as 
income.19 A taxpayer who uses derivatives as stock in trade as part of a business (eg a dealer) 
would include the income for corporation tax purposes under the general provisions in Part 3 
of the CTA 2009.20 Non-trading derivatives are included as ‘loan relationships’ under Part 6 of 
the CTA 2009.21  
 
15 D Southern Taxation of Loan Relationships and Derivative Contracts (2012) 370. 
16 Ibid 64 and 65. 
17 Hudson (n 4) 931.  
18 Section 577. These terms are defined in ss 580, 581 and 582 respectively. 
19 Corporation Tax Act 2009, s 571(1); Hudson (n 4) 18–19 n 12. 
20 Corporation Tax Act 2009, s 573; Hudson (n 4) 18–19 n 14. 
21 Corporation Tax Act 2009, s 574; Hudson (n 4) 18–19 n 15. 
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Section 412(2) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) defines these 
contracts very similarly to the tax code, while the tax code has its own internal logic that is 
distinct from regulation. The FSMA defines derivatives as follows: 
This section applies to a contract if: 
a. it is entered into by either or each party by way of business; 
b. the entering into or performance of it by either party constitutes an activity of a specified kind or 
one which falls within a specified class of activity; and 
c. it is related to an investment of a specified kind or one which falls within a specified class of 
investment.22 
 
Specific exclusion in section 412(1) states that these instruments are not ‘void or 
unenforceable because of s. 18 of the Gaming Act 1845’23 to avoid a contention that ‘two 
persons, professing to hold opposite views touching the issue of a future uncertain event, 
mutually agree that, dependent upon the determination of that event, one shall win from the 
other … a sum of money.’24 
Southern25 pointed out that under section 576 of CTA 2209, in relation to a company, a 
‘derivative contract’ is a ‘relevant contract’ which either: 
1. satisfies the accounting test; or 
2. though it does not satisfy the accounting test, is nevertheless classified a derivative 
contract. 
The following components must be present: 
1. an agreement; 
2. contractual intention; and 
3. consideration. 
 
22 D Southern Taxation of Loan Relationships and Derivative Contracts (2012) 64. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Carlill v The Carbolic Smoke Ball Company (1892) 2 QB 484 at 490, per Hawkins J; D Southern Taxation of 
Loan Relationships and Derivative Contracts (2012) 64. 
25 D Southern ‘The taxation of derivatives’ (1998) 4 British Tax Review 348–63 at 357 and 358. 
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These must be binding on the company and must be accompanied by sufficient evidence. 
Section 577 states that a ‘relevant contract’ is: 
1. an option; 
2. a future; or 
3. a contract for differences.  
In terms of sections 589 to 593 of CTA 2009, contracts excluded by legislative design 
are futures and options over intangible fixed assets, contracts where the underlying subject 
matter consists of shares,26 or the rights of a unit holder under a unit trust scheme.27 Section 
591(2) to (6) sets out the defining qualifications relating to the application of the instrument:28 
a. plain vanilla contracts held by a life assurance company which are approved derivatives for the 
purpose of Rule 3.2.5. of the Insurance Prudential Sourcebook; 
b. equity derivatives held for non-trading purposes which are in a hedging relationship; 
c. quoted warrants entered into or acquired for non-trading purposes; 
d. equity derivatives acquired or held for non-trading purposes which are options or futures to 
acquire shares in a company, and the shares to be acquired or delivered constitute a substantial 
shareholding; 
e. there is a hedging relationship between the relevant contract and a loan relationship with an 
embedded derivative. 
 
Sections 661 and 662 of CTA 2009 provide that contracts whose underlying asset is units 
in unit trusts and open-ended investment companies (OEICs) are also excluded to make them 
chargeable assets within the capital gains tax regime, as with the above.29 
The general rule for UK corporation tax purposes is that all profits accruing to a company 
from its derivative contracts are chargeable to corporation tax as income in accordance with 
this Part. Chapter 7 identifies certain assets (property, certain tangible movable property and 
 
26 Corporations Tax Act 2009, s 591. 
27 Corporations Tax Act 2009, s 589(2). 
28 D Southern ‘The taxation of derivatives’ (1998) 4 British Tax Review 348–63 at 361. 
29 Ibid 360 and 361. 
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creditor relationships, in terms of section 641) as exclusions to that general principle. Sections 
633 to 638 exclude certain entities from inclusion in the concept of trading income (the basis 
for corporations tax): mutual trading companies, insurance companies, investment trusts and 
venture capital trusts. Chapter 3 deals specifically with investment vehicles. OEICs, unit trusts 
and offshore funds fall outside of the CTA on the proviso that a ‘qualifying investment 
purposes’ test is passed.30 This test is one of proportionality (60 per cent) for ‘qualifying 
investments’, defined as follows in section 494:31 
In Section 493 ‘qualifying investments’, in relation to an open-ended investment company, a unit 
trust scheme or an offshore fund, mean investments of the company, scheme or fund of any of the 
following descriptions— 
(a)  money placed at interest, 
(b)  securities, 
(c)  shares in a building society, 
(d)  qualifying holdings in an open-ended investment company, a unit trust scheme or an 
offshore fund, 
(e)  alternative finance arrangements, 
(f)  derivative contracts whose underlying subject matter consists wholly of any one or more 
of— 
(i)  the matters referred to in paragraphs (a) to (e) (other than diminishing shared 
ownership arrangements), and 
(ii)  currency, 
(g)  contracts for differences whose underlying subject matter consists wholly of any one or 
more of— 
(i)  interest rates, 
(ii)  creditworthiness, and 
(iii)  currency, and 
(h)  derivative contracts not within paragraph (f) or (g) where there is a hedging relationship 
between the contract and an asset within paragraphs (a) to (d). 
 
30 Corporations Tax Act 2009, ss 493–496. 
31 See Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) ‘Modernising the taxation of corporate debt and derivative 
contracts’ Consultation document (6 June 2013) 78 para 13.7. 
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Table 7.1: Key statutory provisions for computing income (Part 7 Derivative 
Contracts)32 
Section Subject 
576 and remainder of Chapter 2 Meaning of derivative 
572 Profits and losses to be calculated 
573 Trading credits and debits 
574 Non-trading credits and debits to be brought into account 
Part 3 OEICS, Unit Trusts and Offshore Funds 
Part 7 Chargeable gains arising in relation to derivative contracts 
 
7.4 LEGISLATIVE APPROACH IN PRACTICE 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) commissioned qualitative research, published 
in 2011,33 on the impact of the new format of tax legislation on professionals resulting from 
the Tax Law Rewrite Project (TLRP).34 The objects of the HMRC rewrite are as follows: 
[The rewrite has] the aim of making the UK’s direct tax legislation clearer and easier to use. The TLRP 
intended to make the language of tax law simpler, while preserving the effect of the existing law, 
subject to some minor changes. It aimed to reorder legislation, use modern language and shorter 
sentences, and provide consistent definitions and clearer signposting. Its remit did not cover changing 
the law except in minor, well-defined ways. The Income Tax Act (ITA) of 2007 completed the process 
of rewriting the income tax legislation which began with the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 
of 2003 and continued with the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act of 2005.35 
 
Interestingly, the legal profession was critical of the revision, given its departure from 
well-established words, precision, case law and concepts over time: 
All the cases are on the old notions. So now the cases are no longer helpful in construing the current 
legislation. So any case now before the courts, you’re going to have to find the old principle which is 
the subject of the new legislation, and you’re going to have to work your way backwards – Tax 
lawyer.36 
 
32 At http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/4/part/7 (accessed 15 January 2014). 
33 Ipsos MORI Review of Rewritten Income Tax Legislation Research Report Number 104 (2011). 
34 Ipsos MORI cite their terms of reference as ‘was commissioned by HMRC to explore the experiences of tax 
professionals who have been working with rewritten income tax legislation, and to ascertain whether the Tax 
Law Rewrite Project has made the legislation easier to use.’ Ipsos MORI (n 33) 6. 
35 Ipsos MORI (n 33) 6. 
36 Ibid 23. 
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It was felt that the old ICTA had become the subject of so many amendments that it had 
become difficult to navigate, but that the length of the new statute and the loss of well-
established meaning was not contributing towards efficiency of understanding: ‘There was a 
strong sense among tax professionals that the rewrite had been something of a missed 
opportunity for simplification of tax legislation.’37 
The need to retain the certainty and fixity of law, while also capturing the dynamics of 
the economy, was expressed by Southern as follows:  
Confusion arises from demanding the appearance of certainty where certainty cannot exist. Taxation 
law in general, and anti-avoidance rules in particular, rely for their operation and effect on open-
textured concepts and terms, which in turn introduce other concepts which themselves require further 
clarification. Such provisions may lose the name of law, and simply become enabling provisions to 
allow the executive to act on a pseudo-legal basis.38 
The apparent adoption of accounting principles by statute is to some degree an illusion. In the world of 
accountancy, there is no sovereign legislature or final court of appeal.39 
 
Hudson, writing in 2002 at the time that the draft Finance Bill was available for comment, 
stated: 
The key provision is then that the derivative contract must have been transacted for the purposes of a 
trade … In effect, the proposed code is passively reliant on good faith in accounting procedures such 
that it is possible for the Revenue authorities to bring a reasonable amount into account in any tax 
year.40 
 
The HMRC issued a consultative paper on 6 June 2013, entitled ‘Modernising the 
taxation of corporate debt and derivative contracts’. The scope of the consultation includes 
‘proposed changes to the structure of the regime and … Parts 5, 6 and 7 of the Corporation Tax 
 
37 Ibid 22. 
38 D Southern Taxation of Loan Relationships and Derivative Contracts (2012) 2. 
39 Ibid at 65 para 3.38. 
40 Hudson (n 4) 14-52 and 14-53. 
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Act (CTA) 2009’.41 The HMRC explained the main proposals; at the top of the list was the 
need for clarity relating to a drafting regime, which has used accounting rules. ‘Although 
accountancy will very often give an appropriate outcome for tax purposes, the tax regime will 
sometimes need to take a different approach, … . The Government considers that the tax regime 
should be clearer as to when taxation is to depart from the accounting treatment.’42 Derivatives 
and related structures have contributed to ‘more fluid boundaries between debt, equity and 
derivatives’ which have necessitated continual piecemeal changes to the legislation, which in 
turn compromise the coherence of the regime. This in turn introduces complexity and further 
loopholes. This is a typical symptom of a rules-based approach that tries to capture all 
circumstances (in the UK through accounting standards) and in the USA through tax code rules, 
rather than a principles-based regime. 
In some cases of avoidance, HMRC may challenge the accountancy used by a company; but, if the 
scope of the regime ultimately rests on and defers to the accounting view, there will be cases in which 
no successful challenge is possible – for instance where accounting rules have been correctly applied, 
but the result is nonetheless incompatible with the intention of tax rules … it is not that the accounts are 
‘wrong’ … the accounting treatment may give an entirely reasonable answer, but it may not be 
addressing, from the point of view of the … derivatives contract rules, the right question – namely, 
what are the profits, gains and losses from a particular … derivative which fall to be taxed in a given 
period?43 
 
Amendments were incorporated in the Finance Act (No. 2) 201544 to clarify the 
relationship between tax and accounting, to clarify hedging, and to align taxable loan 
relationship profits with accounting profit and loss entries. 
The dogma pendulum for designing tax statutes seems to be returning to a more 
moderated approach: ‘The Government believes that an explicit stipulation that the existence 
 
41 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) ‘Modernising the taxation of corporate debt and derivative 
contracts’ Consultation document (6 June 2013) at 2. 
42 Ibid at 4. 
43 Ibid at 15. 
44 Schedule 7: Loan relationships and derivative contracts, amendments of Part 7 of CTA 2009. 
135 
of a matter within the regime is not ultimately dependent on accounting treatments would 
provide a clearer legislative mechanism’.45 The government has followed the principle since 
the rewrite that ‘aligning the tax treatment of profits, gains and losses on financial instruments 
with the accounting treatment … has been a cornerstone of the regime since its introduction’.46  
The Explanatory Notice to the Finance Act (No. 2) of 2015 summarises the background 
to the changes effective on 1 January 2016 as follows: 
The rules for the taxation of loan relationships, now contained in Part 5 of CTA 2009, date from 1996. 
A similar but standalone regime for derivative contracts, contained in Part 7, was introduced in 2002. 
Parts 5 and 7 are based on the concept of deriving taxable profits and losses on these instruments from 
accounting entries. They do however incorporate some highly complex features, particularly around 
debt held between connected companies and within groups. The government has in the past frequently 
received adverse comment on the complexity of the current rules. The regimes for both loan 
relationships and derivative contracts have developed significantly over time, evolving in response to 
emerging avoidance risks and to changes in commercial and accounting practice. Accountancy 
standards, on which the tax rules are based, have not remained static. Standard setters for both UK 
GAAP and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have made significant changes to the 
accounting treatment of financial instruments. New UK GAAP and IFRS standards have recently been 
issued (including IFRS 9 in 2014) which will be adopted over coming years, and which should cement 
the accounting treatment of financial instruments for some time to come. Historically, the complexity 
in the loan relationships and derivative contracts regimes has provided repeated opportunities for tax 
avoidance. Reactive measures to counter this avoidance have contributed to further complexity and to 
some loss of structural clarity in the regime, tending to leave further potential loopholes …47 
7.5 INTERPERATIVE GUIDANCE ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 
7.5.1 HMRC policy evolution on financial derivative nature 
The HMRC has expressed the following significant opinions on the tax nature of the 
instruments, even when involving complexity. The following extract is taken from a revision 
to their manual, published on 15 March 2015. It is the most promising demonstration of policy 
advancement analogous to the reasoning of this thesis: 
 
 
45 HMRC (n 41) 16. 
46 Ibid 29. 
47 Finance (No. 2) Act 2015, Explanatory Notes, 852–854. 
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Box 7.1: The HMRC’s view on substance and form of complex derivatives48 
Derivatives that give exposure to part of an asset are conceptually the same as derivatives that 
give exposure to the whole asset. 
A view may be expressed on a bundle of components embedded in an instrument, for 
example the coupon, liquidity, credit risk and currency of a bond, or alternatively a view may 
be expressed on one or a combination of these components. There is no conceptual difference 
between taking a view on all components by buying the instrument or entering a derivative 
contract that replicates ownership, or taking a view on one or a combination of the components 
via derivatives. There is no conceptual difference between taking a view on the direction of 
movement (as with simply long and short positions) or taking a view on the magnitude or 
timing of movements, or other components.  
Multi-derivative or hybrid strategies should not be unbundled.  
Given the wide range of situations this principle can apply to, three examples are set out 
below. These are intended to be illustrative and not a definitive list.  
In all cases involving any such ‘bundling’ we would expect there to be evidence that the 
transactions were executed in pursuit of a clear prior strategy.  
Two or more derivatives 
Where, for example, the view is that the price will increase but only within a certain band, and 
the most efficient way to express that single view is via a series of derivative transactions, those 
transactions should be considered as a whole and not each in isolation.  
A derivative and another financial asset (for example shares) 
Where the view is that an asset would not be acquired at current value but would be at a set 
lower value, a put option is written at that lower value, i.e. as a cost efficient method of 
acquisition. The writing of the option and the potential acquisition of the asset should be 
considered as a whole and not each in isolation.  
A sequential series of similar derivative strategies 
A derivative that is close to maturity generally has greater liquidity than a derivative identical 
in every way, other than having a longer period to maturity. ‘Rolling’ short dated derivative 
strategies such that there is a sequential series of similar derivatives should be viewed as a 
whole and not each in isolation. 
 
 
48 See Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) ‘Business Income Manual (BIM) 56910’ (undated). At 
https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/business-income-manual/bim56910 (accessed 7 April 2015). 
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The above statements of interpretation are significant, demonstrating an evolutionary change 
in the way that derivatives are conceived, given the long debates that have been discussed in 
this thesis. The views are also significant given the common-law tradition of the UK. The 
HMRC makes the following statements of importance: 
1. A view may be expressed on a bundle of components embedded in an instrument, 
for example the coupon, liquidity, credit risk and currency of a bond, or 
alternatively a view may be expressed on one or a combination of these 
components. 
2. There is no conceptual difference between taking a view on all components by 
buying the instrument or entering a derivative contract that replicates ownership, 
and taking a view on one or a combination of the components via derivatives. 
3. There is no conceptual difference between taking a view on the direction of 
movement (as with simply long and short positions) and taking a view on the 
magnitude or timing of movements, or other components. 
4. Multi-derivative or hybrid strategies should not be unbundled.  
It is interesting that (1), which relates to embedded derivatives, expresses the opinion that 
components may either be taken together as a unitary tax outcome or be isolated.49 This 
correlates with sections 640 to 659 of the CTA 2009, where certain derivative contracts are 
taken out of the derivative contract rules in a range of circumstances. Section 640 states that in 
the case of deemed relevant contracts resulting from bifurcation (disaggregation), and which 
fall within the stated subsection, profits and losses will not be treated as ‘income’ for tax 
purposes, but as capital for CGT purposes: 
 
49 Embedded derivatives refer to hybrid instruments that combine a non-derivative host contract with a 
derivative included in the (non-derivative) contractual structure. The presence of the derivative might alter the 
economic structure (such as cash flow). 
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[F]or non-trading investors, who are not insurance companies or collective investment schemes, the 
credits and debits representing the fair value movements in the equity element in certain convertibles, 
and the land or equity element in asset-linked contracts, are brought into account as capital gains and 
not as income in relation to the holders. These rules apply to convertibles (as regards the investor) and 
asset-linked securities (as regards both debtor and creditor). The contracts must not be held for trading 
purposes.50 
 
The above is effectively a reservation of rights by the HMRC to break up a derivative if 
necessary or when certain underlying subject matter (reference asset value) applies (land, 
tangible moveable property, certain share options, creditor relationships that are tracking a 
CFD, and property-based total return swaps). In terms of section 645, equity options are treated 
as capital subject to certain conditions. In order to convert debt instruments into equity, the 
shares into which they convert must be ordinary shares or mandatorily convertible preference 
shares.51 
Of significance to this policy conclusion is the issue of ownership in (2) above, which 
acknowledges economic replication of ownership as no different from ownership itself, when 
considering the attributes of the derivative instrument. The corollary is that they should be 
treated no differently for taxation purposes either. 
 
50 D Southern Taxation of Loan Relationships and Derivative Contracts (2012) 433 para 15.32. 
51 Ibid para 15.36. 
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CHAPTER 8 
UNITED KINGDOM: TREATMENT OF INCOME CHARACTER  
8.1  INTRODUCTION 
The US Supreme Court decision in Eisner v Macomber1 is one of the first tax cases that students 
are taught: the concept of a tree as a capital asset that bears fruit (income). Yet, this American 
tree has given rise to two opposing doctrines on income. While the court acknowledged the 
basis in trust law (in the Anglo tradition) for distinguishing between these two categories of 
proceeds, it went on to state that if a taxpayer sold the tree, that too would constitute income – 
a point ignored by the Anglo courts.2 However, the Anglo courts used the distinction to support 
a definition of income characterised by a schedule-based approach and the transposition of 
precedent in other branches of law (in this instance, trust law) to ascribe meaning to tax law. 
The USA, within the broad concept of income, which did not distinguish between income and 
capital gains, then sought to provide relief statutorily within the US broad meaning.3 This 
resulted in a fundamentally different departure point in the US analysis, from where one might 
begin in the Anglo tradition.4 In the latter half of the twentieth century, the UK (as well as 
Canada, Australia and South Africa in 2001) broadened the tax base and its concept of income 
by devising a separate tax dispensation for chargeable gains, with its distinguishing feature 
being a lower rate of taxation for capital gains.  
 
1 Eisner v Macomber 252 US 189 (1920). 
2 Referred to by some as the ‘logical fallacy of the transplanted category’. See N Brooks ‘The role of judges’ 
referred to by R Krever ‘Interpreting income tax laws in the common law world’ in M Achatz et al (eds) 
Steuerrecht Verfassungsrecht Europarecht: Festschrift für Hans Georg Ruppe (2006) 357 n 6. 
3 IRC §1221, which defines capital assets by exclusion. 
4 The agrarian tradition has been referred to above, with a distinction being drawn between landowners and 
those who used the land to produce income.  
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8.2 NEXUS-WITH-A-SOURCE TEST 
The primary UK judicial test in identifying income is determining its source. The three possible 
sources are labour income, business or the use of property. The fruits of these activities have 
to be cash or be convertible into cash. This is in contrast to US recognition, which includes any 
net accretion of economic capacity, realised or not. Krever pointed out that the US courts do 
not have any independent power in defining income as in the UK; they simply identify via 
external objective criteria whether income is present.5 
In Federal Coke,6 the receipts in the absence of a source were simply held to be a 
windfall in the hands of the recipient company. The perspective considered is that of the 
recipient, not the payer.7 
8.3 SUBSTITUTION AND FORM AND NATURE TESTS 
Two supplementary tests accompany the source test. An amount received in substitution for 
income or its non-payment assumes an income character. The second test is the form and nature 
test. An example thereof is the payment of an annuity that has the ‘feel’ or characteristic 
frequency of income (form of payment). Furthermore, it involves the extent to which the 
taxpayer anticipated the payment and how it was applied. In FCT v Dixon,8 whether the income 
flows from a business venture or is a ‘mere enterprising realisation of capital’ is a central 
enquiry. ‘The sale of an investment asset generates a capital gain. The sale of a business asset 
… used to produce income generates a capital gain unless the taxpayer is also in the business 
of selling its depreciated property.’9 
 
5 Krever (n 2) (2006) 363. 
6 Federal Coke Co Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 77 ATC 4255. 
7 Hayes v FCT (1956) 96 CLR 47; Scott v FCT (1966) 117 CLR 514. 
8 FCT v Dixon (1952) 86 CLR 540. 
9 Krever (n 2) 365. 
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8.4 INTENT 
[T]here is an abiding myth in the derivatives markets that everyone uses the same products in the same 
way and that all products share the same features in all contexts.10 
 
Subjective intent is used to discern the business motive. Was the property that was sold 
acquired with the purpose of resale at a profit or in the course of a profit-making scheme, or 
was it acquired without these motives? As in South Africa, intentions can also change during 
the holding period.11 
Although the case law on characterisation is incomplete, Hudson indicates12 that, much 
like in the USA, income character is likely to be determined by the functional context of the 
taxpayer. A corporate client who rarely uses an interest rate swap would likely receive capital 
treatment, whereas a dealer selling that swap would need to treat the item as income, regardless 
of intent (whether used as a hedge or stock in trade). The context of each individual party will 
therefore have a bearing on the characterisation of the income. 
The legislative approach is therefore to follow the accounting treatment applied by the 
taxpayer and challenge that where required as avoidance. Attempting to categorise derivatives 
by instrument type assumes that all taxpayers use the same instrument in the same way, which 
is simply not the case. It would also mean an endless game of catch-up which would never 
yield its desired result for the fiscus. 
8.5 TAX AVOIDANCE 
8.5.1 General interpretative approach 
The office of the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and 
advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, … 
according to the true intent of the makers of the Act ….13 
 
10 A Hudson The Law on Financial Derivatives 6 ed (2018) 18-07. 
11 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Whitfords Beach Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 355. 
12 Hudson (n 10) 18-03. 
13 (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b, in VanderWolk ‘International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation’ (2002) Bulletin. 
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The use of tax planning arrangements which often includes derivatives necessitates an 
understanding of how courts have developed a doctrine of interpretation to these contracts. The 
UK courts have traditionally focused on legal form to preserve correctness, but the approach 
of the courts did drift towards more expansionary interpretative dogma and then pulled back as 
the consequences of this line of reasoning sought expansion by Revenue.  
The already quoted decision of IRC v Duke of Westminster is an example of textual 
literalism. The overall nature of ‘what is actually going on’ economically (the payment of a 
gardener’s wages) was ignored by Lord Tomlin. Krever explained as follows: 
For example, while an Anglo court would view a standard ‘repo’ transaction as a separate sale of an 
asset, put option for the repurchase, and further sale back to the original vendor, a US court would 
simply collapse the arrangements for tax purposes into a secured loan and apply the tax provisions 
relevant to debt to the transaction.14 
 
In an attempt to establish the true ‘facts of the case’, the landmark judgment of WT 
Ramsay Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners15 in the House of Lords in 1981 went beyond 
the traditional analysis and required an economic reality (real economic loss as opposed to a 
paper loss) to the legally valid transaction. 
The oft-cited Duke of Westminster principle16 was contextualised by Templeman LJ as 
lending itself to a performance: 
The game is recognised by four rules. First, the play is devised and scripted prior to performing. 
Secondly, real money and real documents are circulated and exchanged. Thirdly, the money is returned 
by the end of the performance. Fourthly, the financial position of the actors is the same at the end as it 
was in the beginning save that the taxpayer in the course of the performance pays the hired actors for 
their success. The object of the performance is to create the illusion that something has happened, that 
 
14 Krever (n 2) 374, also n 42. Nebraska Dept of Revenue v Loewenstein 513 US 123, 128 n. 3 (1994). See also 
First American Nat’l Bank of Nashville v United States 467 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1972); Union Planters Nat’l 
Bank of Memphis v United States 426 F.2d 115 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 US 827 (1970); American Nat’l Bank 
of Austin v United States 421 F.2d 442 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 US 819 (1970). 
15 W T Ramsay Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners, Eilbeck (Inspector of Taxes) v Rawling [1982] AC 300. 
16 ‘Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less 
than otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then, however unappreciative 
the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to 
pay an increased tax’ (per Lord Tomlin). 
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Hamlet has been killed and Bottom did don an ass’s head, so that tax advantages can be claimed as if 
something had happened. The audience are informed that the actors reserve the right to walk out in the 
middle of the performance but in fact they are creatures of the consultant who has sold and the taxpayer 
who has bought the play; the actors are never in a position to show a profit and there is no chance that 
they will ever go on strike. The critics are mistakenly informed that the play is based on a classic 
masterpiece called ‘The Duke of Westminster’ but in that piece the old retainer entered the theatre with 
his salary and left with a genuine entitlement to his salary and to an additional annuity.17 
 
The court sought to apply a purposive interpretation by looking to economic substance 
or reality. It was therefore not incumbent upon the court to examine each constructed step in 
the composite transaction, but to view the transaction as a whole. There was no commerciality 
and no gain or loss. In a subsequent and supporting decision, Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s dictum 
in Fitzwilliam v Inland Revenue Commissioners referred to the necessity to identify the ‘real 
transaction’.  
In MacNiven v Westmoreland Investments Ltd18, Revenue sought to widen the purposive 
approach of IRC v McGuckian19 as a means to anti-avoidance. The House of Lords chose not to 
strip out what were circular payments on the grounds of artificiality, choosing rather to allow 
the transactions if they followed the statutory description for the exemption of liability to tax.20 
In Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson21 the House of Lords sought to bring 
final clarity to what Ramsay had established as principle. The five Lords preferred a natural 
interpretation of a given statutory provision rather than the purposive approach of Ramsay, 
which stripped away what were viewed by the court as artificial steps in a series of 
transactions.22 This would require a court ‘to give the statutory provision a purposive 
construction in order to determine the nature of the transaction … and then to decide whether 
 
17 [1979] STC 582 at 583H–584B. 
18 MacNiven v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2003] 1 AC 311. 
19 IRC v McGuckian [1997] 1 WLR 991, 3 All ER 817, STC 907. 
20 Hudson (n 10) 18-48. 
21 Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson [2004] UKHL 51. 
22 See discussion in Hudson (n 10) 18-45, 48. 
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the actual transaction (which might involve considering the overall effect of a number of 
elements intended to operate together) answered to the statutory description.’23 
So it seems the pendulum has arced a return after Ramsay, where statutes must be given 
their natural meaning again. Hudson’s view is that ‘UK revenue law will no longer be astute to 
combat commercial artificiality in tax avoidance transactions but rather will simply construe 
the appropriate revenue statute and permit a tax avoidance scheme to be effective if that is in 
line with a natural interpretation of the statute.’24 
8.5.2 The ISDA agreement and composite transactions 
In Inland Revenue Commissioners v Scottish Provident Institution25 the court disregarded the 
consolidation of the collateral agreement with the transaction involving offsetting options 
under the ISDA Master Agreement. This tax arbitrage scheme, designed by Citibank, was 
intended to take advantage of a change in the tax law. The scheme would allow the life assurer 
to be able to take advantage of an oversight in the transitional drafting provisions of the Finance 
Act 1994 from accrual accounting to mark-to-market taxation, generating a loss of £20 million, 
for which premiums on the offsetting options of £30 million and £10 million were paid.26 This 
decision was appealed to the House of Lords and overturned in a unanimous decision.27 Lord 
Nicholls ruled that the above treatment by the Special Commissioners was a meaningless 
outcome when derivatives within a composite were designed to interact: 
We think that it would destroy the value of the Ramsay principle of constructing provisions such as s 
150A(1) of the 1994 Act as referring to the effect of composite transactions if their composite effect 
had to be disregarded simply because the parties had deliberately included a commercially irrelevant 
contingency, creating an acceptable risk that the scheme might not work as planned. We would be back 
in the world of artificial tax schemes, now equipped with anti-Ramsay devices. The composite effect of 
 
23 Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson (n 21) [32]. See Hudson (n 10) 18-47. 
24 Hudson (n 10) 18-48. 
25 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Scottish Provident Institution [2003] STC 1035. Hudson (n 10) 18-50. 
26 Hudson (n 10) 18-50. 
27 Ibid 18-51. 
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such a scheme should be considered as it was intended to operate and without regard to the possibility 
that, contrary to the intention and expectations of the parties, it might not work as planned.28 
 
In Citibank Investments Ltd v Griffin (Inspector of Taxes)29 Citibank NA (an investment 
company within the Citibank Group) took advice on an offsetting equity option structure that 
would enable the company to establish a known return on the exercise of the options, regardless 
of the movement of the underlying equity index (Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100) 
on which the options would be written. The ability to foreknow the return would allow the 
company to price the transactions akin to a money deposit. As no trading was taking place, the 
advisory firm stated that capital treatment was in order.  
The reason for this desired ‘equity box’ structure was the efficient investment of surplus 
capital of £150 million for 16 months until certain borrowings had to be repaid. As the company 
had assessed capital losses, capital gains were sought to offset the losses, rather than incur 
corporation tax. The board therefore approved the purchase of a capped call option and a 
floored put option. 
Revenue took the view that, taken together, the options constituted a single transaction 
that constituted a loan, not an option. Revenue acknowledged that two separate options were 
required, but held that the one would not have been bought without the other and had, by design 
within the equity box structure, eliminated risk (equity risk) and choice (fixed date of exercise). 
The operation of the reference asset (the FTSE index) was irrelevant and their separate natures 
as options were irrelevant. The Commissioners’ prime focus was on whether the transaction 
was a debt-based return masquerading as equity, and whether the equity structure was therefore 
an artificiality.  
 
28 Ibid 18-53; Inland Revenue Commissioners v Scottish Provident Institution [2004] UKHL 52, [2005] STC 15 
[23]. 
29 Citibank Investments Ltd v Griffin (2000) STC (SCD) 92. 
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Even though the transaction was established to fix a tax outcome as capital in nature, the 
contracts could not be construed as single by virtue of the principles in Ramsay. In summary, 
the transactions were real and not the ‘performance’ referred to by Templeman LJ. 
On appeal, the decision was upheld in the High Court. Patten J in Griffin (Inspector of 
Taxes) v Citibank Investments Ltd30 explained as follows:31 
The development of the law in Burmah and Furniss v Dawson gives the court a limited power in 
appropriate cases to reconstruct a series or sequence of transactions which are indissolubly linked and 
which contain the features described by Lord Brightman in his speech in Furniss v Dawson. Outside 
these limitations it is not open to me on the present state of the authorities to apply the Ramsay 
principle so as to convert genuine transactions such as the two options under consideration into 
something quite different. To do so would be, as I see it, to attribute to the options a substance and legal 
effect which they do not have and which the Crown accepts the court would not give them upon the 
application of the ordinary principles of construction adopted in cases such as Lloyds & Scottish 
Finance v Cyril Lord Carpets Sales Ltd.32 True it is that the purpose of the equity box structure was to 
allow investment in a form which produced a capital gain rather than an income profit. But that is no 
more than the choice which faces any investor … .33 
 
HSBC Life (UK) Ltd v Stubbs34 involved a similar attempt by Revenue to have equity-
linked returns re-characterised as taxable income rather than capital gains, because the 
aggregate product structure provided the features of an interest-based return with equity upside, 
using derivatives. Amongst others, Revenue used economic equivalence as justifying re-
characterisation, given that the aggregate profile of the product was not unlike a zero-coupon 
bond. The taxpayer admittedly sought to avoid having the product falling within the loan 
relationship regime. The case involved a product sold by many life insurance companies in the 
UK, which was also popular in South Africa. Five taxpayer companies were involved in the 
appeal for the period 31 December 1996 to 31 March 1999, involving sold products totalling 
 
30 Griffin (Inspector of Taxes) v Citibank Investments Ltd (2000) STC 1010. 
31 Griffin (Inspector of Taxes) v Citibank Investments Ltd (2000) STC 1010, in a second appeal brought by 
Revenue at [49]; Hudson (n 10) 18-61 and n 123. 
32 Lloyds & Scottish Finance v Cyril Lord Carpets Sales Ltd [1992] BCLC 609. 
33 D Southern Taxation of Loan Relationships and Derivative Contracts (2012) 369. 
34 HSBC Life (UK) Ltd v Stubbs (2002) STC (SCD) 9. 
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some £4.5 billion. Fifty-three representative transactions were initially in evidence, with six of 
these used to reach a decision.35 
Ordinarily, an investor might invest a lump sum (x) at an advertised rate of y per cent, 
which provides a simple arithmetic outcome (z) over 12 months. In the structured product, the 
life company uses z to instead purchase a call option on an equity index (FTSE 100). (x–z) = i 
is used to purchase a five-year bond. By the end of the investment term (five years), the investor 
has received his original capital (x) back due to the bond return (paid monthly or quarterly) and 
has participated in the equity upside via the call option, with no downside risk to the original 
capital, while enjoying an annuity type return akin to a bank deposit. 
The policy contracts were not in dispute, but the underlying investment contracts were in 
dispute. The underlying contracts generally had the following components:36 
1. an equity forward transaction (right to buy) for which the insurer pays (x + z) to a bank 
who agrees to return x and an amount equivalent to the market return in five years; 
2. an equity put option (right to sell) granted by the bank in favour of the insurer to sell the 
shares at the delivery date back to the bank at their then market price; and 
3. a deposit transaction whereby the bank pays interest on x paid over for the forward 
transaction, the interest on which is rolled up and the agreed interest return and 
frequency (monthly, quarterly etc) is paid to the investor. 
The above are structured via an International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA)37 Master 
Agreement. A netting agreement or clause with the Master Agreement will be in place to allow 
offset within the product terms. 
 
35 Ibid [14]. 
36 D Southern Taxation of Loan Relationships and Derivative Contracts (2012) 371. 
37 The International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA) draws up standard agreements for the derivatives market 
in the interests of standardisation. 
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Much emphasis was placed in the case on the ISDA agreements, which an expert witness 
testified to under extensive cross-examination. The Special Commissioner noted the judgment 
of the Privy Council in Chow Yoong Hong v Choong Fah Rubber Manufactory,38 regarding 
whether transactions that could be described as having an economic effect comparable to that 
of a loan should be so regarded when the parties had nonetheless not entered into a loan 
transaction.39 Lord Devlin stated: ‘Even if the post-dated cheques did produce an excess [ie 
were worth more than the bills for which they were given], that is not “interest” within the 
definition unless there is a loan.’40 An earlier case involving a hire purchase agreement, 
McEntire v Crossley Bros Ltd,41 was cited, where Lord Herschell LC had said: ‘But there is no 
such thing, as seems to have been argued here, as looking at the substance, apart from looking 
at the language which the parties have used. It is only by a study of the whole of the language 
that the substance can be ascertained ….’42 
Lord Watson stated the following about the court’s function: 
As is usual in cases of this kind, we have heard a great deal in the course of the appellants’ argument of 
the necessity of attending to the substance of the agreement which we have to construe. My Lords, that 
is a canon of construction which is applicable to all agreements; but it must be borne in mind that the 
substance of the agreement must ultimately be found in the language of the contract itself ….43 
 
In Marren (Inspector of Taxes) v Ingles,44 Lord Wilberforce said: 
No case was cited, and I should be surprised if one could be found, in which a contingent right (which 
might never be realised) to receive an unascertainable amount of money at an unknown date has been 
considered to be a debt; and no meaning however untechnical of that could, to my satisfaction, include 
such a right.45 
 
 
38 Chow Yoong Hong v Choong Fah Rubber Manufactory (1962) AC 209. 
39 HSBC Life (UK) Ltd v Stubbs (2002) STC (SCD) 9 at 27. 
40 Chow Yoong Hong v Choong Fah Rubber Manufactory (1962) AC 209 at 216–17.  
41 McEntire v Crossley Bros Ltd (1895) AC 457. 
42 Ibid 463. 
43 Ibid 467. 
44 Marren (Inspector of Taxes) v Ingles (1980) STC 500, (1980) 1 WLR 983. 
45 Ibid 503/986. HSBC Life (UK) Ltd v Stubbs (2002) STC (SCD) 9 at 29. 
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In Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC,46 Lord Goff of Chieveley 
noted the following about swap transactions: ‘The practical effect is to achieve a form of 
borrowing by, in this example, the floating rate payer through the medium of the interest rate 
swap’,47 which though designed to avoid borrowing restrictions in the LBC, were not in law 
classified as loans. 
The court therefore found with respect to the nature of the payments that the economic 
equivalence of a transaction does not equate to tax equivalence: 
None of the many witnesses we heard, despite very thorough cross-examination, was prepared to 
recognise any of the derivatives purchase transactions as loans, whether or not they were assorted with 
put or call options or two way compensation agreements … In our judgment, it is impossible to 
conclude that any of the parties to these transactions thought that they were lenders or borrowers, or 
that they intended that to be the case. They plainly intended to enter into the legal relationships which 
the documentation showed that they had established, and indeed they took care to enter the relationship 
of buyer and seller of financial futures and not that of lender and borrower ….48  
 
As VanderWolk concluded in his critique, ‘[t]he decisions in Citibank Investments and 
HSBC Life demonstrate that economic equivalence does not necessarily lead to tax 
equivalence’.49 
8.6 CLARIFICATION OF CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS UNDER ISDA 
The slew of cases that followed the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 2008 has 
provided helpful authority on contractual rights under ISDA.50 The legal basis for ISDA is 
located in English and New York law.  
 
46 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC (1996) AC 669. 
47 Ibid 680. 
48 HSBC Life (UK) Ltd v Stubbs (2002) STC (SCD) 9 at 30 and 31. 
49 Vanderwolk (n 13) 76. 
50 ‘At the time of its bankruptcy in September 2008, Lehman had total assets of more than $600 billion. The net 
worth of its total derivatives portfolio amounted to $21 billion, approximately 96% of which represented OTC 
positions. Lehman’s OTC derivatives portfolio consisted of more than 6,000 contracts involving over 900,000 
transactions with myriad counterparties.’ See US Department of the Treasury A Financial System that Creates 
Opportunities, Capital Markets (2017) 115. 
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In England, the most significant cases are Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson51 and LBSF v 
Carlton52 (one of four appeals heard following the Lomas case). In Carlton, the judge referred 
to Lomas as ‘essential pre-reading’.53 
Briggs J stated the following in Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson Inc:  
It is necessary to begin with some preliminary observations about the correct approach to construction. 
The ISDA Master Agreement is one of the most widely used forms of agreement in the world. It is 
probably the most important standard market agreement used in the financial world. English law is one 
of the two systems of law most commonly chosen for the interpretation of the Master Agreement, the 
other being New York law. It is axiomatic that it should, as far as possible, be interpreted in a way that 
serves the objectives of clarity, certainty and predictability, so that the very large number of parties 
using it should know where they stand …. 
 
All personal things are either in possession or action. The law knows no tertium quid between the two. 
While the concept is broad, it includes ‘rights to debts of all kinds … rights of action on a contract’; … 
it was extended to cover documents, such as bonds … This led to the inclusion in this class of things of 
such instruments as bills, notes, cheques, shares in companies, stock in public funds, … these choses in 
action have changed their original character, and become very much less like merely personal rights of 
action and very much more like rights of property.54 
 
These cases turned on contractual rights under section 2(a)(iii)55 of ISDA in the 
circumstances of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Derivative counterparties to Lehman’s 
who were ‘out of the money’ on their positions withheld payment from Lehman’s. At issue 
was whether section 2 permanently extinguishes an obligation to pay or merely suspends it.56  
 
51 Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson Inc (2010) EWHC 3372, (2011) 2 BCLC 120.  
52 Lehman Brothers Special Financing (LBSF) Inc v Carlton Communications Ltd (2011) EWHC 718. 
53 In Enron Australia v TXU Electricity, a court in new South Wales permitted a non-debtor counterparty to 
withhold performance under s 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement. ‘Based on an event of default triggered 
by a debtor-counterparty’s insolvency filing … it has not been followed by the English court in Lomas v FJB Firth 
Rixson’. Ibid [317]. 
54 Ibid [1029]. Lomas (n 51) paras 540, 998, 1029 [footnotes omitted]. 
55 ‘Section 2(a) … provides that it is a condition precedent of the formation of the contract under either the 
master agreement or the payment of any obligation under a confirmation that no event of default, actual or 
potential, has occurred and is continuing at the time any such payment is made (2(a)(iii)). This provision enables 
the parties to render the contract void ab initio in the event that there is any hidden defect in the capacity or 
credit worth of the counterparty.’ See Hudson (n 10) 6-121. 
56 Ibid 6-122. 
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Longmore LJ, in the Lomas v Firth Rixson Inc appeal, referred to the 2011 Belmont Park 
case,57 which addressed the anti-deprivation rule:58 
It would go well beyond the proper province of the judicial function to discard 200 years of authority, 
and to attempt to re-write the case law in the light of modern statutory developments. The anti-
deprivation rule is too well-established to be discarded despite the detailed provisions set out in modern 
insolvency legislation, all of which must be taken to have been enacted against the background of the 
rule … The policy behind the anti-deprivation rule is clear, that the parties cannot, on bankruptcy, 
deprive the bankrupt of property which would otherwise be available for creditors … Except in the case 
of well-established categories such as leases and licences, it is the ‘substance rather than the form 
which should be determinant’… this must now be taken as an authoritative statement of the anti-
deprivation principle.59 
 
Lord Collins, in his introduction, referred to the concept of property with reference to 
credit swaps by citing section 436 of the Insolvency Act 1986: ‘ includes money, goods, things 
in action, land and every description of property … and also obligations and every description 
of interest, whether present or future or vested or contingent, arising out of, or incidental to, 
property.’60 
 
57 Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Securities Ltd [2011] UKSC 38 [18]–[21]: ‘Prior 
to the events which form the background to this appeal, the Lehman Brothers group was the fourth largest 
investment bank in the United States. On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc (LBHI), the parent 
company of the Lehman Brothers group, applied to the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New 
York for protection under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. … This appeal concerns the effect 
of the security arrangements in a complex series of credit swap transactions under which, in effect, investors gave 
credit protection to Lehman Brothers by reference to the performance of a basket of underlying obligations … At 
the time of the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008 there were 19 SPVs being used as Note issuers in 
the programme with a total of about 180 series of Notes with an aggregate principal amount of $12.5 billion. 
LBSF filed for Chapter 11 protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York 
on 3 October 2008.’ 
58 See Collins J at 1-3: ‘What is now described as the anti-deprivation principle dates from the 18th century, 
although the expression “deprivation” has been in use in this context only since the decision of Neuberger J in 
Money Markets International Stockbrokers Ltd v London Stock Exchange Ltd (2002) 1 WLR 1150. In 1812 Lord 
Eldon LC confirmed that a term which is “adopted with the express object of taking the case out of reach of the 
Bankrupt Laws” is “a direct fraud upon the Bankrupt Laws” from which a party cannot benefit: Higinbotham v 
Holme (1812) 19 Ves Jun 88, 92. “… the law is too clearly settled to admit of a shadow of doubt that no person 
possessed of property can reserve that property to himself until he shall become bankrupt, and then provide that, 
in the event of his becoming bankrupt, it shall pass to another and not to his creditors” (Whitmore v Mason (1861) 
2 J & H 204, 212, per Sir William Page Wood V-C).’ 
59 Belmont Park (n 57) [102]. 
60 Ibid [5]. 
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In Belmont Park61 (where the respondents were Australian) the Supreme Court protected 
the ISDA framework. Lord Collins referred to the concept of property with reference to credit 
swaps as including ‘things in action … also obligations and every description of interest, 
whether present or future or vested or contingent, arising out of, or incidental to, property’.62 
Lehman Brothers Special Financing (LBSF) argued that the rights under the Swap Agreement 
and the rights over the collateral to secure them were the property of LBSF within the meaning 
of the Insolvency Act 1986 and therefore formed part of the insolvent estate of LBSF. LBSF 
was insolvent, but ‘in the money’. The notes issued by LBSF had been marketed and sold to 
Australian local authorities, pension funds, private investment companies and private 
individuals63 with a Triple A credit rating. Attempts at arguing ‘anti-deprivation’ because 
counterparties ceased payment under the swaps at the date of bankruptcy of LBSF failed. Lord 
Collins preferred to consider each transaction on its merits to see whether a shift in interests 
could be justified as a genuine and justifiable commercial response to the consequences of 
insolvency. Longmore LJ, in Lomas, quoted64 Lord Collins in Belmont Park and dismissed a 
number of arguments in dealing with title to property:  
107. The answer is not to be found in the Noteholders’ argument that  
(a)  LBSF’s property was a beneficial interest under a trust, … 
(b)  LBSF retains its beneficial interest under the trust to this day. The fact that the security 
interests were held by the Trustee is not determinative. The court has to look to the substance 
of the matter, … Nor is it to be found in the fact that the potential for change in priority was 
in the documentation from the beginning, nor in the ‘flawed asset’ argument or variant of it, 
… The answer is to be found in the fact that this was a complex commercial transaction 




63 Ibid [113]. 
64 Ibid [85]. 
65 Ibid [108]. 
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Rights before and after bankruptcy were then distinguished with reference to the anti-
deprivation principle by asking whether what the court described as ‘the chose in action’66 
represents the quid pro quo for something already done or is intended to provide the quid pro 
quo for services yet to be rendered. ‘The availability of the anti-deprivation principle in 
insolvency law was accepted as correct.’ As summarised by Longmore LJ, ‘it was necessary 
to look at the substance of the agreement rather than its form and to consider whether the 
provision in question amounted to an illegitimate attempt to evade the relevant bankruptcy law 
or had some legitimate commercial basis.’67 
Longmore LJ supported Lord Collins by looking to the substance of the contract, rather 
than a claim against property, given that the assets backing the contract held by LBSF were 
held in trust as security. The ‘touchstone’ was that this was a chose in action in the nature of a 
‘complex commercial transaction’ that was not extinguished by the insolvency of Lehman, or 
claimable as property in isolation of the contractual terms even though the contracts were ‘in 
the money’.  
As Hudson put it, ‘[t]he decision of the Court of Appeal in Lomas v AFB Firth Rixson 
combined four different appeals which included an appeal from the judgment of Briggs J in 
Lomas itself.’68 Although the construction of the ISDA Master Agreement was flawed, the 
courts confirmed the single provision agreement and the principle of netting between parties 
under the agreement. The relevant point for this thesis is that the contract is a valid one 
bestowing rights on the parties that have undergone the severest of tests through bankruptcy in 
the highest courts, confirming application to property as defined in the Insolvency Act 1986, 
which includes things in action. The corollary therefore must be that if financial derivative 
 
66 Ibid [88]. 
67 Hudson (n 10) 6-143. 
68 ‘Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc v Carlton Communications Ltd on appeal from the judgment of 
Briggs J; Pioneer Freight Futures Co Ltd (in liq) v Cosco Bulk Carrier Co Ltd on appeal from Flax J; and 
Britannia Bulk plc (in liq) v Bulk Trading SA.’ See Hudson (n 10) 6-136. 
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instruments bestow rights, those rights are to be considered property, bringing derivatives 
within the ambit of the logic as applied in CIR v Pick ’n Pay,69 and do not differ from 
transactions in respect of any other property such as land and shares. Watermeyer CJ described 
‘property’ as follows: 
[W]hat is meant by property is all rights vested in him which have a pecuniary or economic value. Such 
rights can conveniently be referred to as proprietary rights and they include jura in rem, real rights such 
as rights of ownership in both immovable and movable property, and also jura in personam such as 
debts and rights of action.70 
 
8.7 SUMMARY 
The UK provides valuable insights into the treatment of financial derivative instruments. The 
UK is a leading financial jurisdiction with policies that have promoted London as a financial 
centre in Europe. Its judicial tradition shares a common history with our own. It is therefore 
interesting that the HMRC interpretative statements on derivatives (Box 7.1 above) adopt a 
conceptual stance that is unknown to South Africa.  
Rather than characterising derivative instruments in isolation, the HMRC considers the 
context of each taxpayer (badge of trade) when characterising income. An accounting approach 
has been adopted, yet the HMRC has developed its own language and framework for the 
taxation of these instruments. This approach is accompanied by developing anti-avoidance case 
law that directly confronts the pretensions associated with the sale of artificial derivative 
structures in Ramsay and confirms the need to keep faith with natural interpretation, according 
to Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson.  
Questions as to whether derivative transactions should be disaggregated or viewed as a 
composite under the ISDA Master Agreement are addressed. In Griffin (Inspector of Taxes) v 
 
69 CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 1992 (4) SA 39 (A), 54 SATC 271. 
70 CIR v Estate CP Crewe and Another 1943 AD 656, 12 SATC 344 at 352. See SARS Comprehensive Guide to 
Capital Gains Tax Issue 7 (2018) 42. 
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Citibank Investments Ltd, the court confirmed that there are limitations on its powers to 
reconstruct transactions that are ‘indissolubly linked’, thereby risking converting genuine 
transactions into ‘something quite different’.71 In Scottish Provident, the House of Lords ruling 
that the transaction should be ‘considered as it was intended’72 was essential to avoid a return 
to a ‘world of artificial tax schemes, now equipped with anti-Ramsay devices’.73 In HSBC Life 
(UK) Ltd v Stubbs, it was interestingly HMRC that made an economic equivalence argument 
to justify re-characterisation. The court held that the substance and the language of the 
agreement are both relevant to character determination. Importantly, economic equivalence 
achieved by combining instruments, as illustrated mathematically by Warren74 above, cannot 
on its own lead to tax equivalence. 
Finally, the bankruptcy cases involving Lehman Brothers in 2008 have provided 
authority on contractual rights under ISDA, confirming that those rights are in the nature of 
property and must be protected under insolvency law. The wide use of the contract template 
makes it an appropriate proxy for understanding the legal nature of financial derivative 
instruments, so that it serves the objectives of ‘clarity, certainty and predictability, so that the 
very large number of parties using it should know where they stand’.75 That clarity obtained 
through the Court of Appeal upheld the ISDA agreement as a chose in action in the nature of 
property. This establishes a causal link in helping to understand how these contracts should be 
framed in South African jurisprudence. Interestingly enough, this clarity is not provided by tax 
 
71 Griffin (Inspector of Taxes) v Citibank Investments Ltd (2000) STC 1010 in a second appeal brought by 
Revenue at [49]. Hudson (n 10) 18-61 n 123. 
72 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Scottish Provident Institution [2004] UKHL 52; [2005] STC 15 at [23]; 
Hudson (n 10) 18-53. 
73 Ibid. 




law, but by the insolvency case law that resulted from the collapse of Lehman Brothers and its 
extensive use of derivative contracts.
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CHAPTER 9 
AUSTRALIA: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY OUTLINE 
9.1 INTRODUCTION  
Thus, modern borrowing of precedents between constitutional judges would be an expansion of a 
typical format of common law that evolved from a historically common practice among the judges of 
the ex-Commonwealth countries. Beginning in the 19th century these judges largely used precedents 
of foreign judges, generally British ones and in particular the Privy Council. The Privy Council was the 
court of final appeal for the colonies and dominions, a function that it still performs today in relation to 
a small group of Caribbean countries. Its function of ensuring the exact observation and interpretation 
of the law deeply influenced the development of law in countries such as New Zealand, Australia, India, 
South Africa, Hong Kong, Caribbean countries, and Canada (along with other countries in the colonial 
area of East and Southern Africa).1 
 
Australia was included in this research because of its status, like South Africa, as a former 
colony of Britain sharing a common-law tradition. To my knowledge there has always existed 
a constructive and helpful relationship between SARS and the Australian Tax Office. The 1994 
Tax Advisory Committee2 document acknowledged extensive reliance on an Australian 
document of the same title, and sought to deal with the rapidly advancing, sophisticated and 
complex financial instruments.3 Possible departures from the Australian approach included 
applying normal tax principles, whereas the Australian Tax Authorities were in favour of all 
gains and losses being recognised on revenue account.4 The situation remains largely 
unchanged to date. The development over some 20 years of the Australian legislation referred 
 
1 See P Nevill ‘New Zealand: The Privy Council is replaced with a domestic Supreme Court’ (2005) 3 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 115 et seq. In some former Commonwealth countries, appealing to 
the Privy Council was formally annulled only recently, while in others, such as South Africa, it was abolished a 
long time ago. The case of Australia is worth noting: Australia eliminated this mechanism that put the national 
legal system in direct communication with the British one only in the 1980s, which, as stressed by Australian 
doctrine, produced a deep legal influence. The mechanism of the Privy Council is also analysed by PK Tripathi 
‘Foreign precedents and constitutional law’ (1957) 57 Columbia Law Review 319 et seq. See also the study of S 
Gardbaum ‘Japanese Law Symposium: The new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism’ (2001) 49 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 707–60; A Lollini ‘Legal argumentation based on foreign law: An example from 
case law of the South African Constitutional Court’ (2007) 3(1) Utrecht Law Review 61.  
2 Tax Advisory Committee Consultative Document on the Tax Treatment of Financial Arrangements (1994). 
This committee was appointed to advise the Minister of Finance on tax matters. It no longer exists. I am grateful 
to Dr Jan Graaff who served on the committee and who provided me with this document and related work 
papers. 
3 Ibid 1. 
4 Ibid 2. 
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to as the Taxation of Financial Arrangements, which was introduced in 2008, therefore requires 
attention.  
9.2 FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK WITHIN AUSTRALIA 
The Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) is the regulator responsible for 
regulating asset managers in Australia under the Corporations Act 2001. 
Essentially, four management structures are used by managers in this jurisdiction: 
(a) Fixed unit trusts, managed by a trustee manager via a contractual relationship under a 
trust deed, operate as a conduit for taxation purposes, with income, gains and losses 
taxed in the hands of the investor. 
(b) The Management Investment Trust (MIT) regime was introduced in 2010, given the 
uncertainty around the characterisation of gains made by funds. In consequence, an 
MIT must comply with certain criteria, including that it may not be a trading trust, and 
the assets must be widely held. 
(c) Venture capital limited partnerships (VCLPs) and early stage venture capital limited 
partnerships (ESVCLPs). 
(d) Linked investment companies – closed-end listed trusts.5 
9.2 TAX LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
9.2.1 Tax Laws Amendment (Taxation of Financial Arrangements) Act 2009 
The Tax Laws Amendment (Taxation of Financial Arrangements) Bill 2008 (the Bill) was 
introduced into Parliament on 4 December 2008. The Bill contained Division 230, which 
comprised stages 3 and 4 of the reforms to the taxation of ‘financial arrangements’ and received 
Royal Assent on 26 March 2009. The Tax Laws Amendment Act 2009 (the TOFA Act) was 
enacted to address the lack of statutory mechanisms for dealing with financial innovation. First 
 
5 P Dickson The Asset Management Review (2012) 42–55. 
159 
mentioned in the 1992 Budget, the taxation of financial arrangements (TOFA) was 
implemented in three stages from 2001. The Australian Tax Office (ATO) stated that prior 
measures had been of a limited and piecemeal nature in response to specific issues: 
What has been lacking is an overarching framework which seeks to systematically address the 
functional purposes of different financial arrangements and the ways in which they are used. As a 
consequence, current tax laws, which have continued to rely significantly on legal form, represent an 
increasingly complex amalgam of both general and specific provisions … Current tax laws have 
resulted in tax-based timing and character mismatches and lack the tax design architecture needed to 
facilitate efficient hedging activity and market-making. In a number of areas, gaps have appeared in the 
law, determinacy has been lacking, tax anomalies and distortions have emerged, neutrality has not been 
achieved, and uncertainty has developed about the appropriate treatment of some basic financial 
arrangements.6 
 
The ATO sets out the chronology of the development of TOFA as follows:7 
Division 974 of the ITAA 1997 was introduced in the New Business Tax System (Debt and Equity) 
Act 2001 and the New Business Tax System (Thin Capitalisation) Act 2001. It introduced rules for 
classifying financial instruments as debt interests or equity interests according to the economic 
substance of the instrument rather than its legal form. 
 
Division 775 and Subdivisions 960-C and 960-D of the ITAA 1997 were introduced in the New 
Business Tax System (Taxation of Financial Arrangements) Act (No. 1) 2003. Under Division 775, 
forex realisation gains and forex realisation losses, attributable to fluctuations in foreign currency 
exchange rates, are made when a forex realisation event occurs. 
 
Division 230 was introduced by the Tax Laws Amendment (Taxation of Financial Arrangements) 
Act 2009 (the TOFA Act). The TOFA Act implements Stages 3 and 4 of the TOFA reforms and are the 
final set of TOFA reforms recommended by the Ralph report. Stage 3 addresses hedging financial 
arrangements, allowing for the matching of the tax classification and tax timing of gains or losses from 
certain hedging financial arrangements with the gains and losses from a hedged item. Stage 4 deals 
with the tax treatment of all other financial arrangements by providing a framework for calculating and 
taxing gains and losses from financial arrangements. 
 
6 See http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/ (accessed 17 July 2014) at 1.4 and 1.6. 
7 See https://www.ato.gov.au/Business/Taxation-of-financial-arrangements-%28TOFA%29/In-detail/Guide-to-
the-taxation-of-financial-arrangements-%28TOFA%29/ (accessed 8 January 2018). 
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On 29 June 2010, a number of amendments to the provisions were announced to improve 
certainty under TOFA hedging rules. On 29 November, further announcements were made as 
well as further changes in the 2011 to 2012 budget.  
At a 2014 conference, which focused on the symmetrical treatment of TOFA provisions 
for liabilities, the following statement was made with regard to the introduction of the original 
legislation in the conference paper that was co-authored by an Assistant Commissioner at the 
ATO: 
The size of both the amount of foreign currency debt and derivative positions held by large and 
medium sized Australian entities (including financial institutions, mining companies, general 
corporates, listed and unlisted trusts, etc.) was unquestionably one of the key reasons for the 
introduction of TOFA. In this regard, there was a recognition within Treasury, the ATO and the 
taxpaying community that there needed to be clearer and more comprehensive income tax provisions 
dealing with such instruments. The introduction of the Division 230 elective methods (plus also FRE9) 
was also driven by a desire to allow taxpayers to obtain greater book/tax symmetry in relation to these 
types of transactions.  
 
In other words, it was the very size and importance of both foreign currency debt positions and 
derivative transactions (which now represent billions of dollars of transactions every year) which was 
one of the key drivers of the TOFA regime. As part of this, ensuring a consistent treatment for both 
assets and liabilities was fundamental. This was particularly the case in relation to derivatives which 
are typically entered into by taxpayers in order to provide an economic hedge in relation to another 
transaction (for instance, foreign currency debt). As derivatives will typically be entered into ‘on-the-
money’ with movements in value then causing the derivative to either become an asset (an in-the-
money derivative) or a liability (an out-of-the money derivative) it was imperative that Division 230 
provided for symmetrical treatment in relation to the recognition of gains and losses on assets and 
liabilities.8 
 
It is also evident from the ATO explanation that accounting standards were used to 
inform legislative design: 
The Division 230 tax framework explicitly takes into account a number of Australian accounting 
standards. These standards reflect the adoption of the international financial reporting standards in 
 
8 See E Campbell & A Hirst ‘Financial Services Conference, Liabilities – A changing world post TOFA’ (2014) 
The Tax Institute 19. Campbell is Assistant Commissioner at the ATO.  
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Australia, with effect from 1 January 2005. However, Division 230 does not mandate that taxpayers use 
accounting standards as the basis for taxation.9 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill provides helpful clarification on the legislative 
approach, which now deems all gains and losses from financial arrangements subject to 
Division 230 to be on revenue account,10 other than for hedges. A first-time reader of the 
provisions may face the difficulty of definition, for example, what an arrangement constitutes: 
2.36 Typically, an arrangement will be constituted by a contract. Generally, this would be the case for 
ordinary financial instruments, common hybrid instruments and derivatives. However, the concept of 
arrangement as used in Division 230 recognises that a contractual basis may be insufficient to reflect 
the substance of an arrangement in all circumstances. It is recognised that modern arrangements can be 
put together in very complex ways and that their substance may be different from their form … 
2.44 An arrangement, as defined in the ITAA 1997, is a broad concept. It includes any arrangement, 
agreement, understanding, promise or undertaking, whether express or implied. Moreover, it does not 
need to be enforceable, or intended to be enforceable, by legal proceedings.11 
 
Reference to the legislation, namely section 230-5, identifies the TOFA provisions as 
applying to financial arrangements that are settled in cash or ‘equitable rights and/or 
obligations’ to receive or provide a financial benefit. The concept of a ‘benefit’12 is simply a 
net gain or loss.13 A ‘financial arrangement’ is defined as follows: 
 
9 See http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/ (accessed 18 July 2014) 1.17. The Australian Accounting Standards Board 
(AASB) is responsible for developing and issuing Accounting Standards applicable to Australian entities. In 
2002, work commenced towards adopting standards that are the same as those issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board, for application under the Corporations Act 2001 for accounting periods beginning 
on or after 1 January 2005. 
10 See http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/ (accessed 18 July 2014) 3.16. Under Division 230 the general rule is that 
gains and losses from financial arrangements will be on revenue account. This treatment will simplify the law 
by removing the need to determine the revenue or capital nature of such gains and losses. 
11 See http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/ (accessed 18 July 2014); Explanatory Memorandum to Tax Laws 
Amendment (Taxation of Financial Arrangements) Bill 2008. 
12 Division 230 focuses on net concepts of gains and losses rather than gross receipts and outgoings (flows), at 
least under the Subdivision 230-B accruals/realisation and Subdivision 230-G balancing adjustment provisions. 
Although ‘gains’ and ‘losses’ are not specifically defined in Division 230, as a general rule the concept of net 
gains and losses involves a comparison of the financial benefits provided and received under a Financial 
Arrangement. See Campbell & Hirst (n 8) 14.  
13 230-5 Scope of this Division: (1) You have a financial arrangement if you have one or more cash settleable 
legal or equitable rights and/or obligations to receive or provide a financial benefit.  
230-15 Gains are assessable and losses deductible: 
Gains 
(1) Your assessable income includes a gain you make from a financial arrangement. 
Note: This Division does not apply to gains that are subject to exceptions under Subdivision 230-H. 
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230-50 Financial arrangement (equity interest or right or obligation in relation to equity interest) 
(1)  You also have a financial arrangement if you have an equity interest. The equity interest 
constitutes the financial arrangement. 
(2)  You also have a financial arrangement if: 
(a)  you have, under an arrangement: 
(i)  a legal or equitable right to receive something that is a financial arrangement 
under this section; or 
(ii)  a legal or equitable obligation to provide something that is a financial 
arrangement under this section; or 
(iii)  a combination of one or more such rights and/or obligations; and 
(b)  the right, obligation or combination does not constitute, or form part of, a financial 
arrangement under subsection 230-45(1). 
The right, obligation or combination referred to in paragraph (a) constitutes the financial arrangement.14 
 
The Act deliberately seems to use very general language to capture the potential 
obscurity of what might be constructed by financial innovation. Financial derivatives are 
generally not mentioned or given naming conventions, undoubtedly to avoid inventive 
avoidance by way of definition. The statutory definition of a derivative follows this rule 
of construction: 
230-350 Derivative financial arrangement and foreign currency hedge 
Derivative financial arrangement 
(1)  A derivative financial arrangement is a financial arrangement that you have where: 
(a)  its value changes in response to changes in a specified variable or variables; and 
(b)  there is no requirement for a net investment, or there is such a requirement but the net 
investment is smaller than would be required for other types of financial arrangement that 
would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market factors. 
Note: Paragraph (a) ― a specified variable includes an interest rate, foreign exchange rate, credit 
rating, index or commodity or financial instrument price. 
 
Losses 
(2) You can deduct a loss you make from a financial arrangement, but only to the extent that: 
(a) you make it in gaining or producing your assessable income; or 
(b) you necessarily make it in carrying on a business for the purpose of gaining or producing your assessable 
income. Ibid at n 85. 
14 Ibid at n 85. 
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9.2.2 Character of gains and losses from financial arrangements  
The character of gains and losses from financial arrangements follows from the international 
accounting standards (IFRS) discussed in chapter 4. The Explanatory Memorandum indicates 
that the designation on character was a matter of policy convenience: 
The revenue/capital distinction in the income tax law is often a very difficult distinction to make, 
relying on factors such as purpose, the degree of periodicity, and the circumstances in which the 
relevant amount is found in the hands of the particular taxpayer. Determining the character of the gains 
and losses against factors such as these can be very demanding and complex and the outcome may be 
uncertain ….15 
 
Consequently, a mixture of approaches is used, by combining specific statutory 
provisions (for example, 3.22 below), a catch-all Division 230, exemptions (for exempt 
income) and recognition of hedging, where character follows the object asset of the hedge: 
3.22 In this regard, certainty as to the character of some gains and losses from financial arrangements 
has been provided by a number of existing specific provisions. Specifically, revenue treatment has been 
provided by: 
Sections 26BB and 70B of the ITAA 1936, in relation to the disposal of traditional securities; 
Division 3B of Part III of the ITAA 1936, in relation to foreign currency gains and losses; and 
Division 775 of the ITAA 1997, in relation to foreign currency denominated arrangements (with 
limited exceptions). 
3.23 Complexity will be further reduced by removing the capital/revenue distinction in respect of 
financial arrangements by taxing all gains and losses on revenue account under Division 230. An 
exception to the requirement that a gain or loss from a financial arrangement will always be on revenue 
account is contained within the hedging financial arrangements election, and is applicable to certain 
hedging financial arrangements. Under this exception, the tax characterisation of a hedging financial 
arrangement may be based on the characterisation already given to the hedged item under the taxation 
law, and to that extent will not of itself increase complexity to any significant extent.  
3.24 In addition, any gains and losses to which Division 230 expressly does not apply (such as through 
an exception as set out in Subdivision 230-H as explained in Chapter 2) will fall for consideration 
under the existing tax law. This means their tax treatment, including their character, is to be determined 
by any residual operation of the ITAA 1936 and the ITAA 1997.  
Nexus test for losses  
 
15 Ibid. See Explanatory Memorandum at 3.21. 
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3.25 To be deductible, the current income tax law requires a sufficient nexus between losses and the 
gaining or producing of assessable income. This concept is preserved under Division 230.16 
 
In 2015 I visited Australia with representatives from the South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB) and the National Treasury on matters related to macro prudential policy. Several of 
the meetings also provided an opportunity to inquire about the taxation of financial derivatives. 
In a meeting with a representative of the Australian Treasury on 29 July 2015, it was mentioned 
that a review of TOFA had become necessary. 
In the 2016 to 2017 budget, the Australian Government announced that TOFA would 
undergo further reforms, effective 1 January 2018, to ‘reduce the scope, decrease compliance 
costs and increase certainty’. This would include four key components:17 
1.  a ‘closer link to accounting’ to strengthen and simplify the existing link between tax 
and accounting in the TOFA rules; 
2.  simplified accruals and realisation rules; 
3.  a new tax hedging regime which is easier to access, encompasses more types of risk 
management arrangements (including risk management of a portfolio of assets) and 
removes the direct link to financial accounting; 
4.  simplified rules for the taxation of gains and losses on foreign currency to preserve the 
current tax outcomes but streamline the legislation.
 
16 Explanatory Memorandum. 
17 See https://www.ato.gov.au/General/New-legislation/In-detail/Direct-taxes/Incometax- 
for-businesses/Taxation-of-financial-arrangements---regulation-reform/ (accessed 8 January 2018). 
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CHAPTER 10 
AUSTRALIA: TREATMENT OF INCOME CHARACTER 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
[T]he words income and capital are ordinary English words, in the sense that they each appear in the 
dictionary .… There is no reason to suppose that either word is used in some technical or trade way. 
Hence it would seem to follow that it will be the task of the judge to determine, without evidence, their 
meaning. To the extent that business people or accountants attribute some special or different meaning 
to the words, those meanings would be disregarded and, in particular, evidence could not be advanced 
as to such usages.1 
 
As mentioned above, case law on income character determination for derivatives in Australia 
is limited. The main cases are FC of T v Visy Industries2 and Commissioner of Taxation v 
Woolcombers.3  
The main derivative-related ATO rulings, which are not all relevant to the narrower 
confines of this research, are the following: 
TR 2014/7 – foreign currency hedging transactions 
TR 2012/13 – gains/losses on financial arrangements connected to earning NANE or exempt 
income 
IT 2228 – futures transactions 
IT 2050 – interest rate swaps – character 
IT 2682 – interest rate swaps – timing 
TR 1996/D13 and TR 99/D13 (withdrawn) – payments under swap contracts. 
 
1 Justice DG Hill ‘Income and capital: Have the goal posts been moved?’ (1995) 4 Taxation in Australia: Red 
Edition 8 at 10. 
2 FC of T v Visy Industries USA Pty Ltd (2012) ATC 20-340. 
3 Commissioner of Taxation v Woolcombers Pty Ltd (1993) 93 ATC 5170. This case involves deductibility for 
forward agreements related to commodities and does not apply to this research. 
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As a jurisdiction, case law is therefore largely instructive on general principles associated 
with share dealing, rather than derivatives as a class of instrument within that body of case law.  
Rulings by the ATO were found to be very helpful in establishing a perspective on case 
law development. In this section, key elements of Tax Ruling 92/3 are highlighted, ‘whether 
profits on isolated transactions are income’,4 which is the most complete treatment by the ATO 
on the subject of general income character.  
10.2 PROFIT-MAKING PURPOSE 
Californian Copper Syndicate v Harris5 is cited by the ATO as ‘the starting point in this area 
of the law’,6 citing Lord Justice Clerk (the Right Honourable JHA Macdonald) as follows: 
It is quite a well settled principle, in dealings with questions of Income Tax, that where the owner of an 
ordinary investment chooses to realise it, and obtains a greater price for it than he originally acquired it 
at, the enhanced price is not profit ... assessable to Income Tax. But it is equally well established that 
enhanced values obtained from realisation or conversion of securities may be so assessable where what 
is done is not merely a realisation or change of investment, but an act done in what is truly the carrying 
on, or carrying out, of a business. ... What is the line which separates the two classes of cases may be 
difficult to define, and each case must be considered according to its facts; the question to be 
determined being – Is the sum of gain that has been made a mere enhancement of values by realising a 
security, or is it a gain made in an operation of business in carrying out a scheme of profit-making?7 
 
In this case, the taxpayer had made an $80 million interest-bearing loan over seven years 
at 12,5 per cent per annum to a subsidiary and then, three days later, as predetermined, assigned 
the right to the interest income in exchange for a lump sum, discounted to a net present value 
at a rate of 16 per cent per annum. The court found that the amount ($45.37 million) was 
income. On appeal, the amount was held to be capital by both the Supreme Court of Victoria 
 
4 The ATO was responding to the decision in FC of T v The Myer Emporium Ltd (1987). 
5 Californian Copper Syndicate v Harris (1904) 5 TC 159 at 165–6. 
6 TR 92/3, page 6 at 27. 
7 This passage from Californian Copper has been approved by the House of Lords on numerous occasions – see 
eg Commissioner of Taxes v Melbourne Trust Ltd (1914) AC 1001 at 1010; Ducker v Rees Roturbo 
Development Syndicate Ltd (1928) AC 132 at 140, and Punjab Cooperative Bank Ltd, Amritsar v Income Tax 
Commissioner, Lahore (1940) AC 1055 at 1072. J Manyam ‘Taxation of gains from banking and insurance 
businesses in New Zealand (2010) 20(1) Revenue Law Journal article 6 at 2 n 3. 
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and the full bench of the Federal Court of Australia. Successful appeal to the full High Court 
relied upon the following two alternatives for its reasoning: 
(a)  The amount in issue was a profit from a transaction which, although not within the ordinary 
course of the taxpayer’s business, was entered into with the purpose of making a profit and 
in the course of the taxpayer's business. 
(b)  The taxpayer sold its mere right to interest for a lump sum, that lump sum being received in 
exchange for, and as the present value of, the future interest it would have received. The 
taxpayer simply converted future income into present income.8 
Such purpose need not be in the ordinary course of business as understood in the context 
of a continuum of activities. In Blockey v FC of T, the judge stated:9 ‘But if a man, even in a 
single instance, risks capital in a commercial venture – say, in the purchase of a cargo of sugar 
or a flock of sheep – for the purpose of profit making by resale and makes profit accordingly, 
I do not for a moment mean to say he has not received “income” which is taxable.’ 
This view was further discussed in FC of T v Whitfords Beach Pty Ltd10 and confirmed 
by Mason J. 
10.3 PROFIT OR GAINS IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS 
The consequence of business is hopefully income and the nature of certain businesses implies 
income in the ordinary course. The ATO cites banks and insurance companies as examples of 
businesses where the sale of investments typically represents income.11 This might be regarded 
as glossing over the complex nature of the activities of these entities. However, banks, as an 
example, are often willing to take this view on the sale of investments, given the trading that is 
done on proprietary desks, allowing losses and profits to be netted. Alternatively, income may 
 
8 See TR 92/3, page 6 at 26. 
9 Blockey v FC of T (1923) 31 CLR 503 at 508–9. 
10 FC of T v Whitfords Beach Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 355 at 376, 82 ATC 4031 at 4042, 12 ATR 692. A 
company which owned beachfront land suffered a change in ownership and then procured changes of zoning, 
developed the land as a residential subdivision, and sold the vacant subdivided lots for a profit of several million 
dollars. 
11 Chamber of Manufactures Insurance Ltd v FC of T (1984) 2 FCR 455, 84 ATC 4315, 15 ATR 599 and C of T 
v Commercial Banking Co. of Sydney (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 231. 
168 
be generated in the ordinary course of a business, where the proceeds of a specific transaction 
lack the character or qualities of income.12 
10.4 PROFIT OR GAINS IN ISOLATED TRANSACTIONS 
In Myer,13 the full High Court made the following remarks about isolated transactions: 
It is one thing if the decision to sell an asset is taken after its acquisition, there having been no intention 
or purpose at the time of acquisition of acquiring for the purpose of profitmaking by sale. Then, if the 
asset be not a revenue asset on other grounds, the profit made is capital because it proceeds from a 
mere realisation. But it is quite another thing if the decision to sell is taken by way of implementation 
of an intention or purpose, existing at the time of acquisition, of profit-making by sale, at least in the 
context of carrying on a business or carrying out a business operation or commercial transaction. … 
The courts have often said that a profit on the mere realization of an investment is not income, even if 
the taxpayer goes about the realization in an enterprising way.14  
 
The ATO regards a profit from an isolated transaction as being taxable as income when 
there was both an intention present when entering the transaction to make a profit, and that 
intention was accompanied by a business context.15 
The taxpayer’s intention might be that associated with those who control it, in the case 
of a company.16 However, intention is not a subjective notion, but is borne out by objective 
facts. The ATO speaks to degree by saying that dominance of intention is not needed either,17 
because ‘[i]t is sufficient if profit-making is a significant purpose’.18  
 
12 Commercial and General Acceptance Ltd v FC of T (1977) 137 CLR 373 at 381, 77 ATC 4375 at 4380, 7 
ATR 716 at 722, per TR 92/3 at pages 7 and 8, para 32. 
13 163 CLR 213, 87 ATC 4369, 18 ATR 699–700. See TR 92/3 at para 34. 
14 TR 92/3 at para 36. 
15 See TR 92/3 at para 35. 
16 Whitfords Beach 150 CLR 370, 82 ATC 4039, 12 ATR 701. 
17 At para 40. 
18 FC of T v Cooling 90 ATC 4472 at 4484, 21 ATR 13 at 26; Moana Sand Pty Ltd v FC of T 88 ATC 4897, 19 
ATR 1853; AGC Investments Ltd v FC of T 91 ATC 4180, 21 ATR 1379. See also Forwood Down and Co Ltd v 
Commissioner of Taxation (WA) (1935) 53 CLR 403 (especially Evatt J) and Jacobs J in London Australia 
Investment Co Ltd v FC of T 77 ATC 4398 at 4409–11, 7 ATR 757 at 770–2. TR92/3 at page 10 para 40. 
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Ideally, intention must be present at the time of entering into the transaction. However, 
intentions might change and so would the status of the asset when it is committed to a business 
venture, scheme or transaction.19 
It is possible within the context of a business operation that a transaction is not profit-
making and then the intention of the taxpayer will be important in substantiating purpose: 
It is not our view, nor has it ever been, that all receipts or profits of a business are income. For example, 
when a taxpayer derives a profit from a transaction outside the ordinary course of carrying on its 
business and the taxpayer did not enter that transaction with the purpose of making a profit, the profit is 
not assessable income.20 
 
Factors that might assist with discerning the character of isolated transactions include the 
following: 
1. the self-defining nature of the entity undertaking the transaction (a company versus a 
family trust);21 
2. its relative scale to other activities undertaken by the entity;22 
3. the amount of money involved in the transaction and the magnitude of profit sought or 
gained; 
4. the nature, scale and complexity of the operation; 
5. the manner in which the transaction was executed, including professional advisers 
involved in structuring the transaction; 
6. the arm’s length nature of the transaction; 
7. the nature of the property (is the property only for commercial use – this points to 
 
19 White v FC of T (1968) 120 CLR 191, 15 ATD 173 and Whitfords Beach v FC of T (FC) 79 ATC 4648. (See 
also Menzies J in FC of T v NF Williams (1972) 127 CLR 226 at 245, 72 ATC 4188 at 4192–3, 3 ATR 283 at 
289 and Whitfords Beach Pty Ltd v FC of T (FC) 79 ATC 4648 at 4659, 10 ATR 549 at 567.) TR92/3 at page 10 
para 41. 
20 ATO opinion. TR92/3 at page 10 para 44. 
21 Ruhamah Property Co Ltd v F C of T (1928) 41 CLR 148 at 154; Hobart Bridge Co. Ltd. v FC of T (1951) 82 
CLR 372 at 383; FC of T v Radnor Pty Ltd 91 ATC 4689; 22 ATR 344). See TR 92/3 at paragraph 49(a), at 
page 12. 
22 Western Gold Mines NL v C of T (WA) (1938) 59 CLR 729 at 740. 
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intention);23 
8. the timing (asset held for a long time) or frequency of the operation.24 
Westfield Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation25 followed the Myer26 case on isolated 
transactions.27 Westfield was in the business of designing, constructing, letting and managing 
shopping centres.28 In 1978, the taxpayer acquired an option to buy a block of land with the 
potential of developing a shopping centre in an advantageous location. The taxpayer’s initial 
plans were to develop the land. The option was exercised and the land was later sold at a profit 
on the agreement that Westfield would be given the contract to design and build a shopping 
centre on the land. The Commissioner took the view that the transaction was one of a scheme 
of profit-making, given that a profit was made using the opportunistic foresight of its 
management. Sheppard J stated as follows: 
There are statements in memoranda and letters which indicate that he was not interested in the sale of 
the land unless the applicant were retained as the developer and builder – he realised that he could not 
obtain the leasing or management rights as well. He did not hold out for a top price let alone an 
excessive one. Once he had secured the agreement of the A.M.P. that the applicant could design and 
build the shopping centre, the sale of the land was very much a collateral or consequential matter. He 
sold for a reasonable price and no more … It was not its business to buy and sell vacant land. Hence the 
 
23 Edwards v Bairstow; Hobart Bridge 82 CLR at 383. 
24 Ruhamah Property 41 CLR at 154. See TR 92/3 at page 13 para 49(h). 
25 Westfield Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 90 ATC 4428. 
26 Sheppard J, quoting from the Myer case at 4807: ‘Later their Honours said (ATC p. 4367; CLR p. 211): “The 
important proposition to be derived from Californian Copper and Ducker is that a receipt may constitute income, 
if it arises from an isolated business operation or commercial transaction entered into otherwise than in the 
ordinary course of the carrying on of the taxpayer's business, so long as the taxpayer entered into the transaction 
with the intention or purpose of making a relevant profit or gain from the transaction”. The references to 
Californian Copper and Ducker are references respectively to Californian Copper Syndicate v Harris (1904) 5 
TC 159 and to Ducker v Rees Roturbo Development Syndicate Ltd. (1928) AC 132.’ 
27 Sheppard J, quoting from the Myer case at 4807: ‘The final passage to be quoted from the judgment in the Myer 
case is the following (ATC pp. 4368–4369; CLR p. 213): “... profits made on a realization or change of 
investments may constitute income if the investments were initially acquired as part of a business with the 
intention or purpose that they be realized subsequently in order to capture the profit arising from their expected 
increase in value” ― see the discussion by Gibbs J. in London Australia [London Australia Investment Co. Ltd. v 
F.C. of T. 77 ATC 4398 at pp. 4403-4404; (1976-1977) 138 CLR 106 at pp. 116–118].’ 
28 At that stage the applicant, or the companies associated with it, had built and then owned seven major 
shopping centres in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. The applicant was also managing three 
shopping centres built by it for financial institutions and leased back from them under long-term leases. The 
only other significant developments that were undertaken and owned were an office and hotel block and a motel 
complex in Sydney. See Westfield (n 25) 4803. 
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profit was not income according to ordinary concepts. No more was involved than the realisation of one 
of its capital assets.29 
 
A full Federal Court therefore found that the purchase and sale were in the ordinary 
course of the business of the taxpayer and should be taxed, not as an isolated profit-making 
venture, but as a transaction in congruence with its ordinary modus and therefore as capital (the 
taxpayer was not speculating on a piece of land): 
That having been said, it seems to me, however, that the whole of the transaction, including the sale of 
the land, was one carried out in the ordinary course of the applicant’s business and was part of an 
overall profit-making venture. I do not feel able to separate out the sale of the land from the totality of 
the transaction. The sale of the land was a necessary step in the carrying out of the entirety of what was 
involved … Critical to be taken into account are the applicant’s intentions and purposes at that time. 
The evidence establishes, as I have said, that the applicant intended, when it acquired the land, to use it 
in a way which, although not then precisely foreseen, would achieve for it participation in the 
development of it and other adjacent land into a shopping centre whether integrated with Garden City 
or not. It did not envisage sale as a necessary consequence. But it was certainly a possibility. As events 
turned out the land was sold … In my opinion, it must follow that the amount of the profit was properly 
included in the applicant’s assessable income.30 
 
In FC of T v Visy Industries,31 the taxpayer was a member of the Pratt Group (family-
owned since 1948) whose businesses included waste collection, paper manufacturing, 
packaging and property and share investments. The Australian taxpayer was the holding 
company for the group’s manufacturing division operating in the USA. The matter involved a 
hedging of USD liability on the restructuring of its debt through the issuance of corporate 
bonds. The board of Pratt Finance resolved on 19 March 1997 that the placement of senior 
unsecured notes in the amount of USD400 million would be placed with institutional investors 
resident in the USA, repayable in 15 to 18 years.32 The Group Finance Director of Pratt Holding 
 
29 Ibid 4805–7. 
30 Ibid 4808. 
31 FC of T v Visy Industries USA Pty Ltd (2012) ATC 20-340. 
32 Ibid 10. 
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Pty Ltd described the transaction as ‘the likes of which [they had] never entered into before’.33 
The stated intention was to secure both the benefits of a hedge and the benefit of profit within 
the considerable 20-year term of the forward exchange contract, secured internally at open 
market rates. The group felt that rather than pay fees to external parties (such as a bank), the 
group could transact within its ranks to similar effect more economically, after taking 
professional advice. The relevant exchange rate of USD0.775 was described as a historically 
‘reasonable amount’.34 Visy USA therefore agreed to sell to Pratt Finance five amounts of 
USD, being amounts that matched Pratt Finance’s USD liability under half of the bonds. In 
exchange, Pratt Finance agreed to deliver to Visy USA equivalent amounts of AUD at the 
agreed exchange rate of USD0.775. Then, from mid-May 1997, the Asian economic crisis 
caused the AUD to fall sharply against the USD. By the middle of 1998 the AUD had fallen 
below USD0.59 and Visy USA had an unrealised loss of AUD80 million.35 The auditors called 
the nature of the hedge into question if Visy USA could not afford to settle the amount. When 
the rate recovered somewhat to USD0.645, a forward agreement was decided upon to protect 
Visy Industries. This indemnity provided by Pratt Investments involved the payment of a one-
off, non-refundable fee of USD17,801,325, upon execution of the agreement.36 The 
Commissioner contended that this amount was of a lump sum capital nature in the interests of 
protecting the business structure of the organisation. The primary judge rejected the 
Commissioner’s view that the forward exchange contract was not commercial and was not an 
adventure in the nature of trade. She also concluded that the subsequent indemnity fee was an 
allowable deduction to Visy USA, either as being incurred in ‘gaining or producing its 
assessable income or as being necessarily incurred on a business for that purpose’.37 
 
33 Ibid 11. 
34 Ibid 23. 
35 Ibid 32. 
36 Ibid 41 and 42. 
37 Ibid 45 and 46. 
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On appeal, the judgment was upheld. A number of interesting statements were made by 
the court, quoted here selectively: 
References to ‘profit-making undertaking’, ‘profit-making scheme’ or ‘adventure in the nature of trade’ 
were found to be ‘muffled echoes of old arguments’ concerning old legislation.38  
Myer Emporium was referenced, where ‘it does not follow that a profit or gain made in a transaction 
entered into otherwise than in the ordinary course of carrying on the taxpayer’s business is not 
income’.39  
The extraordinary nature, albeit it subject to the facts of the case, cannot detract from its income nature 
if the taxpayer’s intention or purpose was profit or gain.40  
The appeal rejected the approach that the fact that ‘the outcome of a particular activity may be 
dependent, in part, on chance does not negate a business activity being carried on’ and did therefore not 
constitute a wager.41 
The Commissioner contended that the indemnity fee was not incidental or relevant to the purpose of 
profit-making, but to the maintenance of an internal hedge. The court agreed that basing the nature of 
receipts and outgoings or profits and losses on analogies can be dangerous. ‘They can mislead by 
leading to taxation by reference to economic equivalence, in other words, by reference to the same 
commercial result. The courts of this country have said on many occasions in the past that this is 
neither helpful nor, indeed, permissible …’.42 
The court found that the forward agreement was in form and substance an insurance contract.43  
The non-recurrent nature of the indemnity payment alone will not characterise the outgoing as being of 
a capital nature.44 
The company did these things, in the course of its business, albeit not in the ordinary course of that 
business. Furthermore, the indemnity fee did not secure any enduring benefit of a capital nature.45 
 
38 Ibid 52 and in contrast to judicial thinking in South Africa as espoused in Pick ’n Pay. 
39 Ibid 52. 
40 The court cited Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Whitfords Beach Pty Ltd. 
41 FC of T v Visy Industries USA Pty Ltd (2012) ATC 20-340 at 58. 
42 Ibid 68. 
43 Ibid 69. 
44 Ibid 74. 
45 Ibid 75 and 76. 
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10.5 PROFIT OR GAINS ON SHARES 
Tax Ruling 2005/2346 (TR 2005/23) provides an exhaustive statement on the subject of equity 
income character, issued with respect to the listed investment companies (LIC) regime in 
Australia.47 The LIC regime allows certain ‘permitted investments’: 
(a) shares, units, options, rights or similar interests to the extent permitted by subsections (5), 
(6), (7) and (8); or  
(b) financial instruments (such as loans, debts, debentures, bonds, promissory notes, futures 
contracts, forward contracts, currency swap contracts and a right or option in respect of a 
share, security, loan or contract); or …48 
 
and subject to a number of conditions, allows investors a discount on capital gains tax. 
 
In the ruling, on the subject of the characterisation of gains, the ATO relies substantively 
and almost exclusively on London Australia Investment Co Ltd49 as significant authority on the 
matter. Gibbs J summarised the facts of the case as follows: 
The taxpayer is an investment company … Its principal object was to invest mainly or wholly in 
Australian securities, for the purpose of producing dividend income … During the years in question the 
directors of the taxpayer met each month to decide whether shares should be bought or sold, and during 
that period, as Helsham J. found, the taxpayer engaged in a continuous large scale activity in the buying 
and selling of shares. In deciding what shares should be bought, sold or retained the taxpayer was 
guided by a number of principles, but one important consideration in buying shares was that the 
shareholding should immediately or within a reasonable time produce a dividend yield of four percent 
or better ... In buying shares the taxpayer was influenced by their ‘growth potential’, that is, the 
expectation that they would produce a greater dividend yield. … In the years in question there was a 
steady rise in share prices and in consequence the dividend yield of many shares held by the taxpayer 
 
46 Issued on 21 December 2005. References are to the consolidated version issued on 6 March 2013. This Ruling 
is concerned with the operation of Subdivision 115-D (Tax relief for shareholders in listed investment 
companies) that is contained in Part 3-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA 1997). All legislative 
references are to the ITAA 1997 unless otherwise stated. 
47 ‘A capital gain made by a company is not reduced by the CGT discount, a concession that is available to other 
entities making a capital gain. Similarly, a shareholder receiving a distribution of a capital gain as a dividend 
does not benefit from the CGT discount that may have been available if the shareholder had made the capital 
gain directly. The amendments in Schedule 4 to this bill amend Division 115 of the ITAA (1997) by introducing 
Subdivision 115-D. These amendments enable certain shareholders in LICs to effectively reduce the eligible 
capital gain component of a dividend by the CGT discount’. See http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw (accessed 8 July 
2014). 
48 See http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw (accessed 8 July 2014). 
49 London Australia Investment Co Ltd (1977) 138 CLR 106, 7 ATR 757, 77 ATC 4398. 
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fell and many shares were sold. The shares sold in each of the years in question exceeded a million 
dollars in value and amounted to at least one-tenth of the total value of the shares held in that year. The 
moneys realized on the sale of the shares were not under the articles of the taxpayer available for 
dividend but could be used to buy further shares or to make up a future capital loss … The principal 
question for decision in these three appeals is whether the Commissioner was right in including in the 
taxpayer’s assessable income for the years 1967, 1968 and 1969 the respective amounts of $816,651, 
$140,166 and $413,263 which represent the difference between the net proceeds of the sale of shares 
sold by the taxpayer in each of those years and the average cost to the taxpayer of the shares.50 
 
TR 2005/23 highlights certain qualitative indicators that point to character determination. 
Much seems to be made of the investment process envisaging an ‘exit point’: ‘Nonetheless, the 
fact that the investment process envisaged an “exit point” for some shares appeared to be 
critical to the finding that the taxpayer held shares on revenue account.’51 This assessment is 
then expanded with reference to investment styles in general, such as ‘value investing’ – a 
technique that typically uses a price-to-book ratio to purchase undervalued stocks, but similarly 
sells if the shares become over-valued by the market (an exit price). In value investing, the 
shares are not typically bought with an intention to sell, but simply with the identification of a 
valuation threshold beyond which the investment manager would not consider the investment 
to be prudentially justifiable (they are too expensive relative to their earnings). However, the 
ATO explains: 
Similar reasoning would apply to any investment process which implicitly or explicitly envisages an 
exit point. For example, portfolios managed according to a ‘value style’ normally envisage the 
purchase of undervalued stocks and subsequent sale of the stocks once they become ‘fully valued’ by 
the market. It would normally follow that such portfolios would be held on revenue account. Similar 
conclusions may be reached about other investment styles ... The absence of an investment style which 
envisages an exit point is one indicator that the portfolio would be held on capital account, so that any 
disposals from that portfolio would be mere realisations of investments. The ‘buy and hold’ philosophy 
is an example of such a style.52 
 
50 Ibid 114–15. 
51 TR2005/23 para 76. 
52 Ibid paras 77 and 80. 
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Focus is then given to what seems to be a requirement for an ‘incidental’ quality to the 
sale transaction, which ‘is no more than a mere realization’, which might refer to the degree or 
scale of activity. Myer Emporium is used by the ATO to explain this in more detail: 
On the other hand, where the sale of stocks is no more than a mere realisation or change of investment, 
the proceeds are not recognised as income according to ordinary concepts but as capital gains or losses. 
The Full High Court set out this principle in FC of T v Myer Emporium Ltd (1986-1987) 163 CLR 199 
at 213 as follows:  
‘… over the years this Court, as well as the Privy Council, has accepted that profits derived in a 
business operation or commercial transaction carrying out any profit-making scheme are income, 
whereas the proceeds of a mere realisation or change of investment or from an enhancement of 
capital are not income ….’ 
The proposition that a mere realization or change of investment is not income requires some 
elaboration. First, the emphasis is on the adjective ‘mere’: Whitfords Beach ((1982) 150 CLR at p 383). 
Secondly, profits made on a realization or change of investments may constitute income if the 
investments were initially acquired as part of a business with the intention or purpose that they be 
realized subsequently in order to capture the profit arising from their expected increase in value: see the 
discussion by Gibbs J in London Australia ((1977) 138 CLR, at pp 116–118). It is one thing if the 
decision to sell an asset is taken after its acquisition, there having been no intention or purpose at the 
time of acquisition of acquiring for the purpose of profit-making by sale. Then, if the asset be not a 
revenue asset on other grounds, the profit made is capital because it proceeds from a mere realization. 
But it is quite another thing if the decision to sell is taken by way of implementation of an intention or 
purpose, existing at the time of acquisition, of profit-making by sale, at least in the context of carrying 
on a business or carrying out a business operation or commercial transaction.53 
 
In London Australia Investment Company,54 Gibbs J, in finding that the relevant gains 
were on revenue account, stated that ‘[t]he sale of shares was a normal operation in the course 
of carrying on the business of investing for a profit.’ 
It is likely that all LICs would be considered to be carrying on an investment business. 
On principle, the same could be said of any investment management structure used by 
professional portfolio managers to manage client monies (such as an MIT or other trust 
structure). 
 
53 Ibid para 78. 
54 London Australia Investment Company CLR 117, ATR 763, ATC 4403–4404. 
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TR 2005/23 summarises a list of criteria that are indicative of an income character: 
 
(a) a low average annual turnover (that is, less than London Australia, where the average turnover had 
been in the order of 10%);  
(b) a lack of regularity in sale activity (AGC (Investments) Limited v FC of T 92 ATC 4239 (AGC 
(Investments)); Trent Investments Pty Ltd v FC of T 76 ATC 4105); 
(c) a high proportion of stocks sold have been held for a significant number of years (see AGC 
(Investments) ― 75% of stocks sold held more than 5 years). However, if a high proportion of the 
remainder are turned over, this tends to the opposite conclusion; 
(d) a low level of sales transactions compared to the number of stocks in the portfolio (see Milton 
Corporation v FCT 85 ATC 4243); 
(e) profits on sale normally constitute a small percentage of total income; and significant percentage of 
‘aged’ stocks remain in the portfolio (AGC (Investments) ― nearly 60% of stocks held more than 
10 years)’.55 
 
In a joint submission by the Taxation Institute of Australia, CPA Australia, the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in Australia, and the National Institute of Accountants and Taxpayers 
Australia,56 they take strong exception to what seems to be a stance of over-reliance on London 
Australia Investment Co Ltd to the effect that it seems to nullify the policy objectives of the 
LIC regime.  
10.6 PROFIT OR GAINS ON SHARES ― ALTERNATIVE GENERAL FINDINGS 
In contrast to London Australia Investment Co. Ltd, Charles v FC of T57 involved the 
characterisation of a receipt by a unit holder in a unit trust, where almost 50 per cent of the 
proceeds of a distribution (£390) constituted capital profits from rights issues and realisations 
within the portfolio for the year ended 30 June 1949. The Commissioner contended that this 
portion constituted proceeds from a profit-making undertaking or scheme that had, from the 
beginning, the character of income produced from ‘personal exertion’.58 The trust deed allowed 
 
55 TR2005/23 para 80. 
56 Joint Submission by Taxation Institute of Australia, CPA Australia, Institute of Chartered Accounts in 
Australia, National Institute of Accountants and Taxpayers Australia, Draft Taxation Ruling TR 2005/D2, dated 
14 March 2005. 
57 (1954) 90 CLR 598. 
58 At 598. 
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for the variation of securities. Counsel for the Commissioner was at pains to explain the 
dealings in securities which were ‘considerable; they occurred frequently and produced 
substantial profits’.59 The High Court found that the actions of the investment manager were 
‘transactions effected in the course of performing a fiduciary duty to preserve for beneficiaries 
as far as practicable the assets comprising the trust fund and any increments in the value of 
those assets which might appear from time to time to be in jeopardy.’60 
In TD 2011-D1, the ATO stated that some commentators had taken the decisions in 
London Australia and Charles as indicative of the fact that the actions of trustees will always 
constitute ‘a necessary incident of the trustee’s fiduciary duty to preserve for beneficiaries as 
far as practicable the assets comprising the trust fund and any increments in the value of those 
assets.’61 
However, the decision in Charles, stated the ATO (with which I concur), ‘was based 
largely on the unchallenged evidence from the manager of the trust that at no time were 
securities acquired for the express purpose of re-sale at a profit and that sales were normally 
made when the managers anticipated a fall in the value of shares.’62 
Radnor63 involved an investment vehicle for three trusts set up to support a disabled 
person for the rest of his life. In Radnor, Hill J referred to the decision in Charles as follows: 
The trust deed provided that, except for the purposes of the deed, the trustees should not sell any 
investments until the determination of the trust. Nevertheless the deed did give the trustees a wide 
power to vary investments. The court, on the evidence before it which included the provisions of the 
trust deed, saw the case as one where the transactions were effected in the course of the trustee’s 
fiduciary obligations to the beneficiaries to preserve for them the trust assets and increments thereto, 
rather than as a case where the trustees were carrying on a business of ‘stock jobbing’. Nevertheless, 
Dixon CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ said (at ATD 331; CLR 610): 
 
59 Ibid 609. 
60 Ibid 612. 
61 TD 2011-D1 at 6 para 42. 
62 Ibid para 43. 
63 FC of T v Radnor Pty Ltd 91 ATC 4689, (1991) 22 ATR 344.  
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‘[I]f the proper conclusion from the evidence were that the managers and the trustees co-operated in 
pursuing a systematic course of buying and selling securities for the purpose of producing profits 
and thereby swelling the half-yearly amounts of ‘cash produce’ available for distribution to 
certificate-holders, the Commissioner’s opinion that such profits should be treated as assessable 
income of the certificate-holders when paid over to them would be clearly correct.’64 
 
TD 2011-D1 summarises what the ATO would regard as factors that would contribute to 
a capital determination for trust actions: 
1. the absence of an investment style that envisages an exit point; 
2. a low average annual turnover – that is, less than in London Australia where turnover had 
been in the order of 10 per cent; 
3. a lack of regularity in the particular sale activity – AGC (Investments) Limited v FC of T 
(1992) 23 ATR 287, 92 ATC 4239; Trent Investments Pty Ltd v FC of T 76 ATC 4105, 
(1976) 6 ATR 201; 
4. a high proportion of stocks sold have been held for a significant number of years (see 
AGC (Investments) – 75 per cent of stocks sold held more than 5 years). However, if a 
high proportion of the remainder are turned over, this tends to support the opposite 
conclusion; 
5. a low level of sales transactions compared to the number of stocks in the portfolio – see 
Milton Corporation Ltd v FC of T 85 ATC 4243, (1985) 16 ATR 437; 
6. profits on sale normally constitute a small percentage of total income; 
7. significant percentage of ‘aged’ stocks remain in the portfolio (AGC (Investments) – 
nearly 60 per cent of stocks held for more than ten years); and 
8. the existence of a family as distinct from a commercial explanation for the dealing.65 
 
64 At ATC 4698 and 4699. 
65 TD 2011-D1 para 55. 
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AGC (Investments) Ltd66 presents an interesting co-mingling of issues, often at the centre 
of cases involving income character determination. It is doubtful whether Commissioners bring 
cases against taxpayers when capital losses are claimed in declining markets, arguing that they 
are business income. If so, this would provide a proper balance of argument. AGC sold a 
significant portion of its investment book at the height of the 1987 bull-run, had a group 
structure that was open to challenge with respect to separation of functions, had both long-term 
investments and significant realisations, coupled with internal communications that were 
conflicting at times and certainly cognisant of the case law implications of trading. 
AGC was part of an insurance group, and amounts were advanced to the investment arm 
to invest on behalf of the group. By March 1983, the amount owed by the appellant to AGC 
(Insurances) on this account was $23,250,000. By September 1987, the account stood at 
$91,683,103.55. In the 12 months to 30 September 1987, the appellant sold its holdings in 33 
companies, realising the sum of $79,413,638. The sales represented approximately one-half of 
the value of the portfolio. The surplus achieved on realisation was $45,068,043 in total. 
In a letter to the fund managers, ‘Westpac Management’, on 26 January 1978, the General 
Manager commented on the investment policy for the portfolio. Tax advice was sought on the 
London Australia investment case. The following comments were made to Westpac: 
If we are to be taxed on the principles set out in the judgment we may as well face these issues and 
exploit all forms of gain from our equity operation. We shall inform you of their advice and the policy 
we should like to follow. 
Notwithstanding the above we feel it is important that you should fully exploit the cyclical fluctuations 
in the share market by capitalising on market highs for sales and repurchasing at the bottom of any 
depressed period.67 
 
66 AGC (Investments) Limited v FC of T (1992) 23 ATR 287, 92 ATC 4239. 
67 At 4242. 
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The Commissioner based the contention of profit-making on this correspondence in 
particular. More moderated subsequent correspondence is referred to in the judgment 
concerning, in particular, the London Australia case, by Beaumont, Gummow and French JJ:68 
It will be recalled that, by its letter dated 26 January 1978, the appellant informed Westpac 
Management that the appellant was seeking advice as to the effect of the London Australia decision; 
and that, if the appellant were to be taxed accordingly, the appellant should ‘exploit all forms of gain 
from our equity operation’. The letter added that, notwithstanding this, Westpac Management ‘should 
fully exploit the cyclical fluctuations in the share market by capitalising on market highs for sales and 
repurchasing at the bottom of any depressed period.’ On behalf of the Commissioner, much reliance is 
placed upon this passage to justify the inference, at the time of acquisition, of a purpose or intention on 
the part of the appellant, of profit making by subsequent sale.69 
 
It seems as if advantage was deliberately sought from a rising market in quite an 
aggressive manner for an insurer managing reserves. The reference to London Australia when 
deciding investment strategy in itself seems to point to concern with management’s own intent. 
The timing of the exit point just before the stock market crash in October 1987 appears to 
further endorse the opening motivation, ‘should fully exploit the cyclical fluctuations’, as 
expressed in the letter of 26 January 1978. Subsequent correspondence referred to seems almost 
to manage down the impact of the 1978 letter, as if guided by advice. However, records of 
transactions dating back to 1970 were examined. Evidence given and accepted by the full 
Federal Court was that, of a total of 81 equity acquisitions, 26 had been held for a period 
exceeding 15 years, 20 had been held for a period of between ten and 15 years, and an additional 
14 had been held for between five and ten years. This is not synonymous with the management 
of working capital (or circulating capital as the Australians seem to refer to it) or with a trading 
motive.  
 
68 A full Federal Court opinion. 
69 AGC (Investments) Limited v FC of T (1992) 23 ATR 287 [58] and [59]. 
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In the final weighing of the matter, the appeal was not so much about primary facts or 
the credibility of testimony, but about inferences that could be drawn from correspondence: 
There is little, if any difference in the submissions put by the parties with respect to the legal principles 
applicable here. The central issue in the litigation at first instance and before us, was the true 
characterisation of the appellant’s purpose in acquiring its share portfolio. This is a question of fact, 
albeit of secondary fact. There is no real dispute about the primary facts, and little appears to turn on 
the credit of the individual witnesses called on behalf of the appellant. But the proper inferences to be 
drawn from the primary facts are contentious.70 
 
While this is not helpful with respect to legal principle (the principles were not in 
dispute), it proves the point that, given no difference of opinion on fact or principle, in the final 
instance, a judgment will have to be made on what the court believes are the true intentions of 
the taxpayer. Where this is not subject to disagreement on objective facts, it leaves assessment 
of subjective intent as the final arbiter of income character, which is a consequence more suited 
to adjudicating matters for individual taxpayers rather than corporate or collective entities. 
In FCT v Equitable Life & General Insurance Co Ltd,71 the taxpayer was a company 
belonging to insurance group QBE Insurance (International) Ltd. For several years, until the 
1983 and 1984 tax years, the taxpayer was assessed for tax as a share investor, after ceasing its 
insurance business in 1977 and operating as an investment company within the group. The 
taxpayer also engaged in intra-group loans. At least one other company in the group, QBE 
Securities (Pty) Ltd, also appears to have been taxed in this manner.  
Equitable Life contended that the investment portfolio did not constitute ‘circulating 
capital’ for the business of insuring risk within the group: 
The taxpayer’s investments have never been viewed by its directors or shareholders as a potential 
reserve fund to meet the liquidity requirements of QBE’s group insurance operations. Proceeds from 
the disposal of the taxpayer’s investments have, in fact, never been used for this purpose. To cover any 
major catastrophe QBE Insurance (International) Limited has entered into reinsurance treaties. Further, 
 
70 Ibid [45]. 
71 FCT v Equitable Life & General Insurance Co Ltd (1990) 21 ATR 364, 90 ATC 4438. 
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proceeds from the disposal of the taxpayer’s investments are never taken into account in QBE’s group 
insurance operations’ cash flow forecasts or budgets.72 
 
In the years of income that ended 30 June 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982, three acquisitions 
were made that were not associated with new issues and take-over offers relating to an existing 
investment. In 1981, as can be seen below, substantial sales were made. The company expected 
the market to correct, and sold $9,8 million worth of shares over the next two years.73 In 1983 
and 1984 the company purchased $7,2 million in an apparent reversal of that sentiment,74 but 
then cleared out the portfolio in the latter year in the amount of $12,7 million. Yet Davies J, 
with a full bench, commented that:  
Such a course was not inconsistent with long-term investing, though it tends towards profit-making and 
profit-taking … Overall, the portfolio appears to have been a widespread, secure portfolio which was 
managed in a conservative manner, though managed so as to enhance its overall capital value.75 
Table 10.1: Yearly purchases and sales (inception to liquidation)76 
DATE PURCHASES SALES 
  AUD AUD 
1978 4 195 071,54 703 417,00 
1979 570 306,17 1 813 170,00 
1980 332 041,81 1 945 825,00 
1981 341 452,34 7 251 367,00 
1982 244 362,44 2 313 869,00 
1983 3 741 517,78 745 745,24 
1984 3 447 211,20 12 701 281,00 
TOTAL 12 871 963,28 27 474 674,24 
 
72 FCT v Equitable Life & General Insurance Co Ltd (1990) 21 ATR 364, 90 ATC 4438 at 4440. 
73 Davies J, quoting the trial judge: ‘After March 1980 there was an instruction requiring the investment 
committee “to continue to rationalise the share portfolios and improve their performance”. The September 1980 
resolution was not directed to advantageous disposal of shares. Although the evidence does not establish the 
constant “fine tuning” found in London Australia, it must be assumed that the investment manager had regard to 
these directions in making decisions as to the acquisition and disposal of shares.’ See FCT v Equitable Life & 
General Insurance Co Ltd (n 72) 4442. 
74 ‘Pincus J. has set out the memorandum of a Mr Moody dealing with the policy for the last six months of 1983. 
This shows that, as there were excellent long-term investment opportunities in both the resources and industrial 
sectors “$10 million should be made available for long-term share investment” and that as “excellent short-term 
situation opportunities are expected to become available in both the resource and industrial sectors ... an additional 
$1 million be allocated for trading investment in mining, oil and industrial shares”.’ See FCT v Equitable Life & 
General Insurance Co Ltd (n 72) 4442. 
75 Ibid 4441. 
76 Extracted from FCT v Equitable Life & General Insurance Co Ltd (n 72) 4442 and tabulated.  
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Of interest to this case is the attitude of the Commissioner to the activity of professional 
portfolio management: 
As I have said, the Commissioner accepted that the taxpayer was not engaged in the business of share 
trading at any relevant time, and that this part of the case is to be dealt with upon the basis that the 
taxpayer’s activities were dictated by ‘the portfolio management principles’ to which I have referred. 
The Commissioner’s argument was, however, first, that a taxpayer who acquires and disposes of assets 
according to such principles, is liable to tax upon the surpluses generated by such business, whether by 
way of receipt of dividends or surplus on disposal; and, second, that (whether this be so or not) the way 
in which the portfolio management principles were applied by the taxpayer had such a result.77 
 
The view was not confirmed though, with Davies J, quoting the trial judge as follows: 
At pp. 4108-4109, his Honour said:  
In my opinion, this general principle should not be accepted. The term ‘portfolio management’ covers a 
number of different kinds of business activities and I do not think that the activities, systematic and 
concerted though they may be, have the income tax results which the Commissioner claims. The term, 
as perhaps it would more usually be understood, denotes merely the systematic investment of assets. I 
do not think that, notwithstanding Mr Priestley's careful argument, such investment activities have the 
tax consequences he suggests because they are systematic or are directed to matters other than the 
derivation of income. 
Those who have large sums of money have normally not held such money in globo but have turned it to 
account. Where this has been done not by way of trading or in the making of profits by ventures in the 
nature of trade, but by the purchase of assets to be held, it has generally been accepted that an increase 
in the value of the assets, whether realised or unrealised, is not of the nature of income. The distinction 
between investment, in this sense, on the one hand, and the use of capital in trade is well established.78 
 
Davies J went on to express the court’s own view of the matter: 
It is, in my opinion, consistent with investment principles, e.g., that an asset will be sold and the 
proceeds invested in another asset because, inter alia, it is seen that the asset purchased is likely to be 
more valuable than that sold. I do not think that the principles which have been established require that 
the investor, in considering whether to hold or dispose of an investment, should not have regard to the 
fact that a prospective investment will become of a greater capital value than the one presently held. 
The difficulty of drawing the line between a sale and purchase for that purpose and one for the purpose 
of realisation at a profit does not, in my opinion, mean that the investor must ignore the opportunity to 
improve as well as maintain the value of his capital. 
 
77 Ibid 4442. 
78 Ibid. 
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At p. 4108, his Honour commented:  
Investment, in the sense to which I have referred, does not cease to be such merely because it is done 
systematically and skilfully ... But, upon the present facts, I do not think that it was so. Except in the 
sense to which I have referred, the Commissioner did not contend that what the taxpayer was doing was 
a trade.79 
 
The court therefore concluded that the activities of the taxpayer were ‘consistent with 
long-term investment’. The profits that it derived were profits from ordinary investing, rather 
than ordinary income from profit-making.80 
In Investment and Merchant Finance Corporation Ltd v FCT, 81 the Commissioner 
sought to have a specific share transaction that resulted in a loss for the taxpayer, who was a 
share dealer, identified and assessed as capital under section 51 of the Income Tax Assessment 
Act 1936–1969 (Cth) (the Act). Barwick CJ stated that trying to isolate a transaction on this 
basis within a running business was flawed and that the business should be regarded as a whole. 
The Commissioner used the argument in Milton82 that the taxpayer’s business taken as a 
whole83 was akin to that of a merchant bank and that its investment portfolio was consequently 
part of that consideration and should be taxed accordingly – outside of the general framework 
of consideration on income characterisation and viewed through the lens applicable to banks 
and general insurance companies who often have share portfolios. The activities of the 
company included the following: 
1. lending money on the security of mortgages over real property, conducted partly by the 
company directly and partly by wholly-owned subsidiaries;  
2. accepting money on deposit from investors for reinvestment; 
 
79 Ibid 4447. 
80 Ibid 4448. 
81 Investment and Merchant Finance Corporation Ltd v FCT 71 ATC 4140. 
82 Milton Corporation v FCT 85 ATC 4243. The company was a public company listed on the Sydney Stock 
Exchange. 
83 The Commissioner did not rely on section 26a, or on the fact that the shares in question were bought for 
resale, or on the fact that the taxpayer was a share trader. 
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3. investing in the short-term money market; 
4. investment in real estate (minor); and 
5. management of the investment portfolios of superannuation funds and some client 
investors. 
The court found the Commissioner’s contention to be unlikely. The guidelines used in 
arriving at this conclusion were the following: 
In reaching these findings I accept and rely upon the supportive evidentiary material particularly being 
the extremely small scale and intermittent nature of the sales, the reasons advanced for the sales, the 
very small amount involved in relation to the overall value of the total portfolio, the history of the 
taxpayer, and the fact that its portfolio management was the sole and exclusive responsibility of one 
man. He was experienced, knowledgeable and trusted in the field of investment, not only with this 
company, but with other substantial and public companies, and his association with the taxpayer 
spanned virtually a professional lifetime, and whose constant policies, guidelines approach and 
determinations were directed to investment as capital and assets in no way were related to or part of the 
business activities carried on by the taxpayer.84 
 
The court’s reasoning points to a clearly demarcated investment operation, but also to 
one of degree: 
This is a vastly different situation … different as to scale, systematic conduct, policy and above all, the 
nature of the business and the relationship of the source of the gains to the business. Further, the 
company was an investment company dealing solely in shares, quite unlike the taxpayer.85 
 
In National Bank of Australasia Limited v FC of T,86 the appellant sold all the shares it 
owned in the capital of Queensland National Pastoral Company Limited during the year of 
income ended 30 June 1963, at a profit of £527,625. In assessing the National Bank’s income 
tax, the Commissioner treated this amount of profit as assessable income. The Pastoral 
Company had been purchased from the Queensland National Bank at the time of its liquidation 
in favour of a merger. The Pastoral Company was formed to hold properties that had been 
 
84 Milton Corporation v FCT 85 ATC 4243 at 4250. 
85 Ibid 4251. 
86 National Bank of Australasia Limited v FC of T 69 ATC 4042. 
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mortgaged to the bank, but had defaulted due to difficult economic circumstances. Shares were 
issued in the company to offset against the outstanding debts.  
But it does not at all follow that the National Bank should be considered to have taken over the 
Queensland National Bank’s assets in the same character as that in which the Queensland National 
Bank had held them. Their character in the hands of the National Bank must depend on the nature of 
the purchase transaction: was it a transaction on capital account – for the purpose of adding to the 
profit-making structure of the National Bank – or was it a transaction forming part of the profit-earning 
activities within the structure. I have no doubt that it was the former … The purchase of the shares bore 
no resemblance to an investment of banking funds, made to earn income pending a need for their 
deployment in the making of advances and the like; it bore no resemblance to an investment by way of 
erecting a second or third line of defence against a time of stringency or emergency.87 
 
The National Bank of Australia, notwithstanding the dividends that the Pastoral 
Company would yield, had convincingly testified to the fact that the nature of rural and pastoral 
assets in the portfolio gave it a significant profile in those communities, enabling it to leverage 
that profile for additional or related business. The court concluded on this testimony that the 
motive at the time of purchase, holding and sales had always been the goodwill nature of the 
asset, notwithstanding any other economic benefits. The profit upon sale of the shares was 
therefore capital. 
In GRE v FC of T88 an example to the contrary is found, where shares were held as part 
of the funding structure of a general insurer, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Unitraders 
Investments Pty Ltd. The court further held that certain profits derived by GRE from bonds, 
some of which were sold at a profit and others of which were redeemed at maturity, were not 
exempted from assessable income by the provisions of section 23J of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). Regardless of instrument type (equity, bonds, property), the 
portfolio was part of the insurance business. The investment strategy was to hold a proportion 
in equities, and varying that proportion was within the requirements of prudent management: 
 
87 Ibid 4047–8. 
88 GRE Insurance Limited v FC of T 92 ATC 4089. 
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In our respectful opinion, however, the activities of Unitraders were an integral part of the insurance 
business conducted by GRE. Although the equities were held by the wholly owned subsidiary rather 
than by GRE directly, the equities indirectly formed part of the funds representing the insurance 
reserves and part of the circulating capital of the business. Just as the prudent management of the 
investment portfolio of an insurance company ordinarily requires that some proportion of equities be 
held as well as government securities, mortgages and debentures, so in this present case, it was always 
an element of the investment strategy that a proportion of equities be held. And that strategy continued, 
the proportion varying whenever it seemed prudent from an investment point of view to vary the mix.89 
 
10.7 SUMMARY 
The findings of the Australian courts are consistent with the broad principles that apply in the 
UK and the USA. Visy Industries provides recent jurisprudence that confirms that derivative 
contracts can be used as a business hedge that in form and substance amounts to an insurance 
contract. The court held that, notwithstanding the element of chance, the forward agreement 
did not amount to a wager. The court also addressed the principle of economic equivalence 
discussed in this thesis and the legal error of characterising based on referencing another 
transaction or asse. This supports the need for the separate characterisation of each derivative 
contract and the relevance of the legal structure and context of the contract.  
The very limited case law on characterising derivative gains and losses will probably 
never be developed further, given the legislated TOFA regime.90 Intervening legislation has 
effectively sterilised the ability to trace how judicial reasoning would have developed, based 
on purely common-law principles: 
The question – revenue expenditure or capital expenditure – is a question which is being repeatedly 
asked by men of business, by accountants and by lawyers. In many cases the answer is easy; but in 
others it is difficult. The difficulty arises because of the nature of the question. It assumes that all 
expenditure can be put correctly into one category or the other; but this is simply not possible. Some 
cases lie on the border between the two; and this border is not a line clearly marked out; it is a blurred 
and undefined area in which anyone can get lost. Different minds may come to different conclusions 
 
89 Ibid 4093. 
90 View expressed to me telephonically on 29 July 2015 by Professor Graeme Cooper, Professor of Taxation 
Law, University of Sydney. 
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with equal propriety. It is like the border between day and night, or between red and orange. Everyone 
can tell the difference except in the marginal cases; and then everyone is in doubt. Each can come down 
either way. When these marginal cases arise, then the practitioners – be they accountants or lawyers – 
must of necessity put them into one category or the other; and then, by custom or by law, by practice or 
by precept, the border is staked out with more certainty. In this area, at least, where no decision can be 
said to be right or wrong, the only safe rule is to go by precedent. So the thing to do is to search through 
the cases and see whether the instant problem has come up before. If so, go by it. If not, go by the 
nearest you can find.91
 
91 Lusher J in Milton Corporation Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 85 ATC 4244.  
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CHAPTER 11 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
11.1  INTRODUCTION 
The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of 
payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the 
contributor, and to every other person.1 
 
It may be asked how the jurisdictional analysis above is relevant in the South African context. 
I have avoided conducting a comparative analysis because of the questionable value of such an 
exercise, due to the vastly different legal and regulatory contexts. This review of the 
jurisdictions has provided a working hypothesis that harmonisation is not a research objective. 
I am not seeking to overhaul our case law or harmonise our tax policy with the US, the UK or 
Australia, which are three related, but very different, jurisdictional contexts. Clarity was sought 
by researching three jurisdictions within Commonwealth and US authority. While the USA has 
the most detailed legislation on the subject, its system lacks structural commonality with South 
Africa. The UK is the closest legal relative, but has opted, like Australia, for what might be 
considered ‘policy convenience’, by adopting accounting standards. This review did not 
include civil-law jurisdictions as this would have further complicated any attempt to simplify 
the analysis. A similar sentiment was expressed by Lord Steyn in White et al v Jones et al:2  
Strongly though I support the study of comparative law, I hesitate to embark in an opinion such as this 
upon a comparison, however brief, with a civil law system; because experience has taught me how very 
difficult, and indeed potentially misleading, such an exercise can be.3   
 
 
1 Second canon of taxation laid down by Adam Smith: Adam Smith An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations (1776, 1849 ed) 371. See GT Pagone ‘Tax uncertainty’ (2009) 33 Melbourne University 
Law Review 886. 
2 White et al v Jones et al [1995] 2 AC 207. 
3 Law Library of Congress The Impact of Foreign Law on Domestic Judgments (2010) 29. 
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This research also cannot be a survey of what might work for South Africa. Improved 
clarity might be achieved by analysing a foreign jurisdiction’s own policy journey, correctly 
situated within its own legal system. While the stated problem is universal, the responses are 
not, complicated further by the doctrine of interpretation applied by national courts. However, 
where appropriate, foreign case law has provided helpful insights, even though our courts are 
not bound by it. An example of this are the insights gained on the nature of derivative contracts, 
analysed in the Lehman Brothers cases above. It is therefore proposed that the reasoning of the 
courts referred to in sectionh 8.6 above will be useful in pursuing clarity and congruency within 
our own case law, rather than trying to determine legal correlates. This is especially relevant 
where insufficient local precedents exist, as is the case in South Africa. The Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996, in the Bill of Rights,4 which applies to all law,5 provides in 
section 39 that interpretation must be informed by international law and may be informed by 
foreign law. It therefore allows for insight gained from foreign jurisprudence. From a 
commercial viewpoint, derivatives are instruments that should be understood within a global 
context and our common law should be informed and developed by modern international 
perspectives, so as to avoid a disintegrative impact associated with ingrown domestic tax 
policy. 
The preceding jurisdictional analysis has considered three policy approaches adopted 
by four jurisdictions: 
1. a definition by exclusion of a capital asset set in legislation, buttressed by an anti-
avoidance tax code (the USA); 
2. an accounting approach that follows IFRS, in the UK and Australia; 
 
4 Chapter 2. 
5 Section 8(1): ‘The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and 
all organs of state.’ 
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3. a hybrid tax policy in South Africa that in part adopts an accounting approach, but in 
remainder relies on a facts and circumstances common-law determination informed by 
the presence of a ‘scheme of profit-making’. 
In considering the possible importation of lessons from foreign jurisdictions, the 
following aspects will be discussed below: (1) relevance to our case law; (2) suggested 
interpretative approach of our courts; and (3) recommended tax policy. 
11.2 RELEVANCE TO OUR CASE LAW 
The Lehmans cases in the UK present two corollaries for consideration: (1) If derivative 
contracts are by virtue of the rights they confer in the nature of ‘property’, they should therefore 
be included for consideration, according to the leading authority of Pick ’n Pay;6 and (2) they 
should consequently be treated like any other property in the determination of a ‘scheme of 
profit-making’. As Smalberger stated, ‘[t]ransactions involving shares do not differ from 
transactions in respect of any other property’.7 As a result, the ordinary tests applied by our 
courts that were outlined above must then be followed to determine to the character of receipts 
or accruals. 
11.2.1 Nature of derivative contracts 
A right ‘in rem’ originally meant a right ‘in a thing’.8 This need for a ‘thing’ or an 
‘underlying’ often complicates the assessment of the nature of a derivative. Instinctively, a 
student of tax might see a derivative as ‘revenue derived from [what would have been] capital 
productively employed [via the underlying reference asset]’.9 Or, to return to Wisdom v 
 
6 CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 1992 (4) SA 39 (A), 54 SATC 271. 
7 Ibid 56. 
8 Y Chang & HE Smith ‘An economic analysis of civil versus common law property’ (2012) 88(1) Notre Dame 
Law Review 33. They commented that in German law the concept is very prominent: ‘it means that the right is 
good against the world – usually called “the principle of absoluteness (Absolutheitsprinzip)”’. 
9 See Berea West Estate (Pty) Ltd v SIR 1976 (2) SA 614 (A), (1976) 38 SATC 43 at 628. 
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Chamberlain (Inspector of Taxes)’,10 the implication is that if the share type produces ‘nil’ 
dividends it is unlikely to be considered capital in nature, regardless of its purpose. This 
approach references the metaphor of a tree (capital asset) needing to bear fruit (income).11 
The difficulty with this metaphor is that it is useful, but not necessarily absolute: ‘This 
economic distinction [of a tree and fruit] is a useful guide in matters of income tax, but its 
application is very often a matter of great difficulty’.12 In Berkey v Third Avenue Railway Co, 
Cardozo J warned that ‘[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices 
to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.’13 Any analysis as to character should 
therefore be vigilant about unilaterally imposing the tree metaphor on all determinations. 
In common law, ‘property’ is conceived of as a ‘bundle of rights’.14 The rights, rather 
than the contract or the physical item, evidence the ‘property’. Smith15 felt that the metaphor 
of a ‘bundle’ is deficient or obscure: ‘John Austin said of property that “indefiniteness is at the 
very essence of the right; and implies that the right … cannot be determined by exact and 
positive circumscription” … the result is that an owner has control over an indefinite reservoir 
of uses’.16 In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another v Ocean Commodities 
Incorporated and Others,17 Corbett JA made a similar statement about shares: ‘A share in a 
 
10 (1969) 1 All ER 332 (CA). The case referred to silver ingots held in a safe as a hedge, regarded by the court as 
a trading venture. SARS states that ‘[t]he proceeds are more likely to be of a revenue nature when the type of 
share purchased does not produce dividends’.  
11 Eisner v Macomber 252 US 189 (1920); Visser v CIR SATC 271 in which it was held at 276 that ‘ “Income” 
is what “capital” produces, or is something in the nature of interest or fruit as opposed to principal or tree.’ 
12 Ibid 276. 
13 155 NE 58 at 61 (Cardozo J for Hiseock CJ, Cardozo, McLaughlin, Andrews and Lehmann JJ) (NY, 1926). 
See GT Pagone ‘Tax uncertainty’ (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 886 at 895. 
14 This conception of property was suggested by Hohfeld and Honoré and dominated legal thinking for most of 
the twentieth century. See WN Hohfeld ‘Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning’ 
(1913) 23 Yale Law Journal 16; WN Hohfeld ‘Fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning’ 
(1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710, cited in MW Lau ‘The nature of the beneficial interest, historical and 
economic perspectives’ (ms. 2013) notes 1 and 24. 
15 HE Smith ‘Property as the law of things’ (2012) 125 Harvard Law Review 1691. 
16 Chang & Smith (n 8) 32. 
17 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another v Ocean Commodities Incorporated and Others 1983 (1) SA 
276 (A) 288. See SARS Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax Issue 7 (2018) 86. 
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company consists of a bundle, or conglomerate, of personal rights entitling the holder thereof 
to a certain interest in the company, its assets and dividends.’ 
It is argued that this same ‘bundle of rights’ that the ISDA master agreement represents 
brings it within the logic of Pick ’n Pay18 as ‘property, ‘whether one is dealing with land or 
shares’. In the case of exchange traded derivatives, the matter seems much simpler as these 
instruments are freely transferable in the same manner as a share or a listed bond. They are 
characterised by a volume of similar units being available at a published market price and 
transferability between buyers and sellers. 
A similar interpretative view is held by HMRC:19  
An individual may contend that his dealings in derivative contracts constitute a trade in itself. He may 
claim that derivative contracts are more sophisticated than dealing in shares and that this is evidence 
that the activity amounts to a trade. Or he may say that such assets, not being income-producing, are 
usually dealt with by way of trade. We disagree. Our view is that you approach the question of whether 
a trade is being carried on in the same way as you would with somebody claiming to carry on a trade of 
buying and selling shares. This means finding the facts and coming to a decision taking an overall view 
of all the circumstances … Where a derivative contract is entered into in the course of activities which 
amount to an investing activity then the profits and losses arising from the derivative contract will be 
regarded as entered into as part of that activity. 
 
The case law and literature reviewed above therefore suggest a characterisation of 
derivatives that may be defined as follows: 
 
18 CIR v Pick ’n Pay (n 6). 
19 BIM56830, available at https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/business-income-manual/bim56880 
(accessed 23 August 2020). 
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1. an agreement or contract20 of commercial value21 between two parties,22 involving the 
sale of a promise,23 of an aleatory24 and permanent nature,25 representing a chose in 
action;26 
2. in identity a contract sui generis;27 
3. constituting a module or bundle of rights,28 in the nature of property,29 which although 
having elements of indefiniteness;30 
4. will have to have crystallised;31 
5. the metrics of which might reference another asset, but whose intrinsic nature exists 
independently32 of the referenced asset; 
 
20 See TE Lynch ‘Derivatives: A twenty-first century understanding’ (2011) 43 Loyola University Chicago Law 
Journal 16 n 57, where enforceability by a court of law is essential to the term ‘contract’. 
21 ‘The answer is to be found in the fact that this was a complex commercial transaction entered into in good 
faith … If this is the touchstone …’ Longmore LJ in Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson Inc (2010) EWHC 3372, (2011) 
2 BCLC 120 at 87. 
22 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Scottish Provident Institution (2003) STC 1035. Ibid at 116. 
23 D Southern & PricewaterhouseCoopers Tolley’s Taxation of Corporate Debt, Foreign Exchange and 
Derivative Contracts (2001) 317, 318; EJ Swan Building the Global Market: A 4000 Year History of Derivatives 
(2000) 17. 
24 ‘Contract in which at least one party’s performance depends on some uncertain event that is beyond the 
control of the parties involved’. Lynch (n 20), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary. See n 51 on page 10 where he 
gives the Latin root aleatory, ‘gambler’, which stems from alea, meaning ‘the throwing of dice’. 
25 Pioneer Freight Futures Co Ltd v TMT Asia Limited [2011] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 96. 
26 Longmore LJ in Lomas (n 21) supported Lord Collins in Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate 
Trustee Securities Ltd [2011] UKSC 38. A Hudson The Law on Financial Derivatives 6 ed (2018) 998 and 
1029; Colonial Bank v Whinney 30 Ch D 261 at 285 (1885), per Fry LJ. See WS Holdsworth ‘The history of the 
treatment of choses in action by the common law’ (1920) 33(8) Harvard Law Review 997, 998 and 1029. ‘All 
personal things are either in possession or action. The law knows no tertium quid between the two’. While the 
concept is broad, it includes ‘rights to debts of all kinds … rights of action on a contract; … it was extended to 
cover documents, such as bonds … This led to the inclusion in this class of things of such instruments as bills, 
notes, cheques, shares in companies, stock in public funds, … these choses in action have changed their original 
character, and become very much less like merely personal rights of action and very much more like rights of 
property’. Financial Law Panel Transactions in Derivatives Legal Obligations of Banks to Customers: A 
Discussion Paper (1995) 9, cited in Swan EJ Swan Building the Global Market: A 4000 Year History of 
Derivatives (2000) n 59. 
27 Spiro v Glencrown Properties Ltd (1991) All ER, per Hoffmann J at [606].  
28 Preferred according to Smith’s description of property. 
29 Belmont Park (n 26) [5]. 
30 Chang & Smith (n 8) 32. 
31 To be ‘in rem’. A ‘mere expectancy’ cannot be separated from the rights property ownership assigns. Krizek 
refers to Harris ‘Property – Rights in rem or wealth?’ to distinguish between wealth coming from property and 
other sources of wealth, such as contracts. The transferability of property, he argued, arises out of the main rights 
in rem, ‘ius utendi, fruendi, abutendi, alienandi, vindicandi et al – i.e. what a man owns he can also transfer’. See 
T Krizek Legal Nature and Definition of Financial derivatives (dissertation, University of Glasgow, 2011). 
32 Lynch (n 20); Longmore LJ in Lomas (n 21) [2]; D Southern ‘The taxation of derivatives’ (1998) 4 British 
Tax Review 348–63. 
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6. whether involving the delivery of the asset or the payment of an amount calculated by 
reference to its value or the value of an index;33 
7. which might be of a capital or revenue nature.34 
In the next section the application of this logic, using an example within an investment 
portfolio, is illustrated. 
11.2.2 Practical application with reference to our case law 
If derivatives are indeed ‘property’ they should then be subject to the same principles as any 
other asset.  
In Chapter 2 a general explanation of derivatives was offered, and it was also explained 
why they might be used in an investment portfolio. For the purposes of this illustration, two 
equity derivative instruments are considered, namely, a forward and an option. 
  An equity future: an equity derivative might reference a single share, a basket of 
shares, a single index or a basket of indices. In this example, an equity future is purchased 
referencing a single share. The share is ABC Ltd. The seller, Bank Z, will make physical 
delivery of 100 ABC shares on 29 March 2019 in terms of the agreement entered into on the 
trade date, 3 January 2019. Bank Z ensures that it holds the required ABC shares to protect 
itself from unforeseen market movements. Bank Z assigns the relevant voting rights on the 
shares to the buyer. The payoff to the three taxpayers at maturity will be the market price of 
ABC shares as at 29 March, less the current market price. This might be negative or positive.  
  An equity call option: an option is purchased allowing a purchase of the shares at a 
fixed price at a future date. The seller, Bank Z, will make physical delivery of 100 ABC shares 
 
33 Longmore LJ Lomas (n 21) n 566. 
34 Templeman LJ in Citibank Investments Ltd v Griffin (2000) STC (SCD) 92. The High Court of Appeal affirmed 
this approach, stating that designing the investment for a capital rather than income profit was ‘a choice which 
faces any investor’. See D Southern ‘The taxation of derivatives’ (1998) 4 British Tax Review 348–63 at 369, 
compared to the view of SARS in its Tax Guide for Share Owners Issue 3 at para 3.4.6. 
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on 29 March 2019 in terms of the agreement entered into on the trade date, 3 January 2019, if 
each of the three clients above exercises their option to buy. The transaction price or strike 
price for ABC is set in the contract. For the sake of this example, the price is R25. A price 
above R25 would imply that the taxpayer will exercise the option. The taxpayer will receive 
ABC shares valued at R25 + ‘x’. If the price is below R25, the taxpayers will not exercise the 
option as there is no incentive to pay more than the current market price for ABC. A premium 
of ‘y’ is paid by the three taxpayers to secure the right to exercise the option. If the option turns 
out to be favourable for the buyers, this advantage would have been secured by the earlier 
payment of the ‘y’ premium. If the market moves negatively and the options are not exercised, 
the premium is effectively lost to the buyers. Bank Z therefore ensures that it holds the required 
ABC shares to protect itself from unforeseen market movements. Bank Z assigns the relevant 
voting rights on the shares to the buyers.35 
In both cases, the price of the instrument is usually determined by a pricing model used 
by the bank which would include consideration for the current price of the shares, a view on 
the future value of the share based on research and market data, the supply and demand in the 
market for the share currently, availability or liquidity, general market conditions and volatility, 
as well as the cost to the bank for carrying the transaction through to maturity. 
If these two transactions were imposed on the facts in Pick ’n Pay,36 it is quite probable 
that a court would want to know why any forward view and contract related to the price of the 
share or its delivery was necessary. The employee share trust existed to place Pick ’n Pay shares 
‘in the hands of eligible employees’.37 The price over time was a function of the company’s 
 
35 ‘The term ‘equity share’ is defined in s 1(1) [of the Eighth Schedule] and means ‘any share in a company, 
excluding any share that, neither as respects dividends nor as respects returns of capital, carries any right to 
participate beyond a specified amount in a distribution.’ See SARS Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax 
Issue 7 (2018) 26. 
36 CIR v Pick ’n Pay (n 6). 
37 Ibid. 
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performance and general market conditions. The trustees did not have a mandate to optimise 
the purchase price of shares. Profits might now well be considered ‘designedly worked for’ and 
not ‘fortuitous’.38 
Secondly, if these two transactions were imposed on Nussbaum,39 it is likely that their 
inclusion in the taxpayer’s share portfolio would still point to receipts of a revenue nature, 
given the overall context of the taxpayer’s management of the portfolio.40 Not only were shares 
‘farmed’ assiduously, but in addition thereto, the taxpayer was using derivatives to take a 
forward view on where that price was headed and purchasing additional economic exposure to 
ABC Ltd in anticipation of further gains.41  
The purchase of an equity option could therefore be considered characteristic of an 
activity associated with a share dealer42 – if the price target is achieved, the option is exercised. 
If not, the option is not exercised and the premium ‘y’ is forfeited. The court a quo mentioned 
that the respondent had not once mentioned a falling market. All the sales were in a rising 
market and they were extensive.43 There was therefore no risk management motive at work to 
protect the portfolio from losses. The equity option will in all likelihood therefore be viewed 
as part of the broader context of trying to capture further capital gains subject to the dictates of 
the market and, given the finding of the court a quo, determined to be of a revenue nature. The 
onus would be on the taxpayer to show that, at the time of purchasing the option,44 there was a 
 
38 Ibid. 
39 CIR v Nussbaum 1996 (4) SA 1156 (A), 58 SATC 283. 
40 Which Howie JA described in Nussbaum ibid (at 1162) as of such an extent that one is ‘struck forcibly by the 
scale and frequency of respondent’s share transactions. Those considerations are, of course, not conclusive but 
they are of major importance.’  
41 Howie JA noted that the sales were ‘almost without exception profitable’: Nussbaum (n 39) 1164–1165. 
42 For further attributes associated with traders see CIR v Stott 1928 AD 252 and Berea West Estates (Pty) Ltd v 
SIR 1976 (2) SA 614 (A) 635, as referred by Corbett JA in Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk v SBI 1978 (1) 
SA 101 (A), 39 SATC 163 at 126. 
43 See Howie JA in Nussbaum 1165 and 1166: ‘He farmed his portfolio assiduously. The number, frequency and 
profitability of sales, especially of short-term shares, bears clear enough testimony to that.’ 
44 ITC 1427 50 SATC 25. 
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capital motive more aligned with the primary motive of investment, rather than the secondary 
motive of dealing for profit. 
Assume now that Nussbaum purchases the equity future in view of the fact that the 
physical shares are tightly held and that the taxpayer’s stockbroker advises that ABC Ltd has 
recently secured licensing rights that will significantly improve its dividend yield. The taxpayer 
in this instance purchases the future in anticipation of being able to secure the physical shares 
when available for purchase in the market. The intention behind this transaction is perfectly 
rational and normal when managing capital assets in a portfolio. Had the physical shares been 
available, they would have been purchased, rather than the future. It could therefore be 
reasonably argued that the transaction fell within the primary intention of the respondent as an 
investor and that there was nothing to indicate that this transaction fell outside the 82 per cent 
of the share portfolio that was managed as an investment.45 The character of the derivative 
should therefore be determined with reference to the time when it was first acquired.46 If, 
however, the physical shares (the second asset or ‘res’) so acquired were sold at some point 
(for example, close to the exercise of the option), the argument might be made that the 
transaction was part of the ‘farming’ of the portfolio. In ‘SAM’ v COT47 it was held that it was 
the intention at the time of exercise that determined the tax character: ‘But where the option is 
exercised for the admitted purpose of selling the subject-matter thereof, then the assets have 
been acquired for the purpose of re-sale and are therefore liable to tax.’ This principle was 
overruled in Matla Coal Ltd v CIR48 and the intention at the time of acquiring the option was 
treated as decisive of the character of the option, according to Corbett JA.49 Given the 
frequency and extent of other transactions in the Nussbaum portfolio, the inference could be 
 
45 Nussbaum (n 39) 1166. 
46 ITC 1427 50 SATC 25. 
47 ‘SAM’ v COT 1980 (2) SA 75 (ZR) [32].  
48 Matla Coal Ltd v CIR 1987 (1) SA 108 (A). 
49 Ibid 128H–129B. 
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drawn that this transaction was part of his secondary profit-making purpose, as evidenced by 
the sale of the (second) physical asset,50 and therefore a revenue motive at purchase could be 
inferred. 
In a third hypothetical example, a portfolio manager managing a collective investment 
scheme portfolio executes the exact same transactions in an equity portfolio called ‘Best Equity 
Fund’. Collective investment schemes are a regulated pooling mechanism that allows the public 
to participate in the market by holding an undivided share or ‘unit’ in that portfolio of assets. 
Investors share in gains, losses and dividend income, proportionate to the number of units they 
own. The legal structure of a scheme is that of a trust, with trustees (normally a trustee service 
of a bank) holding the physical cash and other assets in the portfolio. This provides segregation 
of duty and protects investors from fraud. The scheme ‘manager’ (not the portfolio manager), 
which is a licensed financial service provider, will be responsible for operating the scheme in 
the best interests of investors,51 and will attend to matters such as the appointment (or dismissal) 
of a portfolio manager, governance and compliance, administration of the scheme and 
marketing. The governing Act – the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act – and its 
accompanying regulations,52 together with the standard trust deed and supplemental deeds, are 
used to establish individual funds within the overall scheme. The regulations specifically admit 
the use of derivatives in Chapter V and limit exposure of the portfolio.53 All exposures have to 
be reported quarterly.54 The funds are audited annually and the manager must submit a 
compliance report together with the audit report.55 Portfolio managers also have to be licensed 
 
50 See Howie JA in Nussbaum (n 39) at 1166: ‘In my opinion respondent had a secondary, profit-making 
purpose.’ 
51 Section 2(1) of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002 (CISCA Act) states as follows: ‘A 
manager must administer a collective investment scheme honestly and fairly, with skill, care and diligence and 
in the interest of investors and the collective investment scheme industry.’ 
52 Board Notice 90 of 2014. 
53 Section 15 of CISCA. 
54 Section 20 of CISCA. 
55 Section 10 of CISCA. 
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personally by the regulator, subject to fit and proper requirements, before they are allowed to 
manage money. Furthermore, there is no recorded case in our courts of such a scheme or 
subsidiary fund being found to be conducting a business or a scheme of profit-making in some 
50 years.  
For the sake of the example, Best Equity Fund executes the two transactions. The 
portfolio manager, having received cash from new investors purchases the future in anticipation 
of acquiring the physical share. The amount invested was relatively significant in relation to 
the overall value of the portfolio, and this would leave all investors exposed to potential 
underperformance against the All Share Index if ABC Ltd is not part of the portfolio 
composition. The equity call option is purchased because the taxpayer believes that ABC Ltd 
is not only a substantive weighting in the index, but also holds promise in its own right for 
earnings growth. A premium is therefore paid to secure the right to acquire additional exposure 
to ABC Ltd at the strike price of R25 if this view, substantiated by an analyst’s research and 
personal judgment, proves to be correct by the end of March 2019. 
Both transactions now appear to be entirely within the purview of the object and purpose 
of the scheme, which is a regulated investment scheme. It seems entirely unlikely that a court 
would consider the portfolio manager to be conducting the affairs of the portfolio in the fashion 
of a trader.  
However, it seems equally possible that nothing prevents a manager from conducting his 
management of Best Equity Fund in a manner that reflects the same intent as demonstrated by 
Nussbaum,56 contrary to the framework described above, since there are no regulations 
applicable to the frequency of transactions that might interfere with the prudential duties of the 
manager. While this is not sufficient in itself, nothing excludes the possibility of a secondary 
 
56 Nussbaum (n 39). 
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motive of profit-making. Let us assume further that the manager has invested funds of his own 
in the portfolio and that, further to this, a performance fee is charged for performance over a 
stated benchmark. Performance fees in turn translate into improved earnings for the portfolio 
management business and the manager is rewarded through a company bonus scheme for 
targets related to performance fee earnings. A strong personal motive may now be present if 
the manager believes that there is additional profit to be made by trading the portfolio, 
notwithstanding the higher brokerage costs and securities transfer tax that would be incurred 
(which are, according to industry practice, deducted from any performance calculation in the 
interests of the client). It is entirely possible that such a manager might through demonstrable 
acts consistently and extensively therefore manage Best Equity Fund in a manner 
commensurate with that of a share dealer. Within this context, the manager would be in breach 
of the CISCA framework of agreements and regulations. The two transactions executed in this 
context could quite easily be found by a court under general principles to produce gains or 
losses of a revenue nature. It would, however, be extremely difficult to impute this change of 
intention to the investors, given the construction of the scheme, via the fund as a taxpayer or 
directly in their hands. This would suggest that these circumstances relate more to the failure 
of the enforcement of regulation than to tax policy. The manager is clearly operating in 
contravention of the law and the agreement with the investors in Best Equity Fund. 
Lastly, in all three cases, Bank Z has written the derivative instruments as part of its 
derivative dealing business in the ordinary course. All receipts, gains and losses are therefore 
revenue in nature in terms of section 24 JB of the ITA. 
The above examples illustrate that it is entirely possible for counterparties to the same 
instrument to have different tax outcomes. It is also possible for buyers in these examples to 
have different tax outcomes or altered outcomes in exactly the same manner as for any other 
property. ‘Law books in the hands of a lawyer are a capital asset; in the hands of a book-seller 
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they are a trade asset. A farm owned by a farmer is a capital asset; in the hands of a land jobber 
it becomes stock-in-trade’57 Financial derivatives are no different. 
The hypothesis for this research follows the authority in Pick ’n Pay,58 which is not only 
the leading case on income character determination, but also, it is submitted, the means by 
which financial derivative transactions should be adjudicated. The rights under financial 
derivative instruments constitute ‘property’ like shares and land and should be subject to the 
same general principles of judicial analysis.  
11.3 SUGGESTED INTERPRETATIVE APPROACH IN A SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONTEXT 
11.3.1 Introduction 
As Farber stated in his analysis of the problem, referring to section 1234A (straddle rules) in 
the US tax code: 
Section 1234A was conceived and then modified in response to several competing and often confused 
lines of thinking, and that a little bit of house-keeping around various judicial doctrines might have 
prevented its enactment (its reasons for being) in the first place.59 
 
The UK courts have also avoided analysis,60 even when derivative-related decisions were 
before them. The purposive approach applied to statutory language in the USA led to a ‘frolic’ 
by the lower courts.61 English courts, on the other hand, have begun to accept more contractual 
context, realising the finiteness of definition based purely on black letter words. This outcome 
was also characterised by a troubled journey through the courts following Ramsay in 1981. 
 
57 Maritz J in CIR v Visser 1937 TPD 77, 8 SATC 271 at 276.  
58 CIR v Pick ’n Pay (n 6). 
59 MS Farber ‘Capital ideas: The taxation of derivative gains and losses’ (2010) Tax Notes 1495. 
60 Hudson (n 26) 343. 
61 Arkansas Best 485 US 212 (1988). 
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11.3.2 Alignment with foreign law 
The sub-theme of the contingency of law has been ever-present throughout this analysis as a 
reminder that law does not exist on its own. It is an expression of societal values and of society’s 
sense of justice. A body of judicial opinion relies on tradition expressed through precedent, 
which honours judgments through the checks and balances of referenced authority and the 
hierarchy of the courts. The contours of courts’ ratio decidendi can therefore not be divorced 
from the effects of time and what society valued at the time. 
Although the US and English courts share a largely common-law tradition, the USA has 
been more willing to consider economics in its interpretation (a more contextual view), while 
English courts have tended to follow the legal form (a literalist view).62 
It is noteworthy that the notion that tax analysis might include disaggregation or 
bifurcation as an option for tax analysis as identified by Warren63 in 2004 has been spurned on 
the grounds that limitations exist on the power of the courts to reconstruct transactions which 
are ‘indissolubly linked’, thereby risking converting genuine transactions into ‘something quite 
different’.64 Arguing on the basis of ‘economic equivalence’ alone cannot be used as grounds 
for re-characterisation.65 The substance and the language of the agreement are both relevant to 
character determination. 
When interpreting commercial contracts, the English courts have more recently66 moved 
away from an objective literalism to one that includes context, but excludes subjective intent. 
 
62 I also illustrated how purposivism in the interpretation of statutes was overturned in Arkansas Best after 25 
years of development in the lower courts.  
63 See AC Warren Jr ‘US income taxation of new financial products’ (2004) 88 Journal of Public Economics 
899. 
64 Griffin (Inspector of Taxes) v Citibank Investments Ltd (2000) STC 1010 in a second appeal brought by 
Revenue at [49]; Hudson (n 26) 18-61 n 123 and 18-53; Inland Revenue Commissioners v Scottish Provident 
Institution [2004] UKHL 52, [2005] STC 15 at 23. 
65 HSBC Life (UK) Ltd v Stubbs (2002) STC (SCD) 9. 
66 Spigelman CJ describes this as a shift from text to context. See ‘From text to context: Contemporary 
contractual interpretation’, an address to the Risky Business Conference in Sydney, 21 March 2007, published 
in Spigelman Speeches of a Chief Justice 1998-2008 239 at 240. The shift is apparent from a comparison 
between the first edition of Lewison The Interpretation of Contracts and the current fifth edition. So much has 
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This was affirmed in 2011 by the Supreme Court in Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank.67 However, 
within the spectrum of greater contextualism, Lord Hoffmann68 and Lord Bingham69 are more 
interested in context than objectivists like Lord Steyn: 
The aim of the inquiry is not to probe the real intentions of the parties but to ascertain the contextual 
meaning of the relevant contractual language. The enquiry is objective: the question is what a 
reasonable person, circumstanced as the actual parties were, would have understood the parties to have 
meant by the use of specific language. The answer to that question is to be gathered from the text under 
consideration and its relevant contextual scene.70 
 
Hudson summarised a consensus as follows: 
Importantly, then, the parties’ subjective states of mind and intentions are not the focus of the court’s 
deliberations … it is clear that the English approach is an objective approach which begins with the 
wording of the contract before conducting a survey of the relevant factors which throw light on the 
context in which the agreement was created.71 
 
This seems at odds with using the test of intention as the starting point. In the recent 
judgment of Wallis JA in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality,72 an 
important dictum on the subject of the proper approach to the interpretation of statute, statutory 
 
changed that the author, now a judge in the Court of Appeal in England, has introduced a new opening chapter 
summarising the background to and a summary of the modern approach to interpretation that has to a great 
extent been driven by Lord Hoffmann. See Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 
(4) SA 593 (SCA) 602H–610C n 13. 
67 Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank (2011) 1 WLR 2900. 
68 Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society (1998) 1 WLR 896, (1998) 1 All ER 98. 
See Hudson (n 26) 475 n 33. 
69 Lord Bingham in BCCI v Ali (2001) 1 AC 251 at 259: ‘To ascertain the intention of the parties the court reads 
the terms of the contract as a whole, giving the words used their natural and ordinary meaning in the context of 
the agreement, the parties’ relationship and all the relevant facts surrounding the transaction so far as known to 
the parties. To ascertain the parties’ intentions, the court does not of course inquire into the parties’ subjective 
states of mind but makes an objective judgment based on the materials already identified.’ See Hudson (26) 476. 
70 Sirius International Insurance Co v FAI General Insurance Ltd (2004) 1 WLR 3251. See Hudson (n 26) 476. 
71 Hudson (n 26). 
72 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund (n 66) 602H–610C. 
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instruments and documents73 is provided within the South African context. Wallis JA 
explains74 the spectrum of interpretation as follows: 
At the one end, they may lead to a fragmentation of the process of interpretation by conveying that it 
must commence with an initial search for the ‘ordinary grammatical meaning’ or ‘natural meaning’ of 
the words75 used seen in isolation, to be followed in some instances only by resort to the context. At the 
other, they beguile judges into seeking out intention free from the constraints of the language in 
question, and then imposing that intention on the language used. Both of these are contrary to the 
proper approach, which is from the outset to read the words used in the context of the document as a 
whole and in the light of all relevant circumstances. 
 
The objective is directed at what was actually agreed between two parties: 
The process is objective, not subjective. A sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to 
insensible or unbusinesslike results or undermines the apparent purpose of the document. Judges must 
be alert to, and guard against, the temptation to substitute what they regard as reasonable, sensible or 
businesslike for the words actually used. To do so in regard to a statute or statutory enactment is to 
cross the divide between interpretation and legislation; in a contractual context it is to make a contract 
for the parties other than the one they in fact made.76 
 
The approach described by Wallis JA is more inclusive of context than the English 
approach described by Hudson. Wallis speaks of a unitary inquiry from the outset, where the 
contract and the context are considered together, with neither predominating over the other.77 
 
73 The case law is summarised in Bastian Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v General Hendrik Schoeman Primary 
School 2008 (5) SA 1 (SCA) paras 16–19. There is little or no difference between contracts, statutes and other 
documents, according to KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd and Another 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA), 
(2009) 2 All SA 523 (SCA) para 39. See Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund (n 66) 602H–610C n 14. 
74 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund (n 66) [24]. 
75 ‘Described by Lord Neuberger MR in Re Sigma Finance Corp (2008) EWCA Civ 1303 (CA) para 98 as an 
iterative process. The expression has been approved by Lord Mance SCJ in the appeal: Re Sigma Finance Corp 
(in administrative receivership) and In Re the Insolvency Act 1986 (2009) UKSC 2, (2010) 1 All ER 571 (SC) 
para 12; and by Lord Clarke SCJ in Rainy Sky SA and Others v Kookmin Bank (2011) UKSC 50, (2012) Lloyds 
Rep 34 (SC) para 28. See the article by Lord Grabiner QC ‘The iterative process of contractual interpretation’ 
(2012) 128 LQR 41.’ See Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund (n 66) 602H–610C n 15. 
76 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund (n 66) [18]. 
77 Ibid [19]. Three Australian judges have sought to explain the use of the expression on other grounds. Gleeson 
CJ in Singh v The Commonwealth said that ‘references to intention must not divert attention from the text, for it 
is through the meaning of the text, understood in the light of background, purpose and object, and surrounding 
circumstances, that the legislature expresses its intention, and it is from the text, read in that light, that intention 
is inferred. The words “intention”, “contemplation”, “purpose” and “design” are used routinely by courts in 
relation to the meaning of legislation. They are orthodox and legitimate terms of legal analysis, provided their 
objectivity is not overlooked.’ Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund (n 66) [23]. 
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This is the approach that courts in South Africa are required to follow, without the need 
to cite authorities from an earlier era that are not necessarily consistent and frequently reflect 
an approach to interpretation that is no longer appropriate. This would set the contractual terms 
of the derivative contract within the economic or commercial context of its application.  
In conclusion, Wallis JA has indicated that this balance in approach needs to have a 
sensible outcome, as would be expected of reasonable people. ‘An interpretation will not be 
given that leads to impractical, unbusinesslike or oppressive consequences or that will stultify 
the broader operation of the legislation or contract under consideration.’78 The court cannot 
‘impose’ meaning, but the obvious context to words must be adjudicated.  
 
11.4 ADVANCING OUR TAX POLICY 
11.4.1 Introduction 
As mentioned above, the 1994 Tax Advisory Committee79 document acknowledged extensive 
reliance on an Australian document of the same title, and sought to deal with rapidly advancing, 
sophisticated and complex financial instruments.80 Possible departures from the Australian 
approach included applying normal tax principles, whereas the Australian Tax Authorities were 
in favour of all gains and losses being recognised on revenue account.81 
As great importance is attached to the economic substance of a financial arrangement, the approach of 
defining the characteristics of a financial arrangement is favoured. This method should provide the 
necessary flexibility to deal with new instruments as they are developed. On the other hand a products 
approach, which would attempt to list all the various instruments, would make it very difficult to cater 
for such new products as they enter the market.82 
 
78 See Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund (n 66) [26]. 
79 Tax Advisory Committee Consultative Document on the Tax Treatment of Financial Arrangements (1994). 
This committee was appointed to advise the Minister of Finance on tax matters. It no longer exists. I am grateful 
to Dr Jan Graaff who served on the committee and who provided me with this document and related work 
papers. 
80 Ibid 1. 
81 Ibid 2. 
82 Ibid 3. 
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On the subject of hedging, the committee found the prospect of drawing up special 
hedging rules to be complex: 
The extent to which a transaction is hedged would also be difficult to delineate in tax law. A hedge may 
cover less than 100 per cent of the risk of the underlying transaction, perfect hedges being difficult to 
achieve in practice. However, it is inappropriate to characterize a transaction as a hedge when only a 
small part of the underlying is covered. Nor is it practicable to define a hedge according to the degree 
of risk it covers.83 
 
Similar sentiments were recently expressed by the Davis Tax Committee when 
considering a policy response to base erosion and profit shifting: 
It is strongly recommended that South Africa moves away from anti-avoidance sections aimed at 
particular transactions and establish anti-avoidance principles which can be applied to a broad range of 
transactions without undue technicality; even if there is a risk that one or two transactions fall through 
the cracks, a principal approach to drafting legislation is significantly preferential to a transaction-by-a-
transaction approach which we currently appear to have.84 
 
This is a clear preference to avoid a US styled anti-avoidance codification – a view that 
this thesis supports. These pragmatic realities and the opportunity for tax avoidance, no matter 
how well drafted a provision might be, left the Tax Advisory Committee recommending in 
principle that hedges and their underlying asset or liability should be treated as a composite 
from an equitable tax point of view. However, the Committee avoided attempting any drafting 
recommendations. ‘Special hedging rules … appear to be practically difficult to legislate for or 
administer. However it is intended to examine foreign jurisdictions’ legislation and practices 
at a later stage to determine the extent to which practical difficulties may be overcome.’85 
The general approach of the Committee was therefore to take economic substance into 
account for financial arrangements and have the taxation of those arrangements follow ordinary 
 
83 Ibid 69. 
84 Davis Tax Committee Second Interim Report on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in South Africa ‘Summary 
of Report on Action 2: Neutralise the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements’ Annexure 2 at p 4. 
85 Tax Advisory Committee (n 79) 71. 
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tax principles (rather than special derivative or product rules). The conclusions expressed in 
this thesis, after having considered the development of tax policy in the USA, the UK and 
Australia, expand on this reasoning and find that it can be achieved congruently with our own 
case law and literature, even though any form of broad correlated conclusion is troublesome.  
When the US Tax Reform Act of 1986 was enacted, Congress believed that dispensing 
with a two-tier rate system for capital and income (such as our own) held several benefits for 
eliminating economic distortions: 
This will result in a tremendous amount of simplification for many taxpayers since their tax will no 
longer depend upon the characterisation of income as ordinary or capital gain. In addition, this will 
eliminate any requirement that capital assets be held by the taxpayer for any extended period of time in 
order to obtain favourable treatment. This will result in greater willingness to invest in assets that are 
freely traded (e.g. stocks) and make investment decisions more neutral.86 
As highlighted earlier, the Haig-Simons definition of income measures the increase in a 
taxpayer’s ability to pay tax and makes no distinction between income on revenue or capital 
account. In a sense this treats the returns on capital and labour identically – a distinction that 
causes much tension in modern socio-economic discourse, but that cannot be analysed here. 
This is a fundamentally different departure point from that which favours capital gains for 
exclusion or special treatment, based on the dogma of taxing the increased value of the income 
producing machinery at a different rate from the proceeds of its production. If the Haig-Simons 
definition were to apply, this thesis would be redundant. The Haig-Simons definition would 
solve the problem via perfect symmetry and neutrality between these income sources. 
Assuming no rate differential, the following question arises: ‘What are we actually discussing?’ 
Herein lies the imperative: this analysis is ultimately not directed at the adjudication of taxation 
between capital and revenue, but at the correct legal analysis of the instrument. Avoidance of 
 
86 Joint Committee on Taxation Staff Paper on the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  
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policy development is not an option. Donohoe, whose empirical work on this form of tax abuse 
stands out in the USA,87 explains as follows:  
Financial derivatives are a leading source of corporate tax noncompliance … . Experts claim the legal 
patchwork of derivatives taxation encourages the development of tax planning strategies …, while the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) concedes it is ‘falling farther and farther behind’ financial innovation 
… . Although it is clear from government reports … , anecdotes …, and academic studies … that 
companies can avoid tax with derivatives …88 
 
If the legal nature of the instrument and its appropriate interpretation is therefore not 
accurately understood, the many other tributaries of potential abuse persist, as illustrated 
through this continuum of tax planning strategies, from benign by-products of hedging to 
aggressive transactional design: 
 
 
87 MP Donohoe ‘The economic effects of financial derivatives on corporate tax avoidance’ (2015) 59 Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 1 at 20. 
88 Ibid 1. 
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Figure 11.1: A stylised (partial) illustration of the tax reporting system for financial 
derivatives89 
 
Hudson reflected similarly on the HMRC, engaging in hand-wringing as to what to do. 
The current legislative approach, the Corporations Tax Act 2009, is the successor to three prior 
regimes, as described in chapter 7.90 Hudson referred to a ‘manufactured’ code: ‘My reference 
to “manufacturing” a code is meant to reflect HMRC’s decision to create its own jargon terms 
for dealing with financial derivatives rather than, for example, seeking to adopt market argot 
or alternatively terminology used by the Financial Services Authority.’91 
In deciding to avoid both market language and that of the regulator, the HMRC 
effectively became a ‘taker’ when taxpayers classified an instrument under accounting 
convention. ‘Thus, HMRC was left to accept the information given to it rather than creating a 
strict code of prescriptive rules in legislation’:92 
Indeed this was clear in the Finance Act 2002 and is now in the Corporation Tax Act 2009 where the 
modern ‘narrative’ form of drafting for tax statutes is used whereby a number of sections as opposed to 
the older, more rigid style of detailed definitions, exceptions and so forth in long, single provisions … 
when one thinks in the abstract of the task of taxing the derivatives markets, one cannot help those old 
metaphors of the difficulty of herding cats or of nailing jelly to a wall creeping unbidden into the back 
of one’s mind.93 
11.4.2 Options for improving certainty 
Since there is no such thing as ‘derivative law’, the development of statutes should find a home 
in what Hudson calls the ‘law of finance’: 
[This] is how it can be established as a coherent intellectual and legal field, as opposed to being merely 
a descriptive account of something which is ‘done’ in practice. A coherent law of finance can emerge 
from an elision between the concepts of contract law and the rest of the general law with the contextual, 
 
89 Ibid 4. 
90 Hudson (n 26) 799. 
91 Ibid 800. 
92 Ibid 801. 
93 Ibid. 
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regulatory principles of financial regulation. The principles of financial regulation bind financial 
institutions ….94  
 
The experience of the USA in particular confirms that a product-based or ‘cubby-hole’ 
anti-avoidance approach is complex and will typically lag the cut and thrust of market 
innovations and allow transactors to write derivative contracts to circumvent those rules. 
Legislating for what a capital asset is not95 has also not been very successful. As mentioned 
above, the Davis Tax Committee recently cautioned against codification in the BEPS report, 
as did the Tax Advisory Committee in 1994. As the HMRC has done in its Business Manual, 
clear tax policy statements need to be made: 
Financial transactions include the acquisition, holding, dealing with, and disposal of financial assets 
such as shares and bonds. They also include taking synthetic positions in relation to such assets or 
corresponding indices, or discrete components of them. In our view, using synthetics is not itself 
indicative of trading. There is no conceptual difference between a ‘real’ and a synthetic financial 
transaction (for example, buying a share or entering into a derivative contract that replicates the risks 
and rewards of ownership). All of these approaches may form part of an investment strategy and some 
of them may constitute investment in themselves.96 
 
This statement is congruent with the findings of this research. A comprehensive policy 
framework for the tax treatment of financial derivatives needs to be formulated for South 
Africa. Therefore a few principles for the construction of an approach for South Africa, which 
align with the UK approach, are proposed as follows:97 
1. Derivatives are property in their own right and gains or losses therefrom might be capital 
or revenue. 
 
94 Ibid 11. 
95 ‘Capital assets’ include all property held by a taxpayer, regardless of duration, irrespective of whether the 
property is used in the taxpayer’s business or trade. R.C. 5751.01(F)(2)(c) stated that receipts from the assets 
described in IRC section 1221 or 1231 (assets used in the taxpayer’s trade or business) are excluded from the 
definition of ‘gross receipts’. 
96 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) ‘Business Income Manual (BIM) 56910’ (undated). See 




2. There is no conceptual difference between taking a view on all components by buying 
the physical asset or entering a derivative contract that replicates ownership, or taking a 
view on one or a combination of the components via derivatives. Synthetics are therefore 
no different from physical assets and should be addressed in a fiscally neutral manner. 
3. Ordinary tax principles of interpretation should be applied, with due regard to what the 
parties contracted within the context of their commercial agreement. 
4. The nature of derivative instruments is not defined by hedging. The hedge and its 
underlying composite must conform to a facts and circumstances approach. 
5. There is no conceptual difference between a ‘long’ (a ‘call’) or a ‘short’ (a ‘put’) position. 
These are simply positive or negative economic exposures to the same reference asset. 
Character determination is subject to ordinary tax principles for buying or selling an 
asset.  
For a start, principles would go a long way towards improved certainty. Once the 
principles are agreed, a method of taxation needs to be decided beyond the perimeter of section 
24JB of the ITA.  
The policy choices might be summarised as follows: 
1. a facts and circumstances determination as to the presence of a ‘scheme of profit-making’ 
under the common law (which is the current approach), supported by additional policy 
principles to improve certainty; 
2. a time-based rule as applied in the USA across the tax system to distinguish between 
short- and long-term capital gains and losses. This implies a two-tier capital (capital gains 
tax (CGT)) tax rate, much like section 9C of the ITA, which would avoid the need for 
principles, but could create artificial lock-up effects in the economy; 
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3. a mark-to-market tax levied at the CGT rate where (1) above implies capital treatment. 
This eliminates a deferral benefit and improves cashflow to the fiscus, but creates 
liquidity hardships for taxpayers (favoured by recent policy thinking in the USA98); 
4. an accounting approach, which expands on the policy applied in section 24JB of the ITA 
and aligns with EU fair value accounting preference.99 
These choices all have trade-offs and need to be thoroughly considered and consulted on. 
Due regard also needs to be taken of the development of ‘policy blocks’ within the EU 
favouring fair value accounting, and within the USA, favouring a simple mark-to-market 
regime that accords with US thinking on income definition.  
However, option (1) would on its own make for an immense improvement in certainty 
and would lead to considerable progress in South Africa. 
11.5 CONCLUSION 
This thesis is the culmination of an extraordinarily long journey through the literature and 
working in practice with these issues. Simplifying proxies were used to limit the many variables 
that might be encountered in policy discussions, which then result in circular debate.  
Three common-law jurisdictions were reviewed in addition to our own, providing three 
policy approaches: (1) a common-law approach, where the facts and circumstances are assessed 
for evidence of a ‘scheme of profit-making’ as indicative of a revenue motive; (2) an 
accounting policy approach followed by the UK, Australia and, in part, South Africa; and (3) 
a highly codified system, as evidenced by US tax policy design.  
The primary object of the research was not to determine the characterisation of the 
instruments, but to enquire where the appropriate legal analysis should rightfully begin. To this 
 
98 Joint Committee on Taxation Description of the Modernization of Derivatives Tax Act of 2017. 
99 EU Directive 2013/34 of the European Parliament and Council regulates the taxation of financial instruments, 
including derivatives. Fair value accounting is the chosen basis of taxation within the EU, which includes 
derivatives, in terms of Articles 8, 16 and 17. 
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end, recent UK case law provided congruency with the ratio in CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee 
Share Purchase Trust, which concluded that financial derivative instruments are capital assets 
in their own right. This is the essential logic that SAICA identified in its 1992 document. A 
comprehensive legal definition for these contracts was then posited and a approach to the 
interpretation of the contract by our courts was recommended, following Wallis JA in Natal 
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality, which strikes a balance between 
judicial reasoning in the US following Arkansas Best and the UK following Ramsay. This 
approach to interpretation adressess concerns about financial equivalence and the limits of 
transactional analysis that vexed earlier research. Finally, some alternatives for furthering tax 
policy are outlined, the foremost being the formulation of a set of principles, based both on this 
research and the thinking of the HMRC.  
Domestic reticence towards drafting a comprehensive tax policy framework for 
derivatives has now provided South Africa with an advantage won from the hard experience of 
others. Policy progress can be achieved that keeps faith with existing jurisprudence and 
literature. The commercial fires that might occasionally rage have previously been resolved by 
our courts. The law will deal with these matters dispassionately. There is no need for a ‘law of 
derivatives’ or special conventions or contrivances: 
Law is an interpretive concept … which unites jurisprudence and adjudication. It makes the content of 
law depend not on special conventions or independent crusades but on more refined and concrete 
interpretations of the same legal practice it has begun to interpret … Law’s attitude is constructive: it 
aims, in the interpretive spirit, to lay principle over practice to show the best route to a better future, 
keeping the right faith with the past.100 
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